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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation considers why several characters on the Early Modern Stage 
choose to remain silent when speech seems warranted. By examining the circumstances 
and effects of self-silencing on both the character and his/her community, I argue that 
silencing is an exercise of power that simultaneously subjectifies the silent one and 
compels the community (textual or theatrical) to ethical self-examination. This argument 
engages primarily with social philosophers Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Badiou, and 
Emmanual Levinas, considering their sometimes contradictory ideas about the ontology 
and representation of the subject and the construction of community. Set alongside the 
Early Modern plays of William Shakespeare, Ben Jonson and Thomas Kyd, these 
theories reveal a rich functionality of self-silencing in the contexts of gender relations, 
aberrant sociality, and ethical crisis. This multi-faceted functionality creates a singular 
subject, establishes a space for the simultaneous existence of the subject and his/her 
community, offers an opportunity for empathetic mirroring and/or insight, and thereby 
leads to social unification. Silence is, in its effects, creative: it engenders empathy and 
ethical self- and social-reflection. 
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CHAPTER 1 
"LOVE, AND BE SILENT": STAGING SILENCE 
Imagine with me, Cordelia upon the stage.  A princess, she stands alone before 
her father and his kingly retinue and international guests, suitors for her hand and lands.  
He proposes to award her, the youngest and dearest of three daughters, a third of his lands 
if she will, in purple prose, out-perform her sisters’ expressions of paternal love.  Her 
father awaits confidently her profession.  And she refuses to speak.  She will speak: 
“nothing.”1 When Cordelia declines to “heave/[her] heart into [her] mouth” (1.1.93-94) 
early in Shakespeare’s King Lear, she executes a rebellion of silence with a provocative 
bounty of meanings.  Her silence simultaneously mobilizes and subverts the familial, 
social and political authorizations of speech, the capital of reigning rhetorical methods, 
effectuators of social valence, nihilating fractures of representation, and performances of 
love.  Her silence destabilizes not just her fictional community, but also the community it 
represents, and the one to whom it presents.  In contrast to Gloucester’s cavalier inclusion 
of his bastard, Cordelia enacts radical self- and social-severance in order to signify 
absolute allegiance.  She employs paradox not to reveal incompatible social binaries, but 
points to the unifying path beyond them.  In other words, in her disobedience lies 
obedience.  Her unwillingness to articulate love signifies her deeper and more genuine 
affection, as Kent and the King of France clearly perceive.  Some of these manifold 
layers of meaning have been previously extricated and illuminated by thoughtful 
scholars, but the antithetical power and function of self-silencing remains uncharted.  
This dissertation presumes to analyze moments of staged self-silencing in light of recent 
theories of subjectivity and sociality to argue that self-silencing functions to subjectify 
the silencer, expose civil anomie, and restore social unity. 
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Discussion about silence has taken two primary forms in recent scholarship: 
silence is oppressive and silence is inaccessible.  The critical perspective that those who 
are silenced endure oppression has been fruitful in both analyzing patriarchal hegemony 
as well as in reclaiming lost voices.  Deconstruction, on the other hand, suggested that 
meaning may be found in the margins rather than in the text, but ultimately denigrated 
marginal silence as inaccessible, its meaning, therefore, lacking determinant potency.  
These perspectives are not sufficient to fully account for the multifaceted silences richly 
employed in literature, and leave a void in our theoretical treatment of silence.  While I 
recognize that to analyze silence in any way, is to ask it to “speak,” or to make meaning 
of it, some modern theories of subjectivity and sociality allow us to do so in such a way 
that grants silence a power and significance of its own, not dependent on surrounding 
language, not a marginal meaning.  In an effort to focus on the power aspect of silence, 
and to set this work apart from the silence-as-oppression perspective, I have chosen to 
look specifically at examples of self-silencing.  Choosing silence when speech seems 
warranted pointedly exercises a type of resistant power that is repeatedly evoked in Early 
Modern literature.  Silence is most easily accessed theatrically; on the stage we are able 
to see silence at work in a community, as it were.  Although plays are, of course, artificial 
microcosms and thus not necessarily “real,” the simulation of reality allows us to watch 
silence work without being dependent upon textual exposition.  Thus I will be looking at 
instances of self-silencing on the English Early Modern stage.  These examples offer a 
look at philosophy in action, as we see the effects and affects of silence. 
Before exploring the plays, I want to say more about both the silence and the 
philosophy I’ll be referencing, as well as provide the historical context in which the 
analysis is placed.  The silent moments I’ll be considering are initiated by various types 
of characters and at varied times but they are all self-instigated.  The character 
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independently chooses not to speak when urged to do so by either convention or 
community.  I will not be studying pauses, aposiopesis (incomplete or broken off speech) 
or textual elisions.  Nor will I be looking at the stereotypical silence of emotional 
extremes such as grief or joy.  I focus specifically on silences that surprise us, and these 
may manifest diversely as absolute silence, embodied silence, evasion, or 
representational speech.  Significant about most of these moments is the attention given 
to the character’s silence.  Not only is their silence unorthodox, but it is obvious, self-
conscious silence; silence that is intended to be recognized as silence, and thus intending 
to communicate something.  However, this express parameter does not so simply inhere 
in the outworking of silence.  Especially in regard to gender, we will find that silences 
that are nearly imperceptible at the lateral level of the conceit, in fact reveal their self-
consciousness from the metatheatrical perspective.  My guiding question throughout is 
what does this silence mean for the character’s subjectivity and how does it affect the 
community?  This dissertation marshals philosophic work about language, subjectivity 
and community to theorize what in fact these reflexive, self-silencing moments are 
accomplishing. 
The contemporary need for a viable social ethic is anxiously acute, specifically in 
the aftermath of the attacks of September 11 and the “war on terror.”  Although the 
undermining of authority accomplished with postmodernism established a healthy 
skepticism toward social and political structures, it failed to produce a guiding communal 
ethic.  The post-structural cycling of differences in conjunction with ontological 
ambiguities opened an appreciation for the Other, that has not quite succeeded in 
managing mutually contradictory beliefs within the global community.  Psychoanalysis, 
never especially focused outside the subject, continues its narcissistic cycling of what is 
Real and Imaginary, but is not particularly effective in dealing with sociality.  As Alain 
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Badiou has written, “moral philosophy disguised as political philosophy” led to 
reactionism and paralysis, “philosophy was reduced to being either a laborious 
justification of the universal character of democratic values, or a linguistic sophistry 
legitimating the right to cultural difference against any universalist pretention on the part 
of truths.”2  Today’s thinkers, therefore, are resuscitating and re-formulating ideas of the 
human, even while maintaining their skepticism toward authority and epistemological 
certainty.  The expectation is that a revised conception of the human will authorize a 
viable behavioral and political ethic.  To study the human is to conceive of the subject, 
and perhaps surprisingly, this study of subjectivity converges upon silence.  With 
language one has familial and social relationships, political opinions, affiliations, in short, 
a constructed identity.  Apart from language, however, theorists can attempt to access 
what unifies.  Note that apart from language does not necessarily mean prior to language, 
does not necessarily obtain essence.  Rather, accounts of humanity look at what is beyond 
language, partly what precedes it, but also what limits it and defines it.  Judith Butler has 
recently written,  
If the humanities has a future as cultural criticism, and cultural criticism has a 
task at the present moment, it is no doubt to return us to the human where we do 
not expect to find it, in its frailty and at the limits of its capacity to make sense.  
We would have to interrogate the emergence and vanishing of the human at the 
limits of what we can know, what we can hear, what we can see, what we can 
sense.3 
 
Butler’s emphasis on knowledge via sense perception is highly relevant to the outcomes 
of this dissertation.  With the aid especially of Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Badiou and 
Emmanuel Levinas, I hope to consider what it means subjectively, representatively, and 
ethically for a human to communicate at the limit of language: self-silence.  That non-
linguistic communication entails a sense-able knowledge acquisition.  Any revelations 
afforded by self-silencing then inform upon the epistemological, ontological and ethical 
nature of sociality. 
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Although structures of authority pervade readings of subjectivity and sociality, 
silence is not a strategy of hegemonic regimes, who are generally more interested in 
shaping perspectives, often via propaganda.  Self-silencing is a tactic of the 
disenfranchised, which is not to suggest that it is equivalent to being oppressed into 
silence.  On the contrary, choosing silence suggests active agency, although it is often 
resistant agency.  Even more strongly, we might say that at the moment of self-silencing, 
the subject is at his most liberated.  This choice, made publicly, separates the silencer 
from his community, but because he still belongs to the community, he occupies and 
points to the threshold between human ethical and civil practice.  From this position, the 
self-silencer activates a temporal, auditory space for ethical reflection while still 
remaining a part of the subjectifying dynamism.  The witness to the self-silencing, on the 
other hand, must grapple with the sudden appearance of the “gap” of being, that 
inarticulate space that somehow effectuates the transfer of non-being into being’s 
appearance in the sociality.  Slavoj Žižek might call this philosophical wrangling of the 
witness a “short circuit” or a “parallax view.”5  “The standard definition of parallax is the 
apparent displacement of an object (the shift of its position against a background), caused 
by a change in observational position that provides a new line of sight” (17).  The self-
silencer effects a change of perspective in the observer by defying expectations of speech.  
Žižek argues that in a true parallax view, no synthesis or mediation between observed and 
observer is possible.  This does not necessarily preclude, however, unification amongst 
multiple observers, the sociality. 
I propose to analyze silence in different characters highlighting, I believe, 
differing metaphysical quandaries that each present.  For women, silence raises the 
question of epistemology—how can we know when silence is signifying and what then it 
means?  Villains and tricksters test our understanding of ontology, prompting us to ask 
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what is real, of what is the social fabric constructed: evil, goodness, folly?  And revengers 
require us to consider the ethical obligations of community.  Epistemology, ontology, and 
ethics are, of course, inextricably bound together and so we will make recourse to all, but 
the various characters’ personal circumstances initiate differing responsive emphases.  
That this should be so reflects, I think, the paradigms of sociality in which the characters 
are embedded.  For this reason, it has proven illustrative to utilize social theorists to 
unmask the communal webs in which these characters reside.   
Because I am attempting to access interiority through silence and am looking at 
self-silencing as a social action, I will be utilizing the schemas and terminologies of 
particular social theorists to map the relational connections and meanings as they seem 
appropriate to differing characters and situations.  Rather than selecting one theorist in an 
effort to illumine all, I am using three.  Just as different characters choose to self-silence 
for different reasons, and just as the effects of their silence vary depending on the 
silencers role in the community, so varying theorists best access the social networks in 
force in the different plays.  None should suppose me to believe that these theorists have 
some special access to the truth of Early Modern sociology.  Rather I use these thinkers’ 
ideas as implements of interrogation.  The benefit of using articulated theories of social 
relations, regardless of any metaphysical truth-value, is that they exert a revelatory 
pressure on that to which they are applied.  The effort to fit a relational schema onto a 
social network necessarily reveals something about both the schema and the network.  
For our purposes here, the focus is on the network.  What happens to our understanding 
of misogynist Padua and its “silent” shrew if we apply Bourdiou’s concepts of field and 
habitus?  What does Badiou’s schema of inclusion tell us about tricksters Iago and 
Dauphine as well as their victims?  What can Levinas’ notions of proximity reveal about 
Hieronimo’s self-silencing?  These are not historical so much as social and cultural 
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questions.  Their answers offer insight into relational attitudes and expectations that, I 
think, distance Renaissance playwrights from their Early Modern connection.  Although, 
these plays produce echoes of the self-silenced that resonate still today, the relational 
obligation, the social embeddedness of being as a source of agency is much complicated 
by the identity tourism and self-authorization manifested in today’s social media.  It is a 
subsequent project to address the specific historicity of these discoveries.  For now, the 
effort is to use underlying relational structures to discover what comprises, complicates 
or confounds the social interactions of self-silencers and their communities so that we 
may better understand the function of silence. 
The social theory of Pierre Bourdieu, though not as contemporary as the 
subsequent philosophers engaged here, offers the great advantage of praxis, the choices 
and consequences of a sociality whose exercise manifests their underlying beliefs.  
Bourdieu’s concept of linguistic exchange, social capital as well as his access to 
subjectivities as they manifest within a field and doxa allow us to find self-silencing 
where it is undisclosed.  “The principle of practices has to be sought instead in the 
relationship between external constraints which leave a very variable margin for choice, 
and dispositions which are the product of economic and social processes that are more or 
less completely reducible to these constraints, as defined at a particular moment.”6  
Although highly reductionist, Bourdieu’s analytic framework for conceiving of 
behavioral motivations nonetheless proves revelatory as to subjective navigation within 
confining social roles as we encounter in Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew.  In 
some ways, this play may be conceived almost entirely as an indictment of social practice 
and habit.  However, Bourdieu’s establishment of a field of behavior permits us to 
assume a revelational meta-stance oriented toward the operations of the given 
community.  Thus we can perceive that self-silencing is used as a tactical resistance to 
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social tyranny.  As such, however, we must acknowledge that unlike other manifestations 
of silence that are also resistant, gendered silence is invested in discretion.  It best 
conveys ethicality and authorizes personal agency when it is not perceived as resistance.  
This type of silence stands alone in this regard. 
Alain Badiou’s thesis in Being and Event, ontology is mathematics, places 
subjectivity in the context of set theory, wherein we are urged to consider an individual as 
a multiple.  While there is singularity of circumstance, one nonetheless is part of a set, a 
singular multiple.  This terminology articulates a universality in human experience that is 
readily recognized, but also attempts to demonstrate how subjective experience can 
encounter and illustrate ontological truth.  In a given ontological situation, what appears 
as one is actually one multiple of many in a set.  As such, what is real for the apparent 
one is real for the multiple.  Badiou argues that a subject encountering a truth event is a 
subject only within the process or action of the unique situation.  And in the action of the 
situation, the subject place is that of a multiple. The social effect of the set makes a 
multiple of the self-silencer, who, in his singularity represents and reflects back to the 
community themselves, those who belong to the same set.  In this way we can understand 
the unifying power exerted in the act of self-silencing. The community (or set) looks for 
speech, they are met unexpectedly with silence that initiates a reflective thought process 
involving the presence of human life, the meaning of said appearance, and consequent 
ethical imperatives.  This reflective thought process aligns the community in their own 
belonging, even as it may affect the silencer’s relation with the set.  Badiou’s theory is 
thus most helpful in drawing out the ontological questions of being and being as 
multiplicity that we encounter in Othello and Epicene. 
Like Badiou, Emmanuel Levinas conceives of being socially and extra-lingually.  
He configures the sign of being not in speech but in proximal relation to another.  
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“Signification as proximity is thus the latent birth of the subject….As a latent birth, it is 
never a presence, excluding the present of coinciding with oneself, for it is in contact, in 
sensibility, in vulnerability, in exposure to the outrages of the other.  The subject is the 
more responsible the more it answers for, as though the distance between it and the other 
increased in the measure that proximity was increased….The latent birth of the subject 
occurs in an obligation where no commitment was made.  It is a fraternity or complicity 
for nothing, but the more demanding that it constrains without finality and without end.”7  
The social responsibility of the subject here is all the more intriguing since it is not 
manifested in speech, but in silence.  Or what Levinas calls “face-to-face” proximity.  
“Saying is not a game.  Antecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the linguistic 
systems and the semantic glimmerings, a foreword preceding languages, it is the 
proximity of one to the other, the commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the 
very signifyingness of signification” (5).  We might easily parallel the silence that 
signifies with the ethical imperative summoned with proximity—both require a sensing 
presence (visual, intuitive) and neither require language.  The inherency of social 
meaning that Levinas posits is inescapable.  Transversing the gap of non-being, being 
accrues interest, social indebtedness that place it in a perpetual, substitutable relation of 
obligation to the Other.  Levinas, most of all, illumines the ethical and empathetic call of 
self-silencing. 
Using these theorists, it is possible then, to position the study of self-silencing in 
this intersection of the personal and the social.  Both one and the other, neither fully one 
nor the other, self-silencing occupies that threshold place that philosophers are currently 
interrogating to derive both subjects and ethic.  The choice to self-silence is an individual 
one, and in order for this choice to be meaningful both for the silent one and those who 
witness it, we must study the choice in its circumstantial milieu.  If it is the case that the 
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subject is always in some relation to others, how do we understand this interaction, 
especially in the case of a silent subject? 
 I have referred throughout this analysis to those who encounter a self-silencing 
moment as “witnesses,” although, more accurately, they should be called “listeners” of 
the silence.  These persons comprise the community of the self-silenced one, and usually, 
in the moment of self-silencing they are awaiting some type of communication from the 
silent person.  The communicative act of self-silencing solicits a response from its 
community, but the response is one of thought, not necessarily action, although 
behavioral revision is generally warranted. The solicitation itself, inherent in the self-
silencing, is an act of power used tactically both for and against the community. This 
opposition should not be thought of as hostile, though it may in fact feel that way.  
Although the silent one separates from his/her community, that separation often simply 
illustrates a pre-existing isolation that the silence is designed to resolve.  We might 
consider this move along Kirkegaardian lines as Zizek has interpreted, “…every 
translation of ethics into some positive universal frame already betrays the fundamental 
ethical Call, and thus necessarily gets entangled in its inconsistencies. Is the only true 
ethical stance, therefore, acceptance of this paradox and its challenge?” (87). This is the 
call of the self-silenced one: a demand that witnesses/listeners consider the shared nature 
of the human, and correspondingly, the appropriate ethical procedures for human 
sociality.  The silent person does not advocate a particular ethic, but reminds the 
community of the ontological presence of and need for an ethical reality. 
This dissertation focuses on and aligns three sets/types of dramatic characters 
whose practice of self-silencing is remarkable: women, villains and tricksters, and 
revengers. The first chapter studies gendered silence.  The self-silencing of female 
characters has more variable effects, and demonstrates the importance of using social 
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theory to access and articulate it.  Gendered silence deploys presentations of conformity 
to avert attention from personal agency.  For women, their silence paradoxically subverts 
while condoning the idealization of feminine silence.  What the masculine community 
sees reflected in female silence is an ethical ideal, their desire for the woman confirming 
their desire for the ethical.  In either case, the community is called to ethical 
consideration.  The second chapter looks at the villain-trickster.  These characters are 
perhaps more commonly separate, but the social effect of their self-silencing is similar so 
I will consider them together. Villains and tricksters both violate public trust and practice 
dissimulation upon the community. When their deceptions are revealed, the community 
experiences outrage, naturally, but also a sense of shame and humiliation. It is as if the 
inexcusable and inexplicable nature of crime and deception causes the community to 
engage in self-reflection. It sees its own dark heart, and experiences an ethical shame, 
which functions to call the community back to an ethical norm.  The last chapter explores 
revengers, individuals who redress an injustice, usually murder, that the ruling powers are 
neglecting, or more frequently, in which they are complicit.  The revenger relinquishes 
his own liberty, a self-sacrifice that self-silencing mirrors moving the community to an 
empathetic and ethical subjective experience. 
While I do not wish to suggest that these functions of self-silencing are limited to 
these character types or to Early Modern literature, it is necessary to focus on specific 
circumstances in order to articulate the functionality of silence. It is an aporia that is 
experienced, and so the unique experience informs both its function and its meaning. 
Consequently, before exploring the self-silencing tactics of these character sets, it will be 
helpful to remember some historical circumstances of this time that informed Early 
Modern England’s understanding of silence and sovereignty. I am focusing primarily on 
English plays composed during an approximate twenty-year span from 1588 to 1610 
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encompassing the late Elizabethan and early Jacobian period. Although my project here 
is a philosophical analysis of self-silencing, and not about making a specific historical 
claim, it is nonetheless helpful to recognize that there were political and cultural 
considerations of silence and sovereignty circulating at the time of these plays.  
The late medieval period had seen a rise in vows of silence as common monastic 
practice, and the Carthusian Order, among others, had instituted practices of silent, 
devotional reading.  These silences are early examples of the dynamic, social silences I 
will be exploring in this dissertation.  Far from being an absence or void, these silences 
were supposed to allow their practitioners to disengage from the frenetic practice of self-
fashioning in order to better understand divinity.  The silence of the monk permitted God 
to speak, or at least to be heard.  The devotees relationship with God and his creation was 
nourished, and thought to flourish, with silence.  Although for monastic participants, 
silence yields its benefits primarily to themselves and the God they worship, it was 
thought that their example would register for many the spiritual and social value in self-
silencing.  Jessica Brantley writes, “This oscillation between the most private of eremitic 
devotions and a demonstrated engagement with more public, pastoral concerns is a 
hallmark of late-medieval Carthusian piety, and it finds reflection both in the verbal and 
in the visual arts.”8  Thus we see that this silence is also an effort at social unity, and just 
as we will see in the theatre, it is the response of silence, when speech is customary, that 
provokes new understanding and transformation. 
In response to the treason trial of Thomas More, Parliament passed a statute in 
1541 that read in part: “[whomever] obstinatlye refuse to answere directly to the same 
offences…or…stande muett and will not speake, then such pson or psons so refusing to 
answere or standing muett shalbe convict judgd and demed guyltie of the thinge….”9  
Contrasting with the common law right not to incriminate oneself with speech, this 
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statute initiated a shift in the English government’s perspective of silence.  No longer was 
silence an epistemological enigma, it now constituted guilt.  Approximately fifteen years 
later, Queen Mary’s inquisitorial use of the ex officio oath resulted in several Protestant 
martyrs’ burning at the stake.  The oath, administered before the interrogated was 
informed of any charges against him or her, was a vow to answer truthfully any questions 
that might be asked.  Many refused the oath on legal grounds and others equivocated, but 
those who took the oath and subsequently chose to remain silent were convicted as if 
guilty.  Public attention to the epistemological nature of silence was further excited in 
1583 when the Archbishop of Canterbury decreed that the ex officio oath was mandatory, 
and any who refused to take it were condemned as guilty without the trial by jury 
promised in the Magna Carta.  The Archbishop’s move, criticized by Lord Burghley and 
Francis Bacon, was nonetheless supported opportunistically by both Elizabeth I and 
James I.  Christina Luckyj points out that both accusers and accused practiced silence, the 
first obscuring the charge against the second, and the second preserving, in Thomas 
More’s words, “the secrets of our hearts [of which] God only is the judge” (quoted in 
Luckyj, 33).  As Luckyj writes, “Silence in the late sixteenth century was a site of 
conflict between the authorities who paradoxically both enforced and outlawed it and the 
subject who found in it both oppression and licence” (36).  This paradox of silence will 
repeatedly appear on the English stage. 
If the silence of an interrogated person must be understood as assent, silence 
suddenly had definitive meaning: “Yes, I did commit murder or treason”; “Yes I am a 
Catholic or a supporter of Essex.”  Parliament’s action effectively turns the silent agent 
into an interpellated object, it “subjects the subject” to a coerced interpretive reality.  This 
oppressive legal action coincided with the brief surge in governmentally sanctioned 
torture of persons suspected of harboring information useful to the crown, and the general 
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rising conservatism of the English government.  As Elizabeth P. Hanson has 
demonstrated, the torture was an effort to “discover truth,” an epistemic endeavor more 
than, though certainly not apart from, a penal one.10  Likewise, the silent assent statute 
reveals an epistemic imperative, choosing to insist on its own interpreted information 
over no information.  And in assigning meaning, it acknowledges subjectivity in silence; 
it recognizes that silence is not absence or nothing, it is, in the eyes of Parliament, an act 
of resistance to authority by an agent.  Thus the bill legally instantiated the abstract 
concept of silence with subjective agency, even while it anxiously denied that agency its 
resistant power by assigning it a ventriloquized voice.  As long as there have been 
speakers, there have been those who choose to be silent, and aside the long historical 
record of rhetoric, there is, in its shadow, always an acknowledgment of silence as a form 
of discourse.  The silent subject did not first appear, then, as Parliament passed its bill, 
nor was it necessarily a previously benign entity now made insidious, even criminal, via 
political machinations.  But the bill functions as sixteenth century England’s explicit 
legal recognition of the power inherent in silence.  No longer could the Elizabethan or 
Jacobean governments afford to leave its subjects in peace.  
Censorship is another context in which the monarchies grappled with silence.  
We might initially suppose that state-sanctioned censorship was an oppressive action, 
silencing civil dissent and squelching public discourse.  Deborah Shuger, however, 
demonstrates the oversimplification of this assumption.11  Shuger reveals that the 
surprising goal of Early Modern censorship was not to protect political ideologies, but to 
discourage libel and slander.  Shuger’s research demonstrates that, “The majority of texts 
condemned by the Elizabethan proclamations are…stuffed with defamatory lies.  Many 
are products of the Roman Catholic slander machine on the continent, which seems to 
have been operating at capacity throughout the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
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centuries” (93). (The Protestants and Puritans took their turn during James’s reign.)  
Referring to the “…social operation of language, the ways in which words function to 
knit—or sever—the political and moral ligatures that collectively bind a people into 
community” (89), Shuger argues that the censorship apparatus was instantiated to curb 
libelous civil failings.  “In the most literal sense, defamation law concerns civility: how 
people should behave toward each other.  It is the means by which a society protects the 
social and religious ‘sacredness’ of its members, shielding them from insult, contempt, 
and degrading exposure” (98).  This reading of governmental censorship reveals the 
importance, to the Early Modern mind, of silence in maintaining sociality.  The 
governmental censor indeed imposes silence, but it is silencing lies.  Shuger sees the 
censorship effort arising out of a reflexive expectation that English society is rooted in 
Christian virtues of truth and charity and a “theological right to privacy” (101).  For our 
purposes, it is illuminating to recognize the way in which the monarchies used censored 
silence to secure the social ethic.  Relinquishing his own “sacred” right to privacy, the 
self-silencer exposes himself to scrutiny, to a “reading” beyond his verbal control.  An act 
so startling, that just like civil censorship, the self-silencer draws attention to lapses in 
civility.   
Although typically considered a time of literary and rhetorical flourishing, the 
Early Modern period had reason to experience a concomitant and deeply-felt mistrust of 
language.  The articulation and spread of calumny, projects of dissimulation, and the 
commonplace linking of tricksters with rhetorical skill created a climate of respectful 
suspicion of speech.  Caution regarding language invariably reflected an epistemic crisis: 
how can we know?  How can we know truth?  Allow me to postulate some of the 
dominating contingencies that have shaped this conclusion.  In Signifying Nothing, Brian 
Rotman demonstrates that the Renaissance witnessed the development of “meta-signs,” 
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signs without referents, signs that gesture to metaphysical nothingness.12  These meta-
signs, found in the Hindu zero in counting methods, paper money in capitalist financial 
systems, and the vanishing point in the visual arts, all manifested nearly simultaneously 
in the Early Modern world.  This confluence of events created both a pragmatic, 
psychological and philosophical rift in metaphysical reality that is reflected throughout 
cultural productions.  This rift reverberates, I believe, in the many and peculiar silences 
found in the literature of the period, both poetic and dramatic.  Inasmuch as silence is a 
sign whose referent may or may not exist, it too is, pragmatically, a meta-sign, and 
accordingly, it shares the same power as the other meta-signs: it ambiguates ontological 
certainty.  Silence makes “a thing” out of a “non-thing,” and is unknowable, even while it 
demands response.  Like the numeral zero, silence functions relationally, it affects other 
things (meanings) without having a discreet, discernable meaning itself.  As Rotman 
says, “The effect of meta-signs is to draw attention that representation is a fiction” (57).  
Failures in representation also manifested during the Protestant Reformation 
wherein Martin Luther objected to the Catholic Church’s sale of indulgences. 
Indulgences, David Hawkes has argued,  
…represented fetishized labor. They were representations of human actions, 
which were ascribed supernatural, magical power in the popular imagination. 
Their role was essentially financial. Just as money establishes a medium of 
representation which enables us to conceive an equivalence between human labor 
and various objects, so indulgences provided a common denominator which 
made it possible to imagine an equivalence between penitential tasks and divine 
grace.13 
 
The signifying power of indulgences was undermined, but perhaps more devastatingly, so 
was the representative authority of the papacy.  The Reformation produced especially 
acute concerns about representation for England because of the particulars of Henry 
VIII’s split with the Catholic Church.  By appointing himself head of the Church of 
England, he not only represented God politically but theologically as well, creating a 
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dominance of representation that rendered his legitimacy suspect.  Furthermore, this 
already dramatic and distressing claim to authority was complicated by the brief but 
vexed reign of his Catholic daughter Mary, and then another subsequent revision under 
Elizabeth I.  Of course, this overweaning representational position was even more fraught 
when the office is held by a woman.  By the end of the sixteenth century, England was 
actively exploring the nature of representation, and grappling with corresponding 
philosophical skepticism about knowing what is real or what is true.   
 This epistemic crisis was aggravated by the rise of capitalism that dismantled 
seemingly tidy distinctions of class, ownership, and ultimately identity.  As capitalism 
makes an object of human labor, that which is human becomes exchange-able, sale-able.  
Because labor is an object, it dehumanizes the laborer; he himself becomes the object, 
exchange-able.  Furthermore, the acquisition of objects becomes the sign of identity, but 
the objects remain alterable, trade-able and thus not truly identifying.  Exchange value 
negates any inherent value, and turns everything including people, into commodities.  
That the forces of capitalism were coming to dominance in the Early Modern era 
exacerbates the already raging suspicion of representation and underscores the 
ontological skepticism with which the period is often defined.   
 This particular historical confluence of epistemological problems manifests, I 
believe, in the persistent problematizing of representation.  Stanley Cavell’s 1987 book, 
Disowning Knowledge, made a surprising claim: Shakespeare’s characters were not 
responding to the representational skepticism of their age by seeking to know, to solve 
epistemological mysteries, but were seeking to avoid knowing or being known.14  In a 
naturally self-interested way, many characters wanted to know, categorize, reduce, and 
manipulate others, but spent the bulk of their energies on concealing themselves from 
“the gaze,” which, as Cavell points out, results in a sense of shame.  Similar to Jeremy 
  18 
Benthem’s Panopticon, in Cavell’s formulation, the gaze was experienced as an intrusion 
into the private, inner spaces of the subject.  Even seemingly positive approaches to 
gaining personal knowledge such as the desire to love demonstrated by Cordelia toward 
Lear, or the citizens’ desire to look upon and admire their hero Coriolanus, were 
interpreted by Lear and Coriolanus as violations.  Although Cavell does not consider 
silence directly, there seems to be every reason to avoid speech if one prefers, as Cavell 
argues, to avoid being known (interpellated) or becoming a part of a corrupted 
community.  In fact, it would seem that silence is one of the better ways to preserve 
subjectivity in an age where the self is always subordinated to the monarch, the 
monarch’s religious impositions, religion’s own behavioral expectations, material 
constraints such as the sumptuary laws, and even cultural (and literary) conventions as to 
acceptable speech and action.  Cavell’s reading reveals the truly extraordinary behavior 
of the self-silencer who invites public scrutiny, but without controlling its interpretation.  
In effect, the self-silencer throws the gaze back upon the witness resulting in their sense 
of shame. 
Problems with representation are especially acute in a study of silence.  The 
silent subject can only be approached obliquely.  No diaries, legal records or other 
cultural matter can exist which document the subjectivity of the silent in the moment of 
their silence.  The action of silencing oneself can only be accessed via recollection, 
remembering a silent response, or by observation of another.  Even if a self-silencer later 
recounts his moment of silence to another, he is already a different subject, changed by 
the act of silence, if nothing else.  This inaccessibility is, of course, part of the power of 
self-silencing, but for my purposes it creates an interpretive quandary such as that faced 
by Parliament’s inquisitors.  Unlike Parliament, however, I propose to consider the 
effects of silence by examining other types of forensic evidence to reach my conclusions.  
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Answering such questions as: who self-silences, under what circumstances, what happens 
when they do, how does their community react, and does silence function to persuade 
should provide enough data to draw some meaningful conclusions.  Since part of my 
governing assumption is that silence is a form of rhetoric, I intend to explore specifically 
the literature of the Renaissance for my investigation.  
This choice is based on two factors.  First, representational faultlines 
notwithstanding, I do believe literature offers a perspective especially useful to the study 
of subjectivity.  Literature may be, in fact, the only way to witness the performance of 
historical silence.  On stage there is, at the least, an attempt to recreate the experience of 
human discourse, silence included.  As such, it offers the best opportunity to examine 
how the silent subject functioned in Early Modern England.  Furthermore, theatrical 
performance complicates the reading of silence insofar as the spectator’s position mirrors 
that of the interrogator, both seeking to know and understand.  And as the source of 
silence’s interpretation, both are subjectified in the process.  The spectator, however, is 
deeply engaged in his own self-silencing, a fact acknowledged repeatedly by Renaissance 
playwrights.  Literature’s dynamism of subjectivity warrants its position as the primary 
source for my study of the mechanics of the silent agent.  
The second reason for focusing on literature is the special discomfort Early 
Modern theatre repeatedly expresses toward its own representational occupation.  The 
self-consciousness and reluctance of many period plays to claim mimetic authenticity 
reveals a hesitance toward representation that, I believe, is akin to the failure to present or 
represent found in the silent subject.  Several recent books have explored the 
problematics of representation for the early modern culture.  Arnold Oliver’s The Third 
Citizen interrogates the parliamentary conceit of a voice for every citizen, noting its 
conflation of actual presence with representative presence.  Likewise, Dympna 
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Callaghan’s Shakespeare Without Women makes present the implications of absence, 
exploring the effects of failed theatrical representation on cultural formations of racial 
and gendered identities.  Jon R. Snyder’s Dissimulation and the Culture of Secrecy 
explores actions of dissimulation as a cultivated art.15  Ultimately these works all occupy 
the chasm between a presumed ontological reality (socially constructed or otherwise) and 
its inexact representation.  I believe my analysis of the silent subject will participate in 
this discourse by showing that silence, as an intentional failure to represent, is often a 
paradoxical position of autonomy and empowerment.   
Apart from the theorists I have spoken of in this chapter, I will make recourse to 
several other scholars in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  In examining 
Katharine in The Taming of the Shrew in chapter two, Frances E. Dolan serves as a 
sparring partner, and Elizabeth Gruber offers important revelational insight into 
gendered, knowledge-seeking projects.  My analysis of villains and tricksters (in Othello 
and Epicene) in chapter three is critically dependent upon Wayne A. Rebhorn’s analysis 
of the Renaissance trickster and Thomas M. Greene’s formulation of centering in the 
work of Ben Jonson.  The fourth chapter on Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy is informed by, 
and then dramatically differs from, studies by C.L. Barber, Katharine Eisaman Maus and 
Carla Mazzio.16  
The “age of eloquence” may be called thus because it grappled with articulation, 
with rhetoric as a way of knowing, and much of literary history has been concerned to 
understand the ways in which language and articulation participate in knowledge and 
subject formation.  The ex oficio statute, however, serves as a marker of a corresponding 
rhetorical problem of the early modern era: the silent subject.  Despite the legal and 
political upheavals connected with these Early Modern statutes on silence, due attention 
has not been given to the ways in which self-silencing may construct, contain, and 
  21 
confirm personal agency.  Neither has silence’s influence on community been analyzed 
or even acknowledged.  Nor have critics considered the ways in which these specific 
political expediencies played out culturally in Early Modern England.  My purpose in this 
dissertation, then, is to explore these areas by using literature as a point of access into the 
nature and effects of self-silencing.  From sermons exhorting parishioners to “tame their 
tongues,” to suspected treasoners willing to endure torture rather than make a coerced 
confession, to the many characters populating the early modern stage who choose to be 
silent, self-silencing is a common, but little understood phenomenon of the period.  Or, 
more accurately, the phenomenon of choosing to be silent is not limited to an era, but the 
anxious skepticism of the Early Modern period presents an opportunity to study the silent 
subject when its epistemology is both concentrated and variously figured.   
Returning to Cordelia, we see she is no longer alone on the stage in her silence.  
Standing beside her are other characters, male and female, young and old, of varying 
classes and social authorizations.  They are all silent.  And at first, that silence is directed 
toward one another, but then as one, they turn and look at us.  What are they conveying?  
What do they make us feel?  Is it Stanley Cavell’s shame?  Is it a duty we owe them?  A 
personal failure made manifest; a social problem neglected?  Or is it, as with Cordelia, 
simply love.  Does this presentation of silence compel our empathy and ethicality?  Do 
we, like Lear, now recognize “true need?” (2.4.268)  Do we, like Edmond, have “some 
good [we] mean to do”? (5.3.245). 
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CHAPTER 2 
"MY TONGUE WILL TELL": SPEAKING SELVES 
It is, perhaps, paradoxical to begin an account of self-silencing with a study of 
speech.  But paradox weaves like a thread between the two, uniting them as well as 
defining them.  If we are to study how one works, we must unravel the paradox that binds 
them.  Speech, it is thought, reveals the mind, and in revealing the mind, reveals the 
subject.  Silence, it is presumed, conceals the subject.  But of course the ease of these 
assumptions belies the complexity of their function.  Derrida and others have effectively 
dismantled the commonplace of speech as revelation.  Lacking an ontological 
correspondence to its referent, speech confounds revelation.  Speech intends more than it 
means, and means more than it intends.  Its ultimate revelation is its own reflexive failure 
to represent.  Silence, on the other hand, has been left in relative peace.  Allowed, for the 
most part, to enjoy a quietude of critical inquiry.  I propose to agitate this repose 
however, and discover the effects of self-silencing upon a subject and his/her community.  
Does silence indeed conceal, permit dissembling and subterfuge, or does it also operate 
as a revelator?  If so, what is revealed, and about whom?  Since self-silencing, like 
speech, is a highly contingent activity, its meaning and effects derived from the 
particulars of its usage, it is imperative to turn now to the play with which I propose to 
engage this analysis: William Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew.1 
 Performances, adaptations and scholarship of Shakespeare’s The Taming of the 
Shrew have focused on answering an important question left unanswered in the text: is 
Katherine tamed?2  Is her final speech on the submission of wives spoken sincerely or 
ironically, perhaps with Mary Pickford’s infamous wink?  The play is silent about the 
sincerity of her speech.  Despite attention given as to how to read Katherine’s speech, 
surprisingly little attention has been paid to the fact of the question.  In other words, 
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answering the question has become a favorite critical past-time, but articulating why we 
ask this question in the first place remains unexplored.  The reasoning behind this lack 
seems obvious: that which the play neglects to tell us nonetheless forms the crux of our 
interpretive understanding of the play.  While I don’t disagree with this formulation, I do 
think the play means something even without a clear answer to the “is she or isn’t she 
tamed” question, or rather that the ambiguity is an interpretive point in itself.  In failing to 
explicitly reveal Katherine’s true motivations, Shakespeare places the audience or reader 
in that most anxious-making of positions for the Renaissance (and perhaps for us): a state 
of ignorance.  Our inability to neatly categorize and contain the ending of the play, as 
well as anxieties arising from that inability, transform us into a Hamlet or an Othello, 
seeking to know what cannot be known.  It is, perhaps, the play’s goal that because of its 
silence on the matter we continue to think about and discuss Katherine’s character and 
her relationships long after the curtain falls.  Since Katherine’s personal agency is the 
scaffolding upon which most arguments—either for or against her transformation—are 
built, embracing the ambiguity of the play necessarily offers its own answer to the taming 
question.  But the compelling need to resolve the epistemic quandary discloses a 
compulsive need to know and the corresponding search for a knowledge methodology.  
The play, like theatre itself, ultimately promotes a subversive counter-argument to the 
cultural ideal of transparency: perform an identity in order to preserve an identity.  In so 
doing, The Taming of the Shrew hails subjectivity, gender relationships, the social and 
representational function of theatre as well as philosophical skepticism.   
 Shakespeare’s silence about Katherine’s interiority implicates language as a 
failed epistemology along with Othello’s ocular proof, and Hamlet’s artistic emulations.  
Furthermore, and unlike other of Shakespeare’s work, rather than trying to resolve 
epistemic quandaries in the manner of a Hamlet or Othello, the characters in The Taming 
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of the Shrew strive to create them.  In this play, possessing public knowledge of an 
individual grants power and dominance to the community but denies the individual 
representational autonomy.  Consequently the individual must cultivate obscurity in order 
to retain personal agency.  As the play demonstrates in its presentation of Christopher 
Sly, Bianca, Petruchio, and Katherine personal power is obtained via public performance 
not public revelation.  This performative obstruction is set against the social expectation 
and idealization of transparency.  As Holly A. Crocker says, “When the play begins, 
identity seems to be transparent, correspondence among appearance, performance, and 
absolute essence.”3  The community at large seems to assume that both speech and 
silence reveal the true person.  To better grasp the notion of social expectations, and the 
influence they exert upon personal subjectivity, it is helpful to borrow some terms from 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and apply them to the The Taming of the Shrew.  The 
metadramatic conceit of a play within the play introduces what Pierre Bourdieu would 
call the “field” of investigation.4  The field is a social space with encoded rules and 
relationships training us, as well as its subjects whose behaviors constitute and reinforce 
it, to the functionality of the community.  The field of the induction introduces the 
Petruchio/Katherine story as representational fiction within a representational fiction.  
Their story, however, takes place within the social field of patriarchal Padua, conceivably 
a stand-in for contemporary England.  This plot, occurring at a double-step remove from 
the audience and “reality,” seems to require the wholesale creation of a space for its 
being.  It presents, in other words, a stage behind which it enacts its tale.   
And indeed it is being that is at stake here, being and how we access it: 
epistemology.  As the hostess threatens Sly with stocks and calls him a “rogue,”  
(Ind.1.2) Sly claims a venerable family line, that he is nobler than his intoxicated 
appearance and behavior reveal.  Easily dismissed as drunken boasting, Sly’s claim 
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nonetheless raises the question of how identity is determined.  To the hostess, he is a 
thief; to the advancing Lord, he is a beast, a drunkard, and even a vision of “grim death” 
(Ind.1.35).  But to Sly himself, he is a man of consequence bound by no ordinary laws.  
This claim to intrinsic nobility is useless in the face of Sly’s uncouth and degrading 
performance, no one, including presumably the play’s audience, believes him.  Nor, it 
seems, are we intended to.  Sly is displaced from his ordinary experience and the new, 
elegant environment, clothes, and social interactions surprise and confound him.  He 
reflects on himself and what he knows of himself.  “Or do I dream?  Or have I dreamed 
till now?” he wonders (Ind. 2.69).  Reality is no longer apparent to Sly; even the reality of 
his own identity is undermined in the presence of the nobleman’s luxurious commodities.  
Kate, of course, will experience a similar displacement when she visits Petruchio’s home, 
and as Garber notes, “the suspension of certainties and the interchangeability of reality 
and illusion result in a heightened self-awareness.”5  A self-awareness that in 
metatheatrical terms, now extends to the audience as well. 
And yet, Sly is not precisely self-aware; he may be self-concerned, but his 
knowledge of his identity is confused and unsure, we might even say unaware.  It is, 
however, a key moment of reinvention whose success depends upon Sly’s epistemic 
engagement.  The jesting Lord uses both empirical and social means of deception.  Sly is 
surrounded by the luxury items of the nobility: costly clothes and food, sweet music and 
fine art.  However, if Sly simply woke among fine things he would not, as the Lord 
hopes, “forget himself.”  He would still be Sly, just Sly among fine objects.  
Consequently, the Lord directs his servant Barthol’mew to pretend he is Sly’s noble wife.  
This theatricality on the part of the servants is key to activating both the confusion and 
the transformation.  Sly’s new community destabilizes his self-conception and constructs 
a new identity for him.  The consistency and verisimilitude of their performance is 
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critical to the joke’s success as is demonstrated in the Lord’s lengthy directions as to how 
the page should act his role, even suggesting the use of an onion to elicit the required 
tears.  It is, then, the social performance of the Lord’s servants that most effects Sly’s 
transformation, not simply the new physical circumstances.  The community creates Sly’s 
self—or, from another perspective, there is no Sly without his sociality.  He abandons the 
tinker he knew and embraces his new socially and materially constructed identity.  Thus 
the play begins with identities that are only real insofar as they are socially performed.  
Sly’s noble lineage cannot be real since he behaves like a cur, but Sly’s believes 
Barthol’mew is his wife because he performs the role.  In the theatrical playing field, 
nothing is what it is.  Reality in The Taming of the Shrew is performance.  The Lord’s 
microcosm of willing performers mirrors that of Padua where successful social 
interaction requires performing (or conforming) to expectation.  
Shakespeare is always most interesting when he violates generic expectations and 
that is true for the popular taming genre as well.  Kate appears to deviate from the taming 
genre insofar as she is at least as famous for her silences as for her scolding tongue.  As 
Frances E. Dolan has remarked, “…she is characterized more by silence than by speech 
at several important points in the play.”6  Silent as Petruchio confirms the marital 
arrangement with Baptista, silent as he drags her off to his house after the wedding, and 
silent about whatever may or may not have motivated her taming, Katherine is perceived 
as an enigmatic character.  She purportedly disallows the Paduan public, and by 
extension the reader, access to her private thoughts, if indeed, she has any.  Dolan 
continues, “These moments of silence baffle critics, actors, and directors.  How do we 
know what Katharine thinks, feels, and wants?” (24).  This is indeed the crucial question 
to ask of a silent character, and it is the one critics most frequently assign to Katherine, 
but I am not persuaded that Katherine is as silent or as unknowable as critics would have 
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her.  Katherine strikes me as voluble and accessible.  The insensitive behavior of her 
family and community elicit justifiable reactions from her that reveal a woman who is 
witty and clever with words, sensitive to public appraisal, versant in the social hierarchy, 
and cognizant of her own social role.  Kate’s manner of speaking through most of the 
play is in fact highly revelatory of both her social identity and her personal subjectivity. 
 Stereotypically, a “shrew” is a woman with a well-exercised tongue.  The shrew 
speaks, usually pejoratively, in contrast to the ideal woman who is silent.  The ballad 
“The Cruel Shrew” written by Arthur Halliarg (c1625) illustrates shrewish verbosity as 
the male narrator tells bachelors a cautionary tale of his “unquiet wife,” 
 She never lins her bawling, 
 her tongue it is so loud;  
 But always she’ll be railing, 
 and will not be controlled…. (cited in Dolan 250) 
 
As scholars have frequently remarked, this ballad links women’s speech with 
insubordination.  The problem with shrews, then, is not simply that they speak, but that 
their speech articulates independence and rebellion against authority.  Shrews could be 
either male or female, but when a shrew is female her speech undermines the gender 
hierarchy naturalized religiously, culturally, and legally in the Renaissance.7  
Accordingly, when we meet Katherine she is using her considerable wit to insult those 
who have insulted her, and in doing so demonstrates resistance to their authority over her.  
Her first lines of the play interrogate her father’s desire to marry her off before Bianca, “I 
pray you, sir, is it your will to make a stale of me amongst these mates?” (1.1.57-8).  The 
clever wordplay of stale (joke or prostitute) and mate (with suggestions of mirroring and 
marriage, as well as a defaulted chess game) reveal her ready wit and linguistic dexterity.  
Her query might suggest the fun-loving banter of Much Ado’s Beatrice, except she is not 
speaking to or before an indulgent male community.  Interestingly her question does not 
immediately follow her father’s announcement.  She actually speaks directly after 
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Gremio’s very rude reaction to Baptista’s decision, “To cart her rather,” he says, “She’s 
too rough for me” (1.1.55).  Does Katherine speak at this point because she has been 
publicly insulted, and her father has inexplicably allowed it?8  Katherine specifically 
addresses her complaint to her hierarchical head, her father, not Gremio her insulter, 
drawing Baptista’s attention to Gremio’s slight and Baptista’s failure to provide the social 
protection a father is obliged to offer.  Minimally Baptista himself should respond to 
Gremio’s insult, maximally he would not put her in a social position destined to 
disappoint so many bachelors.  Even after Katherine’s reminder, though, Baptista fails to 
respond thereby allowing Horatio to criticize her as well.  Katherine’s anger magnifies, 
along with her verbosity.  The curiosity here rightly ought to be upon the men of Padua 
who so defy common courtesy as to publicly insult a woman, and upon Baptista for 
permitting it.  Their symbolic violence reveals this dysfunctional patriarchy’s failure to 
care for those it subjects.   
Again, Pierre Bourdieu offers some helpful sociological terminology.  The 
behavior of any given agent, the Paduan men or Katherine, for example, can be termed 
their habitus, their subjective dispositions that derive from the objective conditions of the 
field in which they are considered.  In this case there are two fields: the metatheatrical 
one of Sly’s world, and the patriarchal Paduan community, which may be a stand-in for 
England itself in the minds of the play’s auditors.  Within the patriarchal field of her 
community, we see that Katherine, in her habitus, is socially ostracized for her failure to 
perform in accord with social doxa.  Doxa, in Bourdieu’s definition, are the prevailing 
beliefs and values of a sociality that are naturalized into authority; the 
“presuppositions…of the game” (66).  The patriarchal doxa so ingrained in the Paduans, 
however, has failed to accommodate a woman who does not want to be publicly taunted 
and humiliated, but has no one to defend her.  Katherine’s habitus arises from these 
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neglectful characteristics of the doxa.9  Thus the field of Padua is implicitly criticized for 
the distortions of patriarchy manifest in Baptista, Gremio and Hortensio.  Katherine’s 
failure to recognize or participate in the doxic requirement for feminine silence reveals 
her social ignorance, however.  Katherine does not understand the nature of social 
identity as it is constructed in the play.  Her habitus, her social being, experiences the 
consequences of misconstruing the doxa in which she is situated: she is bereft of social 
capital and unmarriageable. 
 By calling her, quite publicly, “rough” and “devilish,” Gremio and Hortensio 
simultaneously affirm and insure the community’s, and the reader’s, understanding of 
Kate’s character.  As Althusser has demonstrated, to interpellate Katherine with shrewish 
monikers is the social equivalent of making her a shrew.10  Likewise, the public name-
calling insures that she will be a shrew since it, and Baptista’s failure to respond to it, 
elicits an outraged response from Katherine.  In this way Katherine participates in 
constructing her shrewish reputation: she verbally objects to her mis/treatment in the 
community, trading insults, threats, and even violence.  Theoretically both the 
community and Katherine herself are invested in maintaining this arrangement.  Although 
Katherine objects and complains, her objections and complaints reinscribe her role.  
Although the community rejects her for her shrewishness, they nonetheless continue to 
publicly offend and humiliate her.  Even Baptista and Bianca scapegoat Katherine, 
benefiting presumably, from their own subsequent social inclusion.  The cycle is 
mutually affirming in that it offers both Katherine and Padua confidence in their 
rhetorical epistemology and performative sociality.  By calling Katherine a shrew, Padua 
insures that she will be one; by responding to the insult, Katherine is assured of her social 
role and how to fulfill it. 
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 Is it only a role?  Is she actually a lovely girl, as obedient as the best of them?  It 
seems unlikely.  Katherine’s participation in her interpellated identity suggests that she 
behaves this way willingly.  While options were few for women, the one choice 
Katherine certainly has is to remain silent in the face of her offenders.  She does not, and 
is construed as a shrew.  Her continuing participation in assuring her social ostracism, 
coupled with her private behavior indicates that Kate is indeed “cursed.”  Nonetheless, 
this initial exchange in the community suggests that her shrewish identity is not so simply 
constructed.  The complicity of Baptista, Gremio and Horatio demonstrate the personal 
force of doxa and social ostracism.  The shared belief in Katherine’s irascibility held by 
the Paduan men must be seen as culpable in shaping the reality not only of the Paduan 
community but of Katherine herself.  Though she does not choose silence Katherine does 
verbally defy her accusers, but succeeds only in cementing their accusations.  It is unclear 
how much of her shrewish speech derives from a shrewish nature and how much from a 
reaction to a socially unjust persecution.  Just as the servant’s treatment of Sly creates a 
new identity for him, so do the Paduan men make Katherine into a shrew.  That both Sly 
and Katherine participate in this creation reveals the epistemic power of doxa, of social 
beliefs, as they are manifested in public speech.  In other words, shrewishness has 
become a habitus for Kate—an identity she might perform that makes space for her 
within the confining doxa of her community.   
 It is useful, at this point, to bring Bianca into our analysis for the contrast she 
offers to our understanding both of Kate’s speech and the Renaissance ideal of silent 
women.  The sisters’ relationship is fraught with tension and competition.  Early on we 
see Bianca pleading to be released from the ties with which Katherine has bound her, but 
Katherine demands first to know which of the suitors Bianca prefers, warning her not to 
dissemble.  The warning completes a chain of metadramatic references that not only offer 
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our only early access to Bianca’s interiority but link her habitus with performance, and 
consequently insincerity.  As Baptista bustles Bianca indoors after pronouncing his plan 
for the marital disposition of his daughters, Kate expresses frustration with his favoritism, 
“A pretty peat! It is best / Put finger in the eye, and she knew why” (1.1.78-9).  The 
implication here is that Bianca, as the favored daughter, should summon some artificial 
tears to show her own displeasure with Baptista’s decision.  Presumably her tears would 
flow naturally if she felt true frustration or sorrow, but there are no tears and Katherine 
refers to a theatrical trick to make the eyes water insinuating that Bianca often uses such 
tricks to gain Baptista’s sympathy.  Further, this moment echoes one in the induction 
when the Lord advises Barthol’mew to use an onion to elicit tears in his performance.  
These layered metadramatic moments remind auditors of the representational field in 
which these agents move, suggesting that Bianca is role-playing before her father and all 
of Padua.  Bianca is not an entirely persuasive performer, however.  Katherine, at least, 
believes she is something other than what she seems.  Certainly Bianca’s response to 
Baptista articulates a suspiciously conventional obedience “Sir, to your pleasure I humbly 
subscribe” (1.1.81.).  Katherine’s eagerness to fulfill the role of shrew, coupled with her 
suspicions of Bianca indicate that she, unlike Bianca, is not pretending to be something 
she isn’t.  Socially influenced or not, she is a shrew.  Bianca’s nature, on the other hand, 
remains unclear.   
 Access to Bianca’s interiority, unlike Katherine’s is thwarted at most early 
attempts.  Overhearing Katherine’s bickering in the initial scene, Tranio sees some 
entertainment to be enjoyed, but Lucentio is enraptured by Bianca, “But in the other’s 
silence do I see / Maid’s mild behavior and sobriety” (1.1.70-1).  Tranio responds, “Well 
said, master.  Mum, and gaze your fill” (1.1.73).  Tranio lightly mocks Lucentio’s 
confused construction of both sentence and senses.  His synesthetic eyes see silence, and 
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through silence he knows Bianca.  To him, her silence epitomizes desirable maidenly 
qualities: mildness and sobriety, and as he says minutes later, wisdom and modesty as 
well.  And yet Bianca’s interiority is in no way accessed at this moment.  Lucentio’s 
epistemology reveals more about him than it does about the woman he professes to love.  
Lucentio’s habitus conforms to the doxa of patriarchy; there is no need to know more of 
Bianca than her silence.  Bianca’s silence transparently conveys her chastity and 
obedience.  It is clear that her habitus, like Lucentio’s, conforms to the dominating doxa.  
She performs the role of the ingénue, represents the maidenly ideal, and the suitors fall 
for it. Bianca’s prosaic obedience before the watchful audience of her suitors combined 
with Katherine scoff at its sincerity suggests, however, that Bianca is not what she seems.  
For the audience, Bianca’s contextual silence and the theatrical fractures that accompany 
it suspiciously mystify her character’s interiority.11   
 Accordingly Katherine’s interrogation of Bianca’s romantic desire does not 
prove especially revealing about Bianca.  Bianca answers Katherine’s question of which 
suitor she prefers in an unspecific manner: “Believe me, sister, of all the men alive / I 
never yet beheld that special face / Which I could fancy more than any other” (1.2.10-12).  
It is possible this answer is true; it is not textually apparent whether Bianca notices 
Lucentio, her future husband, as he gazes on her.  But the response does not, as the 
question required, select one among her suitors as most favorable.  Instead Bianca 
enlarges her circle of suitors to include all men alive, apparently deferring her answer 
until the time that she is able to choose between that inconceivably vast collection.  
Whether or not this is supposed to be a legitimate response, Katherine disbelieves her and 
Bianca’s subsequent taunting of Katherine by offering up her own suitors for Katherine’s 
love suggests that Bianca may be dissembling in order to annoy Katherine.  Bianca’s 
silence and her mask of orthodox behavior construct her, not Katherine, as the 
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inaccessible entity.  This epistemic challenge, of knowing the reality of silence and 
seemingly appropriate behavior, lies at the heart of Claudio and Hero’s conflict in Much 
Ado About Nothing.  Claudio’s suspicion is that silence and obedience are only the “sign 
and semblance” of virtue, not its substance.  In this play, Katherine alone is suspicious 
about Bianca.  “Her silence flouts me,” she says of Bianca (2.1.29).  Katherine construes 
Bianca’s silence not as virtue, but as a weapon of social warfare or means of deception.  
Katherine’s rejection of this manner of behavior suggests that Katherine herself would 
not dissemble her true feelings, that she would not deceive or withhold information about 
herself from others.  Thus Katherine’s speeches, shrewish or otherwise, make her 
knowable to her community and to auditors of the play.  Her articulation offers us access 
to her interiority.  But Bianca’s silence reads as an intentional social action designed to 
secure her agency via performativity. 
 Bianca’s suitors and her father all appear to be persuaded by Bianca’s 
performance, at least for awhile.  Apart from Tranio’s initial hesitation to participate in 
Lucentio’s reading of Bianca, most of the men do engage in what Elizabeth Gruber calls 
“ventriloquism, …knowledge-seekers projecting their ideas onto inert objects.”12  Bianca 
is not precisely inert, but her intentional performance of silence and obedience render her 
as much an object as is humanly possible.  The bartering for her hand in marriage 
emphasizes her objectified status.  As Baptista remarks of the marital arrangements, 
“…now I play a merchant’s part / And venture madly on a desperate mart” (2.1.318).  
She is a necessary commodity in establishing a noble household.  Just as Sly was not 
persuaded of his new status until presented with a tearful wife, Padua is filled with 
bachelors eager to marry and secure their own respectable social position.  The whole 
appeal of the silent and obedient maiden to the Renaissance man is her supposed inability 
to act apart from his will.  She is necessary, but she is, as Natasha Korda has argued, 
  36 
simply another luxury good solidifying her husband’s reputation.13  As Gruber has 
demonstrated, this illusion of control over the wife corresponds with an illusion of 
knowledge.  Like many male knowledge-seekers, Lucentio, at the moment of seeking to 
know Bianca, fails to understand that he is actually projecting his own idealization of 
femininity onto her; he is not actually knowing her.  It’s worthwhile to reprint here a 
portion of Gruber’s argument about Othello as it pertains to the issues of knowledge-
gathering and subjectivity we’re considering in Shrew: 
In assigning to its hero the prerogatives of the knower, Othello shows how 
subject/object relations are embodied in gender difference and staged in the arena 
of epistemology.  This dynamic proves typical of calumniated-woman plays.  
Such texts appear to raise questions about the identity and existence, even the 
ontological essence of a particular woman, but the relevant narratives actually 
focus upon the torment and desire of man: it is his knowledge, usually hard-won, 
that defines the epistemological journey inherent in the calumniated-woman 
genre.  In proper Cartesian fashion, it is the knower – the man who seeks 
knowledge of his wife – who is endowed with subjectivity. (395) 
 
Lucentio’s reading of Bianca’s silence, then, subjectifies him and objectifies her.  As 
such it is an effective epistemology only insofar as one is seeking to know themselves.  It 
offers little in the way of knowledge about that which is apart from the self, thus placing 
Lucentio in a precarious position of unacknowledged ignorance: he doesn’t know that he 
doesn’t know. 
 Gruber’s argument goes on to parallel, as does Elizabeth Hanson, the knowledge 
quest as an act of torture, ending as it does in Othello, Cary’s The Tragedy of Mariam, 
and in Elizabethan treason trials in the physical restraint, torture, and/or death of the 
questor’s object.14  As the citation from Gruber indicates, she finds the relationship of 
questor for knowledge and object of knowledge as uniquely male and female, 
respectively.  In Shrew however, as we’ve just seen, it is Katherine who objectifies 
Bianca, binding and striking her in an effort to access Bianca’s silence and ascertain its 
meaning.  The play’s narrative, like the ones Gruber refers to, focuses on the “torment 
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and desire” of the knowledge-seeker, Katherine, and thereby Katherine is the one 
subjectified in her epistemological quest.  Katherine’s methodology is also peculiarly 
masculine insofar as she must immobilize the object of her quest.  As Gruber writes of 
epistemic endeavors, the seeker “…will only have knowledge of his object once she has 
been immobilized” (398).  Bianca’s silence was sufficient for Lucentio to read her as an 
object, but Katherine must physically restrain her and even strike her in an attempt to 
access her interiority.  This may be because, as a woman and close relation to Bianca, she 
knows better than to assume what silence means.  And yet, Katherine interprets Bianca in 
a manner similar to Lucentio’s ventriloquism.  After Bianca confesses her inability to 
answer Katherine’s question, their brief exchange continues: 
 Katherine:  Minion thou liest.  Is’t not Hortensio? 
 Bianca:  If you affect him, sister, here I swear 
   I’ll plead for you myself but you shall have him. 
 Katherine:  O then, belike, you fancy riches more: 
   You will have Gremio to keep you fair. (2.1.13-17) 
 
Although Bianca continues to evade answering directly, Katherine nonetheless interprets 
her evasions as sufficient evidence of a response.  She rejects Bianca’s lack of a favorite 
as a lie, and when Bianca fails to say that Hortensio is her favorite, Katherine assumes it 
must be Gremio’s wealth that is most attractive.  Katherine’s investigation of Bianca’s 
interiority is undoubtedly more thorough than Lucentio’s “ocular” effort, but it results in 
the same epistemological error, her own subjectifying and Bianca’s objectifying, and it 
fails to reveal Bianca’s true nature.  Katherine usurps the uniquely male position of 
knowledge-questor in this scene, deploying masculine tactics and claiming a 
masculinized victory.  Thus she is further revealed as a shrew: she not only fails to 
submit to masculine authority, she assumes that authority for herself.  In her masculine 
subjectivity, she remains fully accessible as a character.  She demonstrates the 
transparency that Othello makes claim to: her words and deeds reveal her self.  Although 
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we’re critically accustomed to thinking of Katherine as unknowable, at this early stage 
she is quite plainly accessed.  Is this plain-speaking transparency surprising given that she 
has been been raised—apart from feminine example—in a masculinized doxa where 
plain-speaking, even insult-hurling speech is the norm?  As Bourdieu has described, 
Katherine’s shrewish habitus, though self-defeating, legitimates the doxa by exercising 
its dominant modes of discourse and knowledge-gathering. 
 Of course, Bianca was raised in the same community and yet she seems to be the 
feminine ideal.  What accounts for the difference?  Bianca herself offers the explanation 
when, dismissed by Baptista, she obediently retreats indoors saying, “My books and 
instruments shall be my company, / On them to look and practice by myself” (1.1.82-3).  
Bianca echoes the Induction’s Lord who plans to “practice” his deception on Sly.  
Hearing this reverberation of the theatrical field, the meaning of Bianca’s statement is 
altered from that which it conveys to Baptista and the Paduan bachelors.  They may hear 
a plaintive loneliness, but attentive readers or audience members hear that she will use 
artistic precedents with which to rehearse her performances.  She will play the woman art 
has idealized: chaste, silent and obedient.  Patricia Parker notes this use of artistic 
precedent in her examination of Bianca’s lessons, revealing that Bianca “construes” these 
precedents in such a way that resists and shows up her doxic, would-be tutors.15  The 
scene begins with the two arguing over who gets to sit with Bianca first, and 
interestingly, it is Bianca who decides saying: 
 Why, gentlemen, you do me doubly wrong  
 To strive for that which resteth in my choice. 
 I am no breeching scholar in the schools. 
 I’ll not be tied to hours nor ‘pointed times, 
 But learn my lessons as I please myself. (3.1.16-20) 
 
This speech could quite easily come from the mouth of Katherine, asserting her right to 
choose not only when she studies, but with whom as well.  It is a vocal claim of 
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autonomy, and thus shrewish.  Furthermore, Bianca acquiesces to Lucentio’s teaching 
only provisionally.  “I must believe my master, else, I promise you / I should be arguing 
still upon that doubt.”  When Hortensio reveals himself in a similar manner to Lucentio, 
Bianca swiftly and carelessly rejects his efforts.  He is not her choice, so his “masterly” 
game is not worth playing.  Her claim at this point is that “old fashions please me best; I 
am not so nice / to change true rules for odd inventions” (3.1.78-9).  Since she has just 
responded favorably to Lucentio’s “odd inventions” this is disingenuous.  Further, she 
returns at this point to claiming preference for the old, established ways.  This might be 
understood as traditional roles for men and women and traditional avenues of wooing.  In 
a few short lines Bianca moves from the independent scholar to one who claims the role 
of blushing schoolgirl just as that patriarchal trope best serves her purposes.  “Chaste, 
silent and obedient” is a costume to be donned and disregarded advantageously.  And 
Hortensio is no longer persuaded by this performance.  He threatens to drop her swiftly if 
she is as forward as her “wand’ring” and “ranging” eyes suggest.  Bianca knows the role 
she is to play, but this scene, clearly reveals the willful woman behind the silence who is 
happy to manipulate her public perception to get what it is she really wants.  
Interestingly, were Bianca to play the role of innocent ingénue in this scene we would 
have no access to her personal desires.  It is because she speaks, and speaks with willful 
intention, that we and Hortensio finally begin to access her interiority.  Her maidenly 
silence has been a performance, then, not the true Bianca.  And really, there can be little 
doubt that a woman who elopes with her chosen mate without her father’s approval, is a 
woman unafraid to assert her own will and agency.  Bianca’s independent willfulness in 
the final wager scene should surprise no one. 
Rhetoric and performance aside, however, Bianca’s self-silencing and evasion is 
her most effective tactic.  Consider once more her maneuvering during Katherine’s 
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inquisition.  We’ve already noted the ambiguity of her response to Katherine’s direct 
question about her favorite.  When Katherine asks specifically about Hortensio, Bianca 
again evades answering.  Her response however mirrors that of Katherine’s.  She 
interprets Katherine’s query as if it has supplied her with information rather than required 
information from her.  She assumes that Katherine is asking after Hortensio because she 
desires him for herself.  Katherine has not said this, nor does she indicate so at any point, 
but in this way Bianca taunts her suitor-less sister with her own bounty.  However, the 
epistemological maneuver of reading information about the questioner back into the 
question mimics what Lucentio, Baptista, and Katherine all do to her.  It is a brilliant 
reverse ventriloquism.  Bianca’s use of this tactic enacts the stereotypical male/female 
relationship model of reflection, wherein the female is like the moon which reflects the 
light of the sun or male.  This simile of course is employed later in the play at a crucial 
point in Kate’s transformation.  Bianca’s is an utterly feminine gesture in the Renaissance 
doxa and would be deserving of all praise, but for the fact that she uses her ability to 
reflect as both a shield and a weapon.  Enacting the sun/moon paradigm successfully 
deflects Katherine’s attempt to access Bianca’s private thoughts, at the same time that it 
further defeminizes Kate.  But deploying this gendered ideal at the moment of 
questioning turns what is perceived as ideal into a type of power play, a tactic or 
militaristic maneuver.  Michel DeCerteau in “The Practice of Everyday Life” divides 
social forces into strategic or tactical powers.  Dominating powers are strategic in the 
sense that they have a landscape to defend and from which to prepare a plan to maintain 
and gain authority.  Tactics, on the other hand, have no spatial location.  They are the 
responses of the disenfranchised Other to the dominant powers or paradigms.  By 
maintaining silence, those in impotent positions are able to exercise potent hegemony-
resisting tactics that simultaneously create individual subjectivity while subtly 
  41 
challenging and even changing the dominant geography.16  Self-silencers make space, 
take ground, on which to exercise social agency as personal entities.  As Christina Luckyj 
writes in her study of silence, “…feminine silence becomes a useful instrument for 
making the limits of masculine discursive control and knowledge.”17  Insofar as silence 
and reflection enable unaccessed interiority, they also enable agency.  Keeping private 
one’s identity or other information, knowledge of any sort, preserves it from public 
exploitation but also renders it useful only to that individual.  In a sort of theft by 
omission, the community as a whole and individually are rendered impotent to act upon 
complete information. As such Bianca’s silence reveals a key point in The Taming of the 
Shrew: silence and reflection are socially symbolic capital.  With this maneuver, Bianca 
unobtrusively stakes out a new landscape in which the community is forced to navigate 
blindly and unknowingly in their social interaction with and about her. 
Bianca’s control over her social community dramatically contrast with 
Katherine’s lack of power.  Often what seems to be self-silencing from Katherine at 
moments when we expect raillery is actually a consequence of the inefficacy of her 
rhetoric highlighting her oppression.  She has made it abundantly clear to Baptista that 
she is “forced/to give my hand opposed against my heart…” (3.2.8-9), but Baptista 
requires it anyway and so she is silent throughout the ceremony (as Gremio recounts it).  
She verbally resists leaving the wedding feast, but is unceremoniously hauled forth 
anyway, to the jeering laughter of the Paduan community.  Katherine’s forced removal 
from her wedding reception is often cited as a key moment of silence inexplicable in a 
shrew, yet she is not so much silent, as without recourse within the doxa for the 
indignities she endures.  Her transparently rebellious speech avails her nothing; she is 
physically ineffectual at securing personal liberty; and is denied any social or familial 
protection.  Thus it is only when she is bereft of resistant methodologies that she is quiet.  
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Her only exercise of subjective autonomy is in her speech.  An unwilling student at 
Petruchio’s “shrew-taming school,” Kate is still speaking her mind, still utterly 
transparent.  She articulates the way in which speaking is the only space afforded her 
subjective being: 
 Why, sir, I trust I may have leave to speak, 
 And speak I will.  I am no child, no babe. 
 Your betters have endured me say my mind, 
 And if you cannot, best stop your ears. 
 My tongue will tell the anger of my heart, 
 Or else my heart, concealing it, will break, 
 And rather than it shall I will be free, 
 Even to the uttermost, as I please, in words. (4.3.73-80) 
 
This claim for free speech is most revelatory of Katherine’s interiority, even her personal 
philosophy.  Katherine’s emphasis is on her freedom of speech; she makes no claims here 
for her physical liberation, she asserts only that she will be free in words.  This assertion 
affirms much of what we have seen of Katherine throughout the play.  Even while she 
does what is objectionable to her (releasing Bianca, marrying Petruchio, leaving her 
reception), she nonetheless always lets the community know how she feels about these 
circumstances.  Although she attempts to attain her will physically, she succeeds only in 
asserting it verbally.  To this point in the play Katherine has been completely transparent 
and knowable.  The “silent shrew” is only ever quiet when her words have been spent in 
vain and she is compelled to do that which is disagreeable to her.   
 Throughout the play, then, Katherine’s subjectivity is accessible via speech.  Her 
criticisms of Bianca suggest that she abhors hypocrisy and we can see that she is verbally 
demonstrative, striving to represent her true self to her community.  While this behavior 
is admirable in a man it has proved to be Katherine’s undoing.  She is without adequate 
social protection from Baptista, and has taken to speaking on her own behalf in public.  In 
accordance with this effort, she has embraced a very masculine epistemology seeking to 
know and be known by honest appearances and speech, as is clear from her estrangement 
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from Bianca.  This enactment of masculine behavioral ideals unsurprisingly earns 
Katherine the “shrew” appellation, and her uncomfortable “stale” description as an 
obstacle to Bianca’s hand in marriage is a pointed result of her social ostracism.  Bianca, 
on the other hand, demonstrates a cannier understanding of social expectations.  She 
mimics feminine behavior as demonstrated in the arts and performs the role of the “ideal 
ingénue.”  She is obedient to her father, silent before suitors, and objectified by all.  This 
objectification is in no way a hindrance to Bianca’s goals however.  When bound and 
interrogated by Katherine, Bianca turns the tables on her sister and infuriates her by 
refusing to answer questions directly, by using a screen of maidenly chastity to demur 
more explicit responses, and by enacting the sun/moon reflection paradigm in such a way 
as to make it a weapon against Katherine, masculinizing her and repulsing her attempt to 
know Bianca.  Bianca’s objectification, to the point that she is bound and beaten at her 
sister’s hands, is turned into a strategic power move.  She maintains her subjectivity, her 
personal agency and identity, by using the objectification to screen her more ambitious 
and self-defining activities.   
 Given the social ideals of transparency, Bianca’s type of metadramatic 
subterfuge may seem an especially feminine technique.  But the disguises donned by 
Lucentio and Hortensio (as well as Tranio and Vincentio) should suggest that duping the 
public is by no means the domain of the enigmatic ingénue.  Rather, it is commonplace 
within their social field.  Tranio is linked to the Inductions’s Sly insofar as their disguise 
grants them greater social class and its corresponding privileges.  Juliet Dusinberre 
argues that Tranio subordinates Lucentio, “killing him” with his extraordinary success in 
language and communication.18  Interestingly though, instead of experiencing a “death,” 
Lucentio’s lowered social position liberates him to obtain his own desires while Tranio 
subverts his own subjectivity in order to satisfy the Paduan community’s expectations.  
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Just as Sly cannot get ale as a Lord (Ind.2.1-12), the public scrutiny of upper class 
persons seems to limit their subjective options.  Social scrutiny exerts dramatic pressure 
for conformation to norms and ideals.  In The Taming of the Shrew, this pressure is so 
powerful it requires subversion and performativity in order to maintain personal agency.  
Petruchio too uses this type of performance to obtain his personal goals, and this appears 
to be the gist of his “taming” methodology.  He seems eager to persuade Katherine that 
she need only disguise her true self to be able to pursue her private interests.  As 
Dusinberre concludes, there is freedom in bondage (182).  That bondage is the necessity 
of public performance, disguise, and deception yoked with private inscrutability.  
Although Katherine adheres to what she believes to be the doxic norm of rhetorical 
transparency, Petruchio’s scheme reveals this as a misapprehension.  He better conforms 
to the Paduan sociality of disguise and deception by making speech as inscrutable as 
silence. 
 Petruchio begins his taming of Katherine by publicly constructing her identity in 
way heretofore unknown in Padua.  In conversation with Baptista and other, Katherine’s 
habitus is verbally costumed in idealized garb.19  It is a start to the type of protective 
behavior a woman could theoretically expect from those responsible for and in authority 
over her.  His true beliefs about Katherine are irrelevant.  More to the point is that he 
portrays Katherine as a desirable woman to the Paduan men, and in so doing constructs 
himself as a loving, protective catch of a husband.  While speech for Katherine and 
Bianca is always revelatory, Petruchio’s speech is of an entirely different nature.  
Petruchio is the only character in Shrew to speak soliloquies, which are generically 
supposed to afford us access to the character’s interiority, and accordingly the play’s 
auditors tend to feel as if they know Petruchio.  His subjectivity appears accessible and 
well-motivated because he has spoken to us directly.  The soliloquies themselves, 
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however, are remarkably impersonal.  They do reveal tactics, but they do not ultimately 
tell us much about Petruchio’s motivations, desires or character.  His first soliloquy 
introduces his methodological approach to winning Katherine. 
    I’ll attend her here 
 And woo her with some spirit when she comes. 
 Say that she rail, why then I’ll tell her plain 
 She sings as sweetly as a nightingale. 
 Say that she frown, I’ll say she looks as clear 
 As morning roses newly washed with dew. 
 Say she be mute and will not speak a word, 
 Then I’ll commend her volubility 
 And say she uttereth piercing eloquence. 
 If she do bid me pack, I’ll give her thanks 
 As though she bid me stay by her a week. 
 If she deny to wed, I’ll crave the day 
 When I shall ask the banns and when be married. 
 But here she comes, and now, Petruchio, speak. (2.1.168-181) 
 
Petruchio anticipates Katherine’s shrewish nature; he expects her to “rail,” “frown,” be 
mute,” and “bid me pack.”  So he plots to intentionally misconstrue her words and 
meaning so that she is made charming and their marriage decided.  Wayne A. Rebhorn 
describes Petruchio as a “rhetor”: one who uses identity-shaping language to create an 
artificial or self-constructed identity.20  Here Petruchio uses that talent to recreate 
Katherine.  Undoubtedly, as many have criticized, Petruchio’s refusal to listen to 
Katherine amounts to her objectification.  Her desires, her will, even her very nature 
would be negated and transformed into Petruchio’s vision of her.  Nonetheless, 
Petruchio’s soliloquy sets this up as a game, we might say a play, a performance with a 
role for himself and one for Katherine.  The fact that Petruchio pre-scripts the encounter 
tells us something of his taming methodology – to cross and re-interpellate Katherine – 
but it does not ultimately reveal much about his own motivations or desires.  In fact, the 
soliloquy only reveals that he is plotting a performance, not who he is as an actor or 
suitor.  The anticipated intimate insight of a soliloquy is thus thwarted by a rehearsal of 
lines, rather than a revelation of identity.  Like the play within a play, this speech plots a 
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performance and thus puts us at two removes from Petruchio’s presumed interiority.  
Although it does reveal his goal (marriage) and his methodology, it also tells us that 
speech, like silence, can fail to represent.  Petruchio traffics only in public perception, not 
in private revelation.  He thus joins Bianca, Lucentio, Tranio and Hortensio in the doxa of 
social deception.   
 Given Petruchio’s interest in recreating Katherine’s public identity, it is utterly 
appropriate that his first words to her re-name her, “Good morrow, Kate, for that’s your 
name, I hear” (2.1.182).  He persists in the diminution of her name, despite her 
correction, and proceeds to reconstruct her identity idealistically as pretty and dainty.  
After much bantering, Katherine finally recognizes his speech for the performance that it 
is inquiring, “Where did you study all this goodly speech?” (2.1.256).  In response, 
Petruchio (possibly physically subduing Katherine) speaks to her “plainly,” 
Marry, so I mean, sweet Katherine, in thy Bed. 
And therefore, setting all this chat aside, 
Thus in plain terms: your father hath consented 
That you shall be my wife, your dowry ‘greed on, 
And will you, nill you, I will marry you. 
Now, Kate, I am a husband for your turn, 
For, by this light, whereby I see thy beauty— 
Thy beauty that doth make me like thee well— 
Thou must be married to no man but me. 
Or I am he am born to tame you Kate, 
And bring you from a wild Kate to a Kate, 
Conformable as other household Kates. 
Here comes your Father.  Never make denial; 
I must and will have Katherine to my wife. (2.1.259-272) 
 
Speaking to Katherine in her own plain terms, Petruchio reveals his marital intentions.  
This “plain” speech does not tell us much about Petruchio, however.  Is he marrying her 
for the money or her beauty, as he says, in order to prove his masculinity?  Or perhaps 
some other, un-revealed reason?  Petruchio’s soliloquy’s and monologues reveal nothing 
other than his intentions and his own wit.21  As to his rhetoric, however, Petruchio calls 
Katherine by her full name when he speaks directly to her, but uses the appellation Kate 
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when he is articulating the new identity he wishes to devolve upon her.  Re-naming 
Katherine distinguishes a social identity from a private one.  He offers to share his social 
play, gives her a role in his performance.  Not surprisingly Katherine does not accept this 
part, perhaps because it seems to diminish her identity as well as her name.22  
Nonetheless, Petruchio’s speech is actually another form of silence, and it suggests that 
there is another way of speaking available to Katherine: to tell tales, to perform the role 
of Kate who is the social ideal.  And to use Kate as a prop or costume, behind which 
Katherine may be liberated. 
 Petruchio’s outlandish wedding attire is another effort to teach Katherine the 
benefits of outward conformity.  He establishes a link between speech and clothing—
both are socially informative and subject to judgment, but neither are adequate 
epistemologies.  Petruchio draws a distinction between what is exterior and what is 
interior, only now he has put on the socially unacceptable costume.  Previously he 
performed the social ideal, presumably hoping to show Katherine the ease with which 
one might be accepted in society without necessarily compromising personal integrity.  
Yet she failed to absorb the performance metaphor, so he has switched roles, now.  He is 
to be the “shrew” by making physically manifest the contrary behavior that has won 
Katherine ostracism.  To the Paduan community he insists on the separation between his 
public appearance and his private self, “To me she’s married, not unto my clothes,” he 
says (3.2.117).  This costume, however, succeeds in mystifying his subjectivity.23  Unlike 
Katherine, however, who was always explicit about her feelings and motivations, 
Petruchio is now an enigmatic character who assures the Paduans that he is still rational, 
but offers no satisfactory explanation for his behavior.  The reversal ruse is successful.  
He out-shrews Katherine during the ceremony with his perverse attire and drunken 
behavior.  Gremio calls him a devil and says that by comparison, Katherine is “a lamb, a 
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dove, a fool to him” (3.2.157).  Petruchio’s efforts to transform public opinion about his 
wife are succeeding.  His ridiculous costume and behavior, as well as his uncharitable 
insistence on a premature departure from the wedding feast, aligns Katherine with the 
community, marking him the social outcast.  In other words, his socially unacceptable 
behavior offers Katherine a taste of social inclusion that warrants a comparison of his 
anti-social behavior and her own.  Although the community dismisses them both, 
Katherine has experienced a moment of social solidarity she seems eager to recreate at 
Petruchio’s home.  Her opposition settles now directly upon him, rather than the 
community at large.   
 Apart from the effects upon Katherine, Petruchio’s “performance” at the wedding 
seems directed as much to the Paduans as it does to her.  Bourdieu speaks of thresholds, 
“where the antagonistic principles confront one another and the world is reversed” (228).  
The social world of The Taming of the Shrew presents just such a threshold in the 
wedding of Katherine to Petruchio.  Bourdieu suggests that “the function of the rites that 
accompany…marriage is to disguise and thereby sanction the collision of two opposing 
principles” (234).  Their personal opposition is enacted in the stichomythia of their first 
encounter, but Katherine’s shrewish habitus is prompted largely by the failures of the 
patriarchy to afford Katherine either social protection or independent liberty.  Bourdieu 
would have us identify “the precise locus of the threshold, where the order of things turns 
upside down…” (233).  The social reversal does not lie within the theatre of Sly’s 
transformation which never forgets it is a performance, but behind it within the Paduan 
(English Renaissance) patriarchy which does not recognize performativity and where 
women are problematically perceived as objects who can be known, controlled and 
traded.  Bourdieu sees social rituals such as marriage ceremonies operating as false 
representations.   
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The whole truth of magic and collective belief is contained in this game of  
twofold objective truth, a double game played with truth, through which the 
group, the source of all objectivity, in a sense lies to itself, by producing a truth 
whose sole function and meaning are to deny a truth known and recognized by 
all, a lie that would deceive no one, were not everyone determined to deceive 
himself. (234) 
 
Petruchio disrupts this ritual, calling out its deception in the language of performance and 
patriarchy.  In addition to undermining the expectations of appearance and sober behavior 
during the ceremony, he says of Katherine at the feast, “I will be master of what is mine 
own.  She is my goods, my chattels…my household stuff…my anything” (3.2.229-230).  
In articulating the patriarchal treatment of women as objects, he reveals the 
objectification the marriage rite sought to deny.  His transparency in regards to the 
essential meaninglessness of fashion and ritual, as well as his verbal mockery of 
patriarchy mark him as the social shrew.  Petruchio initiates a reversal between he and 
Katherine, but the message is available to the sociality as a whole.  
 An exchange between Grumio and Curtis offers some insight into Petruchio’s 
shift from normative behavior to socially reprehensible behavior.  Grumio promises a tale 
if Curtis will lend his ear.  When proffered, Grumio proceeds to beat the ear.  Curtis 
announces, “This ‘tis to feel a tale, not to hear a tale” (4.1.60).  Katherine too has failed 
to hear Petruchio’s “tale” or to take her role in his play.  Now she will “feel” the tale.  
She will experience, firsthand, the perverse effects of speaking social truth in a socially 
unacceptable manner.  She will be, as the servant Peter says, killed “in her own humour” 
(4.1. 174).  And it is to be a “murder” of Katherine’s shrewish character, a social death, 
like Hero’s in Much Ado About Nothing, contrived so that Kate, the woman who 
performs socially acceptable behavior in order to preserve her personal autonomy, might 
live.24  Katherine’s inability or unwillingness to learn, as Bianca does, through story or 
literary precedent requires that she learn through uncomfortable physical experience.  As 
  50 
Marjorie Garber has said about Sly, the new surroundings, unfamiliar people, and curious 
social treatment create an environment ripe for transformation.  Katherine is not only in a 
new home, with new servants, but she is barely married, with a new master, uncertain as 
to her own place in Petruchio’s world.  It is the opportune moment, as Petruchio contrives 
it, to “tame” his shrewish wife.  However, unlike Sly in his drunken stupor, excluded 
from the Lord and his men in the induction sharing what Garber calls a “private joke,” 
Katherine is alert and witness to the transformation of her setting and circumstance.25  
Technically, she is in on the joke.  Or, if she doesn’t get the humor, she nonetheless 
watches its staging, and is even privy to its fundamentally performative nature.  It is 
possible she hears Hortensio promise the tailor payment, Petruchio certainly tells her 
repeatedly what he is up to, and Hortensio himself, instructs her how to play her role.  If 
Petruchio is engaging in pedagogy, he makes it very clear to Katherine that she is to be 
his student, however much she, like Bianca and Sly, is an unwilling pupil and performer. 
 Petruchio speaks again to the audience/reader in soliloquy explaining that he 
tames Katherine as one would tame a wild hawk: deprivation engendering dependence.  
While comparing Katherine to a hawk is surely no compliment, it does speak to the 
nature of the Paduan (and English Renaissance) society: women are dependent upon men 
for their physical needs such as clothes, food and shelter.  These things were not rights to 
which women were legally entitled, although it was doxically expected that honorable 
men would provide for women in their care in this way.  Baptista’s indulgence of 
Katherine’s shrewishness failed to express to Katherine her ultimate dependence upon 
him or upon social approbation.  Her reputation in the community surely kept her from 
marrying and in consequence, endangered her own livelihood.  Petruchio’s methodology 
seems designed to reveal to Katherine both her dependence and the value of social 
inclusion.  Indeed Katherine says, “But I, who never knew how to entreat / Nor never 
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needed that I should entreat / Am starved for meat…” (4.3.7-9).  The “lesson” Petruchio 
teaches, though, goes beyond reminding Katherine of her social vulnerability.26  
Petruchio claims to temporarily deprive Katherine of basic necessities out of love.  And it 
can be understood as a type of love, if we see that the temporary suffering will offer her 
long-term benefits in her marriage and community.  This lesson comes, as Lucentio’s to 
Bianca, by means of manipulating language and meaning.  As Katherine says, “And that 
which spites me more than all these wants / He does it under name of perfect love” 
(4.3.11-12).  Katherine finds this particularly challenging because as we’ve already 
noticed, she is intent on having her words reflect her actual meaning.  She thinks it 
impossible that Petruchio’s lesson could be for her own good, so she feels frustrated at 
his apparent hypocrisy.  While Katherine asserts her right to speak freely and honestly, 
Petruchio responds in the tailor scene with a series of verbal miscues and intentional 
misunderstandings.  Echoing the wedding scene, Petruchio again uses clothing as an 
instrument of pedagogy by misrepresenting the quality of the gown made for Katherine.  
When she complains, saying Petruchio wants to “make a puppet” of her.  Petruchio 
intentionally misunderstands her to be referring to the tailor not himself.  When the tailor 
clarifies Katherine’s intended target, Petruchio heaps a tirade of insults upon the tailor.  
This reaction is interesting because Petruchio is not angry that Katherine has accused him 
of puppetry.  His anger is directed to the tailor who has repeated her insult, thereby 
marring Katherine’s own reputation.  The tailor’s crime is reporting behavior that reflects 
negatively on Katherine, and it is this utterance that incites Petruchio’s temper.  What 
follows is an extended, humorous exchange between Petruchio, Grumio and the tailor on 
the imprecision of language.   
 Tailor: …Grumio gave order how it should be done. 
 Grumio: I gave him no order; I gave him the stuff. 
 Tailor: But how did you desire it should be made? 
 Grumio: Marry, sir, with needle and thread. (4.3.117-120) 
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Following so closely upon Katherine’s assertion of the importance of her plain, freely 
uttered speech, this episode cannot but require her to recognize the possibility for 
misstatement and misunderstanding.  Freedom to speak is one thing, but there is no 
guarantee that speech will be understood as intended.  Language is not always a reliable 
communicator of meaning, nor is it necessary that it be so.  There is social capital to be 
gained in politic dissembling.   
Katherine’s failure to grasp this idea is finally remedied by Petruchio and 
Hortensio both using the same plain, revelatory speech that Katherine herself uses.  
Petruchio says, “It shall be moon or star or what I list, / Or ere I journey to your father’s 
house” (4.5.7-8).  He is explicit here, that for their relationship to progress, she must 
acquiesce to his words, not her own ideas.  Hortensio cements the lesson saying, “Say as 
he says or we shall never go” (4.5.11).  Hortensio’s meaning is perhaps a clarification of 
Petruchio’s.  He doesn’t urge her to be persuaded that the sun is the moon, he urges her to 
simply agree with Petruchio in order to get what they all desire.  Katherine needs to echo 
what Petruchio says, it doesn’t matter whether or not it is truth.  This is the type of non-
revelatory speech, even hypocritical speech that enables social interaction.  Conformable 
speech affords social agency and averts the symbolic violence of ostracism.  It may be the 
first time Katherine has realized the benefit in speaking other than what she believes.  She 
quickly tells Petruchio that whatever he says is truth for her.  It is the moment of 
“taming.”  She speaks as if she is submissive to Petruchio, yet she has only been 
admonished to speak in accord with Petruchio, not to speak in accord with her beliefs, 
ideas or even reality.  She has seen that agreeing with Petruchio offers her a social 
passport.  And as he continues with the test, she joins in playfully, the tension in their 
relationship is noticeably relieved for both of them.27   
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As Katherine conforms to Petruchio we lose access to her subjectivity.  Now her 
speech, like Petruchio’s, veils at least as much as it reveals and we must guess how much 
of what she says is true and how much is socially performed.  In the play’s concluding 
wager scene, Katherine is clearly as sensitive to insult as ever, but she awaits Petruchio’s 
encouragement before avenging the insults of Hortensio’s widow.  Katherine sees that, in 
marked contrast to Baptista, Petruchio does support her efforts to defend herself publicly.  
But we cannot think Katherine tame if she aggressively defends herself when under 
attack.  Her battle with the widow recalls her objection to Gremio’s similar insults when 
first we met Katherine.  However her hesitation in reacting, her waiting for Petruchio’s 
approval, suggests that she is, at the very least, respectful of the authoritative dynamic in 
the marital relationship.  She is letting Petruchio determine the social navigability of a 
situation, and awaiting his call before acting.  She no longer needs for her “tongue to tell 
or her heart to break” now that she may be defended or act in her own defence.  When 
Katherine says, “…our [women’s] lances are but straws/Our strength as weak, our 
weakness past compare…” (5.2.173-4), she speaks of her own experience.  Her straw 
lance was ineffective, transparent rhetoric.  Insofar as Petruchio is her “…lord…life… 
keeper/…head…sovereign” (5.2.146-7), he carves out the space for her subjectivity 
within the sociality.  That space, however, is dependent on her persuasive performance of 
the social doxa.  Katherine, a voluble character, is still speaking at the conclusion of the 
play.  She has not become the idealized silent woman.  But she is no longer the 
transparent Katherine of the beginning of the play.  Now she is Kate, her public identity, 
saying what must be said for social acceptance.  She now uses speech as Bianca has used 
silence and Petruchio language: as a costume.  Her thoughts remain her own: perhaps she 
believes her words, perhaps not.  And thus, metadramatically, she gains autonomy over 
her subjectivity.  What has been tamed is not Katherine, per se, but her tongue.28  
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Furthermore, this silencing of the self does not necessarily require actual silence but it 
does obligate one to politic speech. 
 Within an epistemic analysis of social relations, Shrew suggests that privacy is 
desirable and that both speech and silence may be used to deceive or put on a front.  
There is something ultimately distasteful about absolute transparency in the play; a sense 
that human subjects are not meant to be bare before one another.  Perhaps subjects lose 
their potency, their individuality and meaning when exposed to public scrutiny.  
Consequently, characters in this play camouflage or misrepresent their subjectivity in 
order to maneuver around a restrictive sociality.  They create epistemic dilemmas, which 
in turn create a space behind, in which “real” identities may autonomously exercise 
agency.  In The Taming of the Shrew, the philosophy of social performance is pointed up 
as a reality requiring not just a philosophic response, but pragmatic management.  If 
performance is the pragmatist’s answer to philosophical skepticism, it is appropriate to 
use the theatre to make this point.  While Puritan critics decried theatrical deception, The 
Taming of the Shrew acknowledges it as commonplace in human society and not at all 
extraordinary.  Shrew deflates the Puritan argument but never deflates the drama of the 
Induction’s joke on Sly.  Just as the rites that disguise the threshold of opposition are 
exposed in Petruchio’s abrupt departure from the wedding feast, so are rituals of 
theatrical representation dismantled and unmasked.  The performance is uncontained by 
the theatre.  The field of representation is extended to the audience suggesting that there 
can be no return to reality when reality itself is a performance.  The self-silencing of the 
play, its failure to perform, failure to resolve the Sly storyline, reveal what the 
community is trying to forget: that transparency is impossible; that both silence and 
speech are deceptive; that there are no satisfying epistemologies.  As the play’s auditors 
encounter the abbreviated play, their conscious must wrestle with their community’s 
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similarity to that of Padua: superficial, artificial, and oppressive in regards to both gender 
and class.  
For all the Renaissance concern with transparency, personal subjectivity is not 
self-determined in a vacuum.  It involves the imputation of historical and cultural models 
and ideals, as well as the cooperation and collaboration of the community.  Only 
Petruchio and Bianca in The Taming of the Shrew seem to understand the communally 
embedded subject, and the curtailed liberties social interactions entail.  To fulfill the 
community’s expectations, one must necessarily repress, hide or dissemble those less-
desirable qualities, desires, ambitions or idiosyncrasies that do not fit the social norm.  In 
other words, one must intentionally fail to perform their subjectivity.  Thus power is 
meted according to one’s ability to either be silent, like Bianca, or to act the part in which 
the community has cast you, like Petruchio and eventually Katherine.  Both of these 
strategies, like the representational field of theatre itself, create a space for subjectivity 
that does not correspond with one’s fictional representation.  But, in addition to posing 
real economic and social dangers to the community at large, the inherent deceptiveness of 
self-obscurity violates the ethical values of truth, transparency, and moral exemplarism.  
Thus the Paduan doxa (and the English patriarchy it mirrors) is implicitly criticized for 
requiring persons to don a habitus of deceptive speech and manipulative silence in order 
to achieve perfectly ordinary aims of marriage and freedom from public persecution.   
The self-silencing of women, either in speech or actual silence, is most effective 
if it is silence which reflects and conceals.  Women’s silence, as demonstrated between 
Lucentio and Bianca, reflects social and ethical ideals to the men who look (listen) upon 
them.  In that reflection, men are given an opportunity to contemplate and modify 
themselves to be in accord with the ideal they perceive, to be worthy of the woman 
whose possession will elevate their social standing.  For men, the woman they see in 
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silence is like them.  She is a reflection of them.  Meanwhile, reflecting women create 
space behind the mirror, so to speak, in which to be themselves.  This resonates with the 
sun/moon metaphor where men are conspicuously public in the sun, while women are 
occluded in the nighttime sky.  Though there is surely repression in that occlusion 
(women are afforded little opportunity to effect ethical reflection in other women), The 
Taming of the Shrew suggests that public scrutiny might be an even greater bondage to 
endure.  For women’s silence to be effective as a mirror, spotlighting men and concealing 
women, it must be accomplished unobtrusively.  Unlike the silencing of revengers or 
tricksters which is concerned to register as silence in order to effect ethical 
transformation, women’s silence might be read as “shrewish” dissent if it does not 
seamlessly blend into prevailing rhetorical paradigms.  Scholars exemplify this tendency 
when reading Katherine’s silences as shrewish, rather than defeated.  The performative 
fractures of Bianca’s silence likewise reveal her resistant strategies, and thus would serve 
her ends better if completely sealed.  Shrewish Petruchio most thoroughly manages to 
enact a feminine self-silence (accomplished in speech), reflecting to Katherine how she is 
perceived and how she might be free.  The gendered conflict that arises within the failure 
of patriarchal ideals feminizes Petruchio and masculinizes Katherine.  Petruchio’s 
interiority is never convincingly accessed, yet his facile verbosity means that he has never 
been understood as a self-silenced character.  And that, it seems, would be the goal: to be 
seen as conformable publicly, while maintaining and protecting (at a remove) one’s 
desires, motivations, and true subjectivity.  Thus socially-sanctioned behaviors and 
speech-acts become the staging ground of a doxically-scripted performance that 
obfuscates both resistance and self-fulfillment.  Feminine self-silencing is an 
epistemologically resistant strategy available to men and women that exercises a habitus 
while simultaneously disengaging from and thus critiquing the ethics of the doxic field.  It 
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is strategic subjectivity exercised, as it were, behind enemy lines.  But from outside the 
field of its activation, it reveals the ethical insufficiencies of the populace who are 
oppressing, evading, and dissembling. 
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Notes to Ch. 2 “My tongue will tell”: Of Silencing Selves 
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CHAPTER 3 
"YOU KNOW WHAT YOU KNOW": SILENT SELVES, SECRET SELVES 
The epistemological quandaries of the silent subject that we encounter in The 
Taming of the Shrew are fully enacted in the next two plays.  But although silent villains 
and tricksters exploit uncertain epistemology, the effects on their subjectivities and 
socialities are most pronounced in ontological figurations.  Wayne A. Rebhorn has 
documented the trickster as a rhetor, one who accomplishes his ends through energetic 
public speaking to the purpose of evincing a credible ethos.1  With this rhetorically-
ascertained ethos, he then dupes his community to accomplish personal goals whose 
motivations might best be termed Machiavellian.  Voluble villains, however, are a bit 
unexpected given the secrecy required for any successful trick.  Are trickster-villains 
rhetorically or silently manipulative?  Or are these the same thing?  Why and how does a 
trickster-villain self-silence?  What are the subjective and ethical effects of self-silencing 
in these situations?  These are the questions this chapter explores by examining the 
circumstances of villain-trickster self-silencing in William Shakespeare’s Othello and 
Ben Jonson’s Epicene, The Silent Woman.  The effects, intentional and otherwise, of the 
uses of self-silencing by villains and tricksters are both disorienting and surprisingly 
pharmaceutical.  This essay considers the subjectivities of two early modern trickster-
villains from dual perspectives: their own and their community’s.  It finds these 
subjectivities as they are constituted in relation to speech and silence—an exploration that 
requires a survey of silence and dissimulation in the plays, considerations of 
Machiavellian and authoritative representations, and of course the effects of silence upon 
witnesses/listeners.  In order to plot the ramifications of silence on the communities in 
these plays, I will be employing the mathematical ontology of Alain Badiou.  His use of 
set theory allows me to analyze the relationships and functions of characters from outside 
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the linguistic relationships instantiated within the play.  This perspective reveals the vital 
link between ethics and ontology at work in these Early Modern plays.2 
Although tricksters may not be of precisely the same character as villains, I think 
we might consider their difference as one of degree, rather than type.  Both deceive their 
community in service to their own desires, both sublimate the common good to personal 
pleasure, and both are undeterred by the potential for dangerous or fatal consequences—
for themselves or others. Rebhorn offers precedent for my conflation of these character 
types in his seminal exploration of the trickster in Renaissance literature, when he 
casually includes, in a categorical series of Renaissance tricksters, Iago, who is a defining 
character of villainy in the dual senses of criminality and uncouth depravity.  More to the 
point, however, I here combine these categories because they exercise a like methodology 
of self-silencing.  The actions of the villain-trickster reveal a neglected, dangerous or 
unknown element within the sociality.  Their self-silencing refers that element to the 
sociality, suggesting that it is an element shared amongst them.  Self-silencing initiates an 
exchange between the trickster-villain and their community that distributes responsibility 
for the trick or deception upon them all.  This is not to say that the victim or dupe caused 
their own suffering, but everyone is implicated insofar as everyone possesses an un-
represented, secret self that does or may give rise to equally reprehensible behaviors.  The 
trickster-villain’s silence shows how their community is “like” them, revealing personal 
and ethical failures and follies, and ultimately providing a chance for pre-emptive 
correction.  The trickster-villain’s claim of “likeness” does not derive from the authority 
of special knowledge or socially-constructed hierarchy, but within the ethos of identities 
in which trickster-villains traffic.   
Othello struggles to understand that there may be a secret self.  Initially, Othello 
is unable to conceive of a hidden heart of darkness in either himself or others.  For 
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himself he claims a unified and transparent identity: “My parts, my title, and my perfect 
soul/Shall manifest me rightly” (1.2.30-1).3  And for others, as Iago comments, “The 
Moor is of a free and open nature/That thinks men honest that but seem to be so…” 
(1.3.390-1).4  It is this determined naiveté upon which Iago capitalizes in order to undo 
Othello.  When Iago first “pour[s] the pestilence into his [Othello’s] ear” (2.3.356), he 
does so by intimating to Othello that he (Iago) possesses a thought that he will not share 
or make publicly known.  He reveals this thought indirectly through insinuation.  Othello 
asks (following Iago’s hint) whether Iago thinks Cassio is honest.  
Iago:   Honest, my lord? 
Othello:  Honest? Ay Honest? 
Iago:   My lord, for aught I know. 
Othello:  What dost thou think? 
Iago:   Think, my lord? 
Othello:  Think, my lord? 
By heaven, thou echoest me, 
As if there were some monster in thy thought  
Too hideous to be shown.  Thou didst mean something. 
I heard thee say even now, thou lik’st not that, 
When Cassio left my wife.  What didst not like? 
And when I told thee he was of my counsel 
Of my whole course of wooing, thou cried’st ‘Indeed?’ 
And didst contract and purse thy brow together,  
As if thou then hadst shut up in thy brain 
Some horrible conceit.  If thou dost love me, 
Show me thy thought. (3.3.103-116) 
 
Although Iago is effectively silent, only repeating Othello’s words, his entire presentation 
is intentionally replete with evasion.  Not even Othello can fail to recognize Iago’s 
performance of subtext.  Othello can, however, fail to interpret it.  “Show me thy 
thought,” he commands.  Were he a skilled reader of secrecy, he would know that Iago is 
showing him his thought.  The gestural expressions on Iago’s face and the specifics of his 
evasive articulation are all about showing, about teaching Othello to read performance 
instead of trusting in words.  But what Othello is really seeking here is for Iago’s 
“thought” to be expressed in language, Othello’s preferred method of communication.  
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For Othello, to be “shown” is to be told, to be informed with language.  And indeed he 
will be persuaded that Desdemona is unfaithful when Iago tells him so.5  The infamous 
“ocular proof”, that tangible kerchief, is of course, epistemologically bankrupt, 
functioning as little more than the bow on the winding sheets of Desdemona’s deathbed.6  
But before Othello can believe what Iago tells him, his relative innocence regarding 
dissemblance requires that Iago first teach him about hidden interiority.   
If “manifest” Othello ever understood secrecy, Iago now needs to remind him 
why persons are performances, and how to read persons suggestively.  In the sequence 
quoted above, Iago demonstrates dissimulation.7  Having secured Othello’s attention, he 
then explains the fact, as well as the merits, of secrecy. 
 Utter my thoughts?  Why say they are vile and false, 
 As where’s that palace whereinto foul things 
 Sometimes intrude not?  Who has that breast so pure 
 But some uncleanly apprehensions 
 Keep leets and law days, and in sessions sit 
 With meditations lawful?... 
 Though I am perchance vicious in my guess 
 (As I confess it is my nature’s plague 
 To spy into abuses, and of my jealousy 
 Shape faults that are not), that your wisdom 
 From one that so imperfectly conceits 
 Would take no notice, nor build yourself a trouble  
 Out of his scattering and unsure observance. 
 It were not for your quiet nor your good, 
 Nor for my manhood, honesty, and wisdom, 
 To let you know my thoughts. (3.3.133-155) 
Iago instructs Othello in the impossibility of purity, in the natural intermingling of worthy 
thoughts with unworthy, and the value of secrecy in hiding one’s base thoughts so as to 
retain one’s reputation and prevent others from being burdened with prejudicial 
suspicions.  As Janet Adelman writes, “[Iago’s] seduction of Othello works by inscribing 
in Othello the sense of dangerous interior spaces—introducing him to the world of self-
alienation.”8  Further, he accomplishes this education all while avoiding answering 
Othello’s question.  Through his demonstration and introduction of these ideas of 
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dissemblance, Iago fertilizes Othello’s mind to fruitfully receive the seeds of jealousy.  
Iago teaches Othello to find dissemblance in innocence, his method of pedagogy: silence 
and evasion.  Well before he finally self-silences at the play’s conclusion, Iago uses 
silence to reveal the secret self.  
 Though Othello renounces his life at the end of the play, he does not abjure his 
belief in language.  Despite Iago’s education in the art of dissimulation and performance, 
Othello, who wins both Desdemona’s love and the Senate’s admiration with his 
“witchcraft” of words, still yearns to control the use of language in creating his legacy.  
He entreats witnesses to, “Speak of me as I am.  Nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in 
malice.  Then must you speak of one who loved not wisely, but too well….” (5.2.338-
340).  One might expect that the “pestilence” of words with which Iago corrupts Othello 
would be sufficient to dissuade him from trusting in their use; Iago has taught Othello 
that language can be used to dissemble.  But eloquence is Othello’s passport to Venetian 
society.  Without speech, he is without power in the community.9  Thus he rejects Iago’s 
anti-rhetorical curricula and remains, in the end, what he was in the beginning: a 
soldiering man of violence made eloquently visible in language.   
 Othello the play, however, remains much more ambivalent about the power of 
language than Othello the character.  Othello’s efforts to speak rightly of himself in both 
the beginning of the play and its conclusion are undermined by his failure to recognize 
his own linguistic duplicity.  Just before dazzling the Senate, as he did Desdemona, with 
the tale of his latest conquest (Desdemona herself), he claims, “Rude am I in my 
speech,/And little blessed with the soft phrase of peace” (1.3.81-2).  This professed 
insufficiency is, of course, utterly contradicted in the speech that follows, leading the 
Duke to suggest that his own daughter’s love would be won by such story telling.  
Othello’s “round, unvarnished tale” (1.3.90) in fact confirms Brabantio’s suspicions that 
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Desdemona has been “enchanted,” (1.3.62) captured by the “spells” of a “mountebank” 
(1.3.61).  Othello’s personal forthrightness is compromised here.  Perhaps he does, in 
fact, understand the presentational nature of language, that it can hide the socially 
unacceptable “secret self.”  Certainly this is affirmed in his effort to craft his own legacy 
by controlling the telling of his tale at the end of the play.  Othello seems to believe that 
his presentation is his identity; that by saying what he is he creates what he is.  The 
particulars of his suicide and his narration of it, suggests his desire to once again disguise 
his less desirable qualities, to unify his identity, by selecting which of his “divided duty” 
is more deserving.  In choosing the Venetian soldier over the base murderer, he reveals 
his desire to be socially, civilly, redeemed.  Although Othello’s “secret self” appears 
periodically throughout the play, there is a distinct lack of malice in his undermined self-
presentation that suggests he is unaware of his own inconsistency, an ignorance Iago 
exploits in ensnaring Othello in his plot. 
Iago wields language like a weapon furthering the play’s suspicions regarding the 
ethical nature of speech.  Iago performs a subjectivity so persuasively forthright-seeming 
that he earns the designation of honest Iago.  His rhetorical ethos is the source of his 
power over those with greater social, economical and political standing than he.  In 
contrast to Othello, Iago claims to “work by wit, and not by witchcraft” (2.3.372) in 
moving persons to his will.  The distinction is important in the play.  “Witchcraft” is the 
term used repeatedly to describe Othello’s aesthetic eloquence, but Iago distinguishes 
rhetorical art from the witty use of language.  Wit is connected with social understanding 
and cleverness, but not necessarily knowledge or wisdom.  Iago articulates a binary 
between speech used artistically to secure sociality (as Othello demonstrates) and that 
used intellectually, to express one’s self plainly.  This duality is clearly false, since Iago 
uses speech less elegantly but far more creatively than Othello.  Articulating the 
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distinction, however, helps create Iago’s ethos as honest or plain-spoken.  In fact, Iago 
accomplishes his villainy almost entirely by using speech as a persuasively Machiavellian 
tool.  Iago’s wit becomes a type of violence waged against the civil community, 
misrepresenting reputations, identities, and innocent activities.  With an initial exemplary 
listing of 1596, the OED’s third definition of violence is a linguistic one: “Improper 
treatment or use of a word; wresting or perversion of meaning or application; 
unauthorized alteration of wording.”10  Wayne E. Rebhorn cites Puttenham, who “speaks 
of the ‘violence’ of persuasion” (51).  Iago’s method of deception exercises this type of 
rhetorical violence.  His manipulative use of language succeeds in creating an alternate 
reality based not in truth, but in the “wit” of the rhetor.  For both Iago and Othello 
rhetoric enchants and moves people.  But where Othello persuades to love, Iago 
persuades to murder.  Othello’s skill lies in elegant articulation, Iago’s with ethos—the 
creation of an eminently trustworthy “character” who is secretly a villain.  The opposition 
between Othello and Iago manifests the play’s concern for the ethical power of speech.11 
Iago toys with his self-presentation throughout Othello, “And what’s he then that 
says I play the villain,/When this advice is free I give, and honest…” (2.3.336-7, 
emphasis added).  His identity as the trickster/villain is obvious enough to himself as this 
quotation reveals.  No one else has accused him of villainy; on the contrary, his 
community thinks he is honest.  He who says he plays the villain is Iago himself.  He 
knows his manipulations are villainous, but does he assume this as an interiorized 
subjectivity, or does he really believe that villain is a role he “plays”?  I would argue, and 
the quotation affirms, that Iago conforms to Rebhorn’s conception of the trickster as one 
for whom “social roles and the identities provided by those roles have clearly become 
extraordinarily unstable and evanescent” (38).  Rebhorn elaborates: 
In general, for all of these characters, identity has become a project; it can never 
be a given, as it was for comic characters in the Middle Ages, even if it seems 
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their very birthright.  Perhaps rather than speak of Renaissance tricksters as being 
outsiders and insiders, it might be better to speak of them all, no matter what 
position they hold in the social order, as confronting their own identity as 
something external, an alien object to be attained which, because of its essentially 
extrinsic character, can never be completely possessed and hence can never 
provide a deep and genuine sense of being to those who pursue it.  Renaissance 
tricksters, like so many in their culture, are ontologically starved….” (39). 
 
Iago demonstrates this notion of identity as extrinsic in his use of rhetoric both to create a 
credible personal ethos and to manipulate his community, exemplifying the Renaissance 
trickster as Rebhorn describes it.  Rebhorn calls the trickster, the “emperor of men’s 
minds” (62), linking the trickster and the rhetor by means of their use of ethos and their 
“…concern with power, with moving the audience in order to control it….” (52).  To 
create his honest persona and to mar the reputations of others, Iago must demonstrate a 
disregard for essential identity and cast everyone, himself included, as performers.  “Her 
honor is an essence that’s not seen;/They have it very oft that have it not” (4.1.16-17).  
Iago’s explanation of Desdemona’s “seeming” epitomizes his efforts to turn every one 
into an actor. 
Iago offers at least three motivating factors for his “trick.”  He is frustrated that 
Cassio, instead of he, received the lieutenant position (1.1.6-30).  He suspects that 
Othello “twixt my sheets/H’as done my office” with Emilia (1.3.377-8).  And thirdly, 
partly for revenge, he too desires Desdemona (2.1.291-9).  All three of these reasons are 
unpersuasive and problematic, but they reveal Iago’s frustration with his lack of 
authority, power, and dominion in various social spheres.  He finds his desires frustrated 
by his lack of access to social power, and so he obtains the power of autonomous agency 
with rhetoric.  Rebhorn’s important article claims the especially historical nature of the 
trickster’s use of rhetoric as a form of political power.  In the Renaissance, he argues, 
rhetoric is “in itself a paradigm of rule” (52).  The following highlights Rebhorn’s 
description of how rhetorical power operates as sovereignty. 
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Whereas for the ancient Romans the orator fought other orators in the forum and 
the senate in order to persuade a jury or his fellow senators, for Renaissance 
writers the orator primarily combats his listeners in order to bring them under the 
control of his will.  Combat is not contest as it was in the Roman republic; it is 
conquest, conquest of the very persons one rules….  In the Renaissance…the 
rhetor was actually imagined as a real prince, just as rhetoric was seen as an art to 
be used by rulers, offered to them as a means to shape and control their subjects 
and ensure their thrones and titles….  Many go beyond it, however, in 
recognizing that rhetoric actually creates subjects in the first place….  If rhetoric 
means rule, to be subject to the power of speech means to be subject politically. 
Considered as political discourse, then, Renaissance rhetoric 
accomplishes two things simultaneously: it constitutes rulers at the very moment 
that it constitutes the ruled; it creates at once both sovereigns and subjects. (57-
59) 
 
Iago resolves his frustration with his lack of authority by claiming sovereign power in his 
use of rhetoric, manipulating and controlling his community.  As a trickster, he dons the 
costume of the ruler as well as the meaner garb of honest Iago.  But the variety of roles 
the trickster must play to gain his authoritative ethos brings nihilating consequences.  
Again, Rebhorn is helpful, 
Metaphor, ‘translatio’ in all the Latin rhetorics of the period…means a ‘bearing 
across or over’; it involves a necessary crossing of boundaries, a going beyond 
limits.  Since the self the orator creates in and through his language is made of 
metaphors—indeed, is a metaphor—its creation is necessarily an imperial 
gesture, a quest beyond normal boundaries and an appropriation through 
language of that which lies outside.  It means that in some sense, the self one 
creates is something alien, just as language is, and it must be seized or held or 
occupied if it is really to exist.  Moreover, as was noted earlier, such a creation of 
identity in an act of linguistic imperialism is indistinguishable from the act of 
colonizing the Other, of subjecting one’s audience to one’s will.  Therefore, 
every time the orator uses a metaphor—and it would be hard to think of a time 
when he would not be doing so—his act must be read as a double translatio 
imperii: a crossing of boundaries in order to occupy the alien terrain of the Other 
which is simultaneously a crossing in order to appropriate the equally alien 
terrain which becomes the self.  Without such a crossing, the orator, who is both 
a conqueror and a ruler, must necessarily remain empty, unconstituted, deficient 
in being.  His act of conquest through persuasion thus ironically uncovers his 
weakness, his ontological hunger, his dependence on the Other for his very 
identity. (59) 
 
Iago is the consummate trickster in these terms.  Though his identity is forged to meet his 
manipulative need, his conquest of the fellow subject constitute him as a sovereign whose 
authority is highly conditional.  It is borrowed, so to speak, from the Other whom he is 
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subjecting as he crosses thresholds of identity.  Thus even the existence of his own 
subjectivity is relationally dependent.  His reliance upon rhetoric for autonomy and 
power is paradoxically a weakness: he becomes a sovereign subject without a 
subjectivity.   
As I noted, Iago’s motivations are unclear.  We see him using rhetorical power 
but to what end?  His articulated reasons are notoriously insincere or insubstantial.  Iago 
primarily performs his rhetorical magic in an effort to reduce or discredit one (and all) of 
his community.  Iago undertakes this destructive endeavor as if his own life depended on 
its success.  But it is clear to no one why his nihilism impels him to persuade others of the 
authenticity of his performance.  Psychoanalytic scholars Adelman and David Pollard see 
depraved darkness within Iago, a sadomasochism.12  Stephen Greenblatt writes however,  
But ‘I am not what I am’ goes beyond social feigning: not only does Iago mask 
himself in society as the honest ancient, but in private he tries out a bewildering 
succession of brief narratives that critics have attempted, with notorious results, 
to translate into motives.  These inner narratives—shared, that is, only with the 
audience—continually promise to disclose what lies behind the public deception, 
to illuminate what Iago calls the ‘native act and figure’ of his heart, and 
continually fail to do so; or rather they reveal that his heart is precisely a series of 
acts and figures, each referring to something else, something just out of our 
grasp.  ’I am not what I am’ suggests that this elusiveness is permanent, that even 
self-interest, whose transcendental guarantee is the divine ‘I am what I am,’ is a 
mask.  Iago’s constant recourse to narrative then is both the affirmation of 
absolute self-interest and the affirmation of absolute vacancy; the oscillation 
between the two incompatible positions suggest in Iago the principle of 
narrativity itself, cut off from original motive and final disclosure.  The only 
termination possible in his case is not revelation but silence.13   
 
Iago actions may be depraved but his self-presentation lacks a definible subjectivity, 
depraved or otherwise.  His un-dissembled existence points to absence, to void.  It seems 
to me that if Iago is sado-masochistic, it is because he is aware of the void within; his 
self-negation initiates nihilation. 
Alain Badiou’s use of mathematical set theory to describe ontology and the 
subject, in his opus Being and Event, is generally sympathetic to an analysis of self-
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silencing because he finds language restrictive, unable to adequately or accurately 
apprehend philosophy.14  He uses the matheme in an effort to liberate philosophy from 
the limitations of language.  In his theory, Badiou argues that there is no subjectivity 
except as it arises, “operates,” within an event of community or multiplicity.  “Ontology 
is a situation,” (27) he writes, by which he means that Being manifests within specific 
historical circumstances in order to testify to an invariant truth (which nonetheless is 
processed variably).  Being is not an entity existing in any articulate way prior to the 
event and it always exists in relation to the multiplicity.  In fact, being is multiple 
appearing at the instantiation of an event.  The suggestion here is that subjects are deeply 
enmeshed in an ethical relation at the moment they come into being.  The grounding of 
this web is the void—the not-being from which all being arises; all being contains the 
void as a subset.  The gap between not-being and being is “unsayable,” and thus ontology 
exceeds language, just as ethics precedes subjectivity.  All who experience a situation 
belong to that event as the multiplicity of it; individuals are, at this point, merely 
elements of a set in relation to the event.  Individual subjectivity appears (and now it is as 
if it had always been) when one multiple of the multiplicity presents the truth of the 
evental site within a particular domain of life, e.g. love or politics.  In formulating his 
argument, Badiou refutes “the ontologies of presence—for presence is the exact contrary 
of presentation” (27).  His theory is particularly useful, then, in considering the 
Renaissance trickster whose identity is rhetorical presentation.  The trickster’s 
“weakness, his ontological hunger,” (as Rebhorn wrote) requires that he usurp his identity 
and personal agency from the subjective ground of the Other.  Badiou’s subject and 
Rebhorn’s trickster then are similar insofar as identity is presentational, ontologically 
bankrupt, and yet circulating as potentialities amidst various “multiples.”  Badiou’s 
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philosophy, therefore, offers a provocative aid in interpreting the subjective and social 
significance of the self-silencing of Rebhorn’s trickster. 
Badiou authorizes a retrospective application of his own (and other) philosophies 
when he points out the difficulty in discerning the veridicality of a given situation.  Any 
particular circumstance or event (including literary/theatrical/artistic ones) will continue 
to elicit subjects and truths that may reflect present or historical/cultural realities.  
Artistry often far outpaces the understanding and articulation of philosophers; Badiou 
singles out nineteenth century Portuguese poet, Fernando Pessoa, for example, as a writer 
whose work exceeds contemporary philosophy’s dialect.  The effort however, the process 
of analysis, is, for Badiou, part of what constitutes the event as an Event and the subject 
as a Subject.  Although the complexities of Badiou’s theories of ontology and ethics 
render a systematic cogitation alongside Renaissance thinkers tantalizing, for the 
purposes of this essay a relatively brief consideration of the silences of Iago (and 
Dauphine) in Badiouian terms will have to suffice.  This effort provides an expanded 
theoretical understanding of the relationship of Rebhorn’s Early Modern rhetor-trickster 
to his representation and identification in silence.   
A valuable part of Badiou’s application of set theory to philosophy is in the 
context of accounting for the multiplicity, the various persons involved in an ontological 
situation.  Not all will become fully subjectivized within Badiou’s rigorous standards, but 
their various categorizations offer a schema of belonging upon which to map and 
therefore access and analyze relationships.  This is helpful when we try to ascertain how 
one’s (Iago’s) actions affect his sociality as well as his constitution within it.  Within a 
specific metastructure (the State, for example) a particular, localized situation ontologizes 
a set of multiples, a multiplicity.  Belonging to that power-set mobilizes a relational 
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dynamic of membership and inclusion that corresponds to presentation and representation 
in the metastructure.  Badiou describes belonging as follows:  
Once counted as one in a situation, a multiple finds itself presented therein.  If it 
is also counted as one by the metastructure, or state of the situation, then it is 
appropriate to say that it is represented.  This means that it belongs to the 
situation (presentation), and that it is equally included in the situation 
(representation).  It is a term-part.  Inversely, the theorem of the point of excess 
indicates that there are included (represented) multiples which are not presented 
(which do not belong).  These multiples are parts and not terms.  Finally, there 
are presented terms which are not represented, because they do not constitute a 
part of the situation, but solely one of its immediate terms. 
I will call normal a term which is both presented and represented.  I will 
call excrescence a term which is represented but not presented.  Finally, I will 
term singular a term which is presented but not represented. (99).   
 
For our purposes here, I want to distinguish especially the aspect of presentation that 
“finds itself,” from recognition imposed by the power-set that is representation.  This 
tracks more loosely into a paradigm where presentation entails subjectivity and 
interiority, while representation is identity as perceived, nominated, by one’s sociality.  
One may have an identity without a subjectivity and vice versa.  By rights, Iago ought to 
be a normal term in the situation of Othello.  But his “I am not what I am” (1.1.62), his 
negation, the not-ness of his being, deftly articulates the absence of presence that is 
characteristic of an excrescence.  Iago is not present, but he is represented by Honest 
Iago.  This personal absence corresponds with his frustrations about his lack of authority 
in the Venetian/Cyprian community.  Iago’s self-negation illustrates Badiou’s description 
of the absence, the void, of subjectivity apart from an ontological situation.  The 
ontological absence Badiou posits explains and grounds the subjective absence to which 
Rebhorn refers and Iago articulates an experience of both.  
 Apart from establishing a credible ethos, Iago’s other exercise of the rhetor’s 
sovereign power is to construct roles for the others who belong to his situation: 
Unfaithful Desdemona, Cuckolding Cassio, Jealous Othello.  Badiou notes the way in 
which language’s dominion in metaphysics is grounded in its constructible quality.  The 
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“sovereignty of language” folds being within it, such that we cannot readily conceive of 
metaphysics or multiples apart from language and its constructability (301).  Nor does 
this “ontological nominism” (the “spontaneous” epistemology) make space for the point 
of excess—that critical gap between the void and the multiple, presentation and 
representation—resulting in a “poverty of knowledge” (314).   Furthermore, 
constuctivism “reduces the function of excess to nothing” (314).  Iago’s embrace of 
constructivism is curious, then, for the spectacular nihilism it enacts.  Rhetorical 
construction effectively obliterates social space for the excrescence, the excess who does 
not belong within the power-set of Othello, that Iago claims to be.  Of course, Iago’s “I 
am not what I am” is intended simply to acknowledge that he represents fidelity to 
Othello while simultaneously conspiring against him.  But the specific articulation Iago 
chooses here suggests that not only is his subjectivity falsely represented, but that he 
himself is not present.  As the sovereign rhetorician whose manipulative efforts give rise 
to the crucial “event,” he has excepted himself from the community or power-set.   
 But if Iago is not present, and his subjectivity is not represented (because it is a 
false representation), then Iago is more accurately introducing a fourth category of 
membership in Badiou’s pattern.  Giorgio Agamben comments:  
What becomes of the exception in this [Badiou’s] scheme?  At first glance, one 
might think that it falls into the third case, that the exception, in other words, 
embodies a kind of membership without inclusion.  And this is certainly 
Badiou’s position.  But what defines the character of the sovereign claim is 
precisely that it applies to the exception in no longer applying to it, that it 
includes what is outside itself.  The sovereign exception is thus the figure in 
which singularity is represented as such, which is to say, insofar as it is 
unrepresentable.  What cannot be included in any way is included in the form of 
the exception.  In Badiou’s scheme, the exception introduces a fourth figure, a 
threshold of indistinction between excrescence (representation without 
presentation) and singularity (presentation without representation), something 
like a paradoxical inclusion of membership itself.  The exception is what cannot 
be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the 
whole in which it is always already included.  What emerges in this limit figure is 
the radical crisis of every possibility of clearly distinguishing between 
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membership and inclusion, between what is outside and what is inside between 
exception and rule. 
Badiou’s thought is, from this perspective, a rigorous thought of the 
exception.  His central category of the event corresponds to the structure of the 
exception.  Badiou defines the event as an element of a situation such that its 
membership in the situation is undecidable from the perspective of the situation.  
To the State, the event thus necessarily appears as an excrescence.  According to 
Badiou, the relation between membership and inclusion is also marked by a 
fundamental lack of correspondence, such that inclusion always exceeds 
membership, its reducing all its parts to unity.15 
 
Iago’s fluctuating membership in his set mark him as exceptional.  He chooses not to, 
tries not to, unify with his community by obtaining power over them, subjecting them in 
the apparent absence of ordinary access to agency.  His intent, unlike Hieronimo in the 
next chapter, is not to restore ethical norms within his sociality, but to pursue his own 
purposes with rhetorically-authorized power.  The undecidability of Iago’s belonging 
within his sociality reaches its ultimate crisis in the conclusion of the play when his 
destructive actions are revealed and the other multiples of his power-set consider for 
themselves whether and how he belongs to them.   
 The axiomatic assertion of Badiou’s mathematical ontology is that being is 
plural, not singular.  Being is multiple.  “For the multiple to be presented, is it not 
necessary that it be inscribed in the very law itself that the one is not?” (28).  Subjectivity 
does not operate apart from sociality.  This collectivity of being aligns Badiou with 
Levinas’s understanding of ontology as ethics.16  Both theorists find the subject in 
operation within social ethicality; apart from sociality, the subject is accessible only as 
either the void or the gap, a concept lacking extension or articulation.  For Badiou, as 
each multiple participates in a situational event, they process it for truth.  Badiou believes 
in ever-present absolute truth, but thinks that an event is required to draw attention to it.  
Also, different multiples will process that truth differently.  He posits four domains for 
the enacting of truth procedures: love, art, politics and science (340).  Different subjects 
may, then, process the same truth in different ways.  This processing is what 
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distinguishes them as subjects, and maps both their “belonging” to the power-set, and 
their fidelity to the event.  Therefore we look at the actions and reactions of witnesses to 
the culminating event in Othello in order to understand the play’s manifestations and 
understandings of subjectivities, representation, ontologies, and ethics.   
An event, in Badiou’s architecture, is that which initiates a rupture within the set 
– typically, an effect of the set recognizing the presence of a singularity (a presence that 
is not represented).  “I will term evental site an entirely abnormal multiple; that is, a 
multiple such that none of its elements are presented in the situation.  The site itself, is 
presented, but beneath it nothing from which it is composed is presented.  As such, the 
site is not a part of the situation.  I will also say of such a multiple that it is on the edge of 
the void, or foundational….” (175).  Iago serves as the locus of the event in Othello.  His 
believes his self-negation has nullified his presence, that he is an excrescence – 
represented but not present.  But the false construction of his representation obliterates 
his membership via representation.  He should actually be, then, a singularity (present but 
not represented) but for his own argument that he is not being, not present, void.  As 
circumstances come to light in the conclusion of the play, Iago’s residence in the state of 
exception precipitate that rupture within the multiplicity that causes an event.  The 
community realizes that there is among them a malignant presence who has been 
unrepresented.  Othello suspects a devil lurking amongst them.  His habit of transparency 
urges that he “manifest” that hidden devil, and he looks first to Iago, “I look down 
towards his feet—but that’s a fable.  If that thou be’st a devil, I cannot kill thee” 
(5.2.282).  Given his thwarted attempt to murder Iago, this proclamation of Othello’s 
confirms Iago’s truly villainous nature—he cannot kill Iago, therefore Iago is a devil.  
But Iago does sustain wounds, perhaps he retains some humanity; so Othello again 
presses him for articulated information, “Will you, I pray, demand that demi-devil/Why 
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he hath thus ensnared my soul and body?” (5.2.297-8).  Iago’s response is to self-silence: 
“Demand me nothing.  What you know, you know.  From this time forth I never will 
speak word” (5.2.299-300).  At last, Iago lives up to his reputation for honesty: he does 
not speak again.  The effects of self-silencing on Iago’s membership/inclusion in the 
community, and the community’s construction of truth disclose the ontological, 
subjective, and representational postures circulating within the play. 
Iago’s self-silencing violates the ethical reciprocity of both speech and social 
engagement.  He abdicates speech, the source of his power, and submits to the relational 
mapping ordained by his social group that motivated his rebellion in the first place.  The 
rhetorical violence of his self-silencing rebuffs an accounting for this situation and 
resolves that obligation upon the others within his power-set.  Where Hieronimo will seek 
to establish “likeness” with the King of Spain and thus to affect an empathetic 
recognition of the value of human life, we might think the murderous Iago would posit 
that he is essentially different from his community.  However, Iago’s attempt to reverse 
or at least share accountability in fact recommends the “likeness” of his set to himself.  
His silence calls them to consider his ethicality as linked to their own.  How are they 
alike?  “You know what you know,” is certainly a refusal to provide a justifying motive, 
but it also suggests that his listeners are as culpable as he.  What is it that they know?  
To construct a circumstantial grasp of Iago’s machinations, the company hears 
testimony from Emilia, Othello, Cassio, and from Roderigo via letter.  But what they 
know—how this compilation constitutes knowledge and what the event means requires a 
more complicated effort that is both personal (subjective) in its proceedings and 
revelatory in its ontological testament.  The Venetian nobleman Lodovico responds 
“What, not to pray?” (5.2.301) suggesting a religious perspective that leads him to 
assume Iago would want to repent.  Desdemona’s apparent kinsman, another Venetian 
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noble, Gratiano says, “Torments will ope your lips,” (5.2.302) reflecting a political and 
judicial orientation to the matter.  Cassio is true to form in adhering to an aesthetic 
sociality of refined graces: “Most heathenish and most gross!” (5.2.309.)  And for 
Othello, the truth of this event is perceived in terms of love.  He loved both Desdemona 
and Iago well, but neither wisely.  These responses correspond nearly identically with the 
four domains of Badiou’s truth procedures: love, art, politics, and science (which 
subsumes religion for the atheist Badiou).  Each of these multiples is subjectified as they 
construct truth from the circumstance.  But as it should be for the titular character, the 
subjectivity of Othello is more substantively realized.   
What Othello knows, what he thinks he knows, is, has always been, himself.  
Iago’s devilish rhetoric has summoned Othello’s own demon, an entity Othello clearly 
had believed nonexistent or perhaps long ago vanquished.  In his obsessive determination 
to be transparent, Othello now articulates his subjectivity as divided—there is the 
manifest descendent of “men of royal siege” (1.2.21) that he believed he was, and the 
jealous, murderous secret self of which he was (perhaps willfully) unaware.   Now, what 
Othello knows is that he is both a warrior for and an enemy of the Venetian state.   
“…in Aleppo once, 
Where a malignant and turbaned Turk 
Beat a Venetian and traduced the state, 
I took by th’ throat the circumcisèd dog 
And smote him—thus. [He stabs himself.] (5.2.347-350) 
 
Although Lodovico had decided to hold Othello prisoner until his “fault be known/To the 
Venetian State” (5.2.332-3), Othello’s governing impulse to belong to the Venetian set is 
exposed in this, his urgent self-revelation.  Badiou’s criteria for both membership and 
inclusion in a given multiplicity are authenticated in Othello’s palpable presence and his 
efforts at perspicuous representation.  The guilt Othello experiences combined with the 
deferral to decide upon his identification or rejection in the multiplicity prove 
  81 
unendurable to Othello.  Though it is in fact Iago’s manipulations that threaten Cyprian 
and Venetian society, Othello’s naïve collusion with Iago has revealed to Othello that he, 
like Iago, has a secret self: he is an unrepresented murderer.  Thus he sees himself as an 
excrescence that violates the ethical norm of the Venetian power-set.  His narrated 
suicide enacts this excrescential identity: eliminating his presence but representing in a 
tale his inclusion in the event. 
And what of Iago?  The villainous identity with which he trifles throughout the 
play finally claims Rebhorn’s ontologically hungry trickster.  Although he may believe 
identity is an adopted role, or even self- or socially-fashioned, the revelation of his 
actions and their consequences resolve his identity upon him.  Eight times he is called a 
villain after being exposed, as well as coxcomb, caitiff, viper, slave, and devil.  If he 
thought this was only a role, it is now his only role, assigned to him by the truth 
procedures of his power-set.  The community hereby acknowledges Iago as one of their 
own, a normal member: he presents and represents the villain.  Iago’s own processing of 
the truth is more complicated, however.  As the locus of the evental site he is uniquely 
positioned to blur the decidability of the event—thus fulfilling Badiou’s definition of the 
event as “an element of a situation such that its membership in the situation is 
undecidable from the perspective of the situation” (HS25).  Iago does not articulately 
reject the witnesses’ nominal construction of the event and his subjectivity.  The 
accomplished rhetorician does, however, relinquish language, the medium of the set’s 
constitutive truth proceedings.  “…I never will speak word” (5.2.300).  The set’s 
assessment of the event is hereby indicted for its linguistic reliance; they have failed to 
understand the epistemological crisis unearthed in the event.  Rhetorizing created this 
destructive circumstance; it cannot be used to redeem it.  In other words, language is 
contaminated; it cannot provide knowledge sufficient to ascertain truth.  This has been 
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Iago’s “message” all along.  Iago’s subjectivity, moreover, cannot genuinely be 
nominativally, constructibly assigned, but rather operates as he demonstrates fidelity to 
the truth of the event.  Iago exposed can no longer falsify his representation and 
outwardly submits to the State’s nomination.  He becomes, once again, an excrescence.  
Iago represents the villain in this situation; whether he is the villain is for his own 
presaging.   
But there is a presentiment, in his self-silencing, that Iago does subjectify himself 
as the villain.  As the community looks for an explanation for his behavior, he says, “you 
know what you know” (5.2.299), suggesting that the witnesses self-knowledge ought to 
expose something about Iago’s malevolent behavior.  Because one is not and the 
multiplicity is, Iago implicates the entire power-set in his villainy.  They know what they 
know about themselves, and as they encounter Iago, face-to-face, what they should see is 
“likeness.”  If they want to know him, they need to know themselves.  If they know 
themselves, they know him.  Iago’s silence suggests that everyone—he, Othello, every 
term that belongs to the set—possesses an interior of absence.  His silent self, 
ideographically, presents the secret self, the originary void, existent within each multiple.  
Katharine Eisaman Maus writes that in courtship, “Desdemona imaginatively leaps the 
gap between self-knowledge and the normally more limited and conditional knowledge 
of another” (125).  This epistemological gap corresponds to the ontological gap—we 
cannot hope to know, because there is in everyone an unknown, an absence, a missing 
piece that propels the multiple from the void into being.  Iago reinforces the notion of 
multiple “likeness,” that we can know another, but what we know is that they, like us, 
have an unfathomable emptiness within.  Iago, in his specular self-silencing, gestures to 
the nature of being in its multiplicity, highlighting its subset of the void.  Badiou notes 
that “it is in being foreclosed from presentation that being as such is constrained to be 
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sayable…” (27).  When he self-silences, Iago’s presentation is foreclosed and he is 
conceived only as his representation.  But when he refuses to speak his own subjectivity, 
his rejection of speech reopens his ability to present, extends being beyond the limits of 
language.  And what he presents is his belonging to the event, his membership, his 
likeness to the other multiples in the situation.  He demonstrates, “…that the ontological 
situation [is] the presentation of presentation” (27).  His silence reclaims for himself the 
sovereign power to testify to the truth of the event as he perceives it: that the event 
originated with the failure of the community to recognize its own members and distribute 
subjective authority amongst them.  Iago’s fidelity to the truth of the event manifests, he 
becomes a subject, when he presents presentation.  Iago is a “normal,” “like” member of 
his community, then.  He presents himself as a fellow multiple arising from void, and he 
is represented to the state as a villain.  His silence asserts an ontology of shared being that 
invites his set to consider in what way(s) they are “like” Iago—even if that likeness is 
centered around the void that grounds every multiple.17   
Lodovico is granted final say on the matter of Othello.  He initially gestures to 
the several corpses as an instructive, possibly repentence-inducing, vision for Iago, but 
implicitly includes the theatrical audience as well.  “Look on the tragic loading of this 
bed.  This is thy work.” (5.2.359-360).  What Iago may see are others who belong to his 
multiplicity, those to whom he is like and to whom he belongs, despite their exclusionary 
treatment of him.  Their death signifies his own in the sense of his eventual punishment 
for their murders, but also simply in their shared mortality.  Furthermore, Lodovico 
indirectly commands the theatrical audience to observe the sight of the bed as well.  They 
(we) are momentarily aligned with Iago.  The silent corpses implicate everyone for the 
possession of a secret heart of homicide.  The no-longer representing corpses now present 
the void—ontological and ethical—in everyone’s being.  Before this implication can be 
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fully assimilated, however, Lodovico hurriedly closes the bed curtains, “The object 
poisons sight;/Let it be hid” (5.2.360-1).  In what way is the spectre of mortality 
summoned and the memberships’ shared responsibility therein a poison?  Distasteful 
certainly, but the only way in which a vision of death is poisonous is if it eats away at the 
speculators, our own, lives.  Lodovico’s reversal regarding the recuperative value of 
contemplating mortality seems to occur at the same time the vision begins to indict him 
of “likeness,” revealing his unwillingness to examine himself for complicity in the 
situation.  Not that he is guilty of committing murder, of course, but that as a member of 
humanity, more specifically, as one who belongs to the “set” of the play, he too has death 
within, even foundationally in his being.  He, like Emilia, Desdemona, Othello and Iago, 
is of the void, he is mortal, and he, too, is guilty of failing to represent this ontological 
reality.  Curtailing sight of the loaded bed, however, seeks to deny the importance or even 
the reality of the occurrence.  His attempt to enclose, to pull secrecy like a veil, around 
the site of an ontological and ethical rupture imitates the representative failure of 
articulation.  Michael Neill has said, “…this ending, as its stern gestures of erasure 
demonstrate, has everything to do with what cannot be uttered and must not be seen” 
(Unproper, 384).  Unutterable, perhaps, but certainly revelatory in its silence.  The 
unspeakable void of ontology is evident in Iago’s homicidal impulse and the ponderables 
attending the unnecessary demise of Desdemona, Emilia and Othello.  In closing the 
curtains, Lodovico turns away from and attempts to seal off a site of knowledge and the 
regenerative opportunity it affords.18   
Akin to self-silencing, the performative effect of curtailed sight draws attention 
to the secret self however.  As Lodovico denies the theatrical audience that same 
prescriptive visual opportunity, he conversely invites awareness of hidden-ness, of 
something unspoken, un-considered, un-represented.19  Since what has been veiled is our 
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own likeness, our self-reflection is interrupted and we can ponder only upon the fact of 
the failure to present.  Lodovico’s effort to abbreviate the power of performance 
inadvertently succeeds in revealing the voided nature of ontology.  Like Iago’s self-
silencing, the ambiguated access is a disclosure of the gap between being and its 
representation.  Thus the two curtains, the bed curtains and the theoretical theatrical 
curtains create an eerily absent effect of two mirrors facing one another.  Reflection is 
repeated and infinite, but what is reflected?  Only an infinite regression of reflection.  The 
fact that being is multiple; that all arise from and contain the void; that identity is 
conferred socially; that subjectivity appears in a rupture, an event; that what affects one 
of the set, reverberates amongst the entire set.  These infinite reflections, the gap between 
the void and the subject, constitute the state of exception that is accessible only as it fails 
to present.  Self-silencing is a way to present the failure to present, thus it is an 
ontological and ethical challenge to witnesses.  The ethicality, the unicity of being, is 
unavoidable, but silence articulates its imperative.  The rhetorical villain-trickster 
exercises power in speech, but it is power that is subjectively annihilating.  For the 
community, however, Iago’s silence, in acknowledging the subset of void in all being, 
points to the fact of multiplicity.  It is a call to likeness, to ethical relation, that the play 
extends into the audience by prematurely closing the curtains of its own performance.18 
 It is impossible to speak of the void at the center of being in Early Modern 
theatre without acknowledging Ben Jonson.  Thomas M. Greene’s influential essay, “Ben 
Jonson and the Centered Self,” finds in Jonson’s writing a search for an ordered authority 
at the center of circulating politics, religion, world culture and community.20  Although, 
“almost everything Jonson wrote attempts in one way or another to complete the broken 
circle, or expose the ugliness of its incompletion,” (325), Greene notes Jonson’s own 
ambiguity, his often energetic delight in avoiding the centered self, “…the infinite, 
  86 
exhilarating, and vicious freedom to alter the self at will once the ideal of moral 
constancy has been abandoned.  If you do not choose to be, then, by an irresistible logic, 
you choose to change…” (337).  Given the present essay’s focus on self-silencing, 
Jonson’s centering ontology is perhaps best considered in light of his Epicene, or The 
Silent Woman.  In this play, Dauphine Eugenie—Jonson’s most silent trickster—
undertakes to swindle his inheritance out of his crotchety uncle Morose who wishes to 
deny it him.  Dauphine tricks his uncle into marrying a woman, Epicene, whom Dauphine 
has taught and paid to embody Morose’s most desired quality: she is silent.  Immediately 
following the marriage ceremony Epicene begins to speak, loudly and often, and Morose 
desperately seeks a way to annul the union.  Dauphine assures Morose that he (Dauphine) 
can release him from matrimony in exchange for his rightful inheritance.  Morose agrees, 
and Dauphine reveals that Epicene is actually a boy disguised as a woman.  Morose is 
legally liberated from marital obligation because of “error personae.”21  But Morose is 
not the only one who has been deceived by Dauphine’s trick.  The whole community of 
wits, fops, collegiates, and even Dauphine’s fellow tricksters perceived Epicene’s sex 
erroneously.  Furthermore, the theatrical audience too is unaware of Epicene’s disguise 
until the conclusion. 
 Although Epicene is ostensibly about social and gendered silence, it does not 
actually demonstrate a marked philosophical interest in these silence.  Silence is linked, 
rather, with secrecy and identity.22  The play is peppered with the usual cast of Jonsonian 
comedics who energetically rhetorize, self-create, and metamorph.  The play’s caustic 
humor lies in the fact that these creations are utterly artificial, they lack centeredness and 
fail to truly belong to the person.  Beauty is acquisition: women all wear cosmetics and 
are consequently parsed and “owned” by the local chemists, wigmakers, and tailors 
(4.2.95).  Learned men have a collection of “titles” in their libraries, but no 
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comprehension of the contents of those titles, even going so far as to confuse the names 
of these compositions with those of their authors’ (2.3).  Even Morose who articulates the 
idea that silence is centering (“…I should always collect and contain my mind, not 
suffering it to flow loosely” [5.3.46-7]), nonetheless seeks others’ silence so that his 
voice alone may fill the absence.  Completely failing, in other words, to collect and 
contain his own thoughts.  The failure of appearances, education, and ideas to belong to 
those who use or profess them is underscored by the obsessively narcissistic efforts 
individuals put to claiming them.  In company with these protean self-claimers, 
Dauphine’s comparatively silent self-possession is notable, and he does not seem to fit 
with the rest of the play’s community.23  Initially he reads as a sympathetic trickster, 
seeking only what should rightfully belong to him were it not for his misanthropic uncle.  
Testifying to his integrity, his friends Truewit and Clerimont are genuinely eager to help 
him to his inheritance, and quick to defend him against the ill-opinion of the collegiates, 
wits, and fops (4.4.189).  The revelation at the end of the play, however, stimulates a 
reassessment of Dauphine’s seeming difference from his community.   
 “How now, gentlemen, do you look at me?” Dauphine inquires (5.4.218).  The 
tone of triumph here is curious; he has humbled the very friends he now addresses.  They 
have urged his success, schemed on his behalf, and counted him a defensible “eagle” 
among men (4.4.189).  He has repayed their loyalty by duping them right along with the 
fops.  How should they see him now?  “…you have lurched [cheated] your friends...” 
says Truewit (5.4.221).  Although Truewit remains relatively amiable, the confidence 
into which Dauphine had seemingly taken he and Clerimont is eroded.24  Dauphine is 
revealed as a cheat.  Clerimont’s direct response to Dauphine’s query is to state, “A boy.”  
Dauphine takes this to mean that Clerimont is clarifying Epicene’s sex, but perhaps 
Clerimont is actually answering Dauphine’s question: he now looks upon Dauphine as a 
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boy.  A reading made credible given that the first scene of the play reveals Clerimont 
playing with his “ingle at home” (1.1.24) and receiving a lecture from Truewit about 
“what should a man do” (1.1.31).  Clearly the behavior of boys and men is an important 
one for Clerimont.  Maybe he now looks upon Dauphine as a boy, someone to be trifled 
with, unequal to men, not entirely worthy of respect.25  Neither Truewit nor Clerimont 
speak again to Dauphine in the brief remainder of the play.  
In fact, everyone except Truewit (and Dauphine himself) is silenced by the 
magnitude of the deception.  Dauphine’s silence is not of a moment.  It is now revealed to 
be the ever-present undergirding of the entire plot.  Accomplishing his trick in silence, 
Dauphine creates a new background against which the actions of the community can now 
be reviewed.  This new background or landscape is a type of parallax view inaugurated 
with Epicene’s revelation.  In other words, the social effects of Dauphine’s self-silencing 
are not experienced until it is revealed that Dauphine has been self-silencing.  Behaviors, 
conversations, circumstances of the situation all must be re-evaluated in light of this new 
information that transforms all that came before.  Truewit assumes the task of articulating 
how the community has received its comeuppance in light of the trick.  The reality of 
Epicene’s sex gives the lie to the community’s imaginative constructions of or pretenses 
to knowledge.  Thus Daw and La Foole are uncovered as liars and slanderers since they 
pretended to have “known” Epicene sexually.  Epicene “vindicates [the] fames” (5.4.241) 
of the collegiate women whose societal rites she has been initiated in, outperforming their 
cosmetic artifice and epitomizing their gender confusion.  The fellow tricksters have been 
out-tricked; their confidence in their own superior understanding and witty use of rhetoric 
is discredited.  It is silence which prevails in this world.  Morose’s lesson is twofold.  
First, and prosaically misogynistic: if he wants a silent wife, he’d best marry a man.  
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Secondly, the best way to enjoy silence is to be silent.  Dauphine triumps not because he 
verbosely insisted on his way like Morose, but because he schemed in silence.   
But these “lessons” were never part of Dauphine’s goal.  They are an inevitable 
effect of his silence that signifies.  Encounters with self-silencing predictably result in 
self-evaluation and ethical affirmations.  The community of Epicene is revealed—to 
itself—as dishonest, unnatural, de-centered, and deluded.  Their ignorant and unaware 
scrambling for an extrinsic identity is now revealed to themselves as artificial and fool-
making.  J. A. Jackson, arguing that the point of the play is to highlight the way in which 
people make meaning from self, not truth, articulates a similar effect of the staged 
silence, 
‘Meaning’ for all of the characters becomes most concrete when language itself 
has been muted.  Daw and La Foole are stricken, for once, silent.  Clerimont can 
only manage to utter “a boy” (5.4.189) and only Truewit (we should expect no 
less) can muster any kind of response, perhaps out of both admiration and ego.  
Perhaps the momentary lapse of speech stages most perfectly the critical position 
of the play all along.  Each individual is shown explicitly the role he or she has 
always been tempted to appropriate all along: filling in every gap of meaning 
with his or her self.  The muted language on stage at the end of the play creates a 
potential moment of non-appropriation for the audience.  The silence thrusts the 
audience member back onto him- or herself.  The muted language makes explicit 
once and for all the always-present gap of meaning and reveals to the audience 
this space “outside” of themselves that they have always occupied.26 
 
Dauphine’s silencing of himself in orchestrating the trick, renders mute his dupes as well, 
providing a set- and audience-wide comeuppance that serves as a type of personal and 
ethical tonic to restore the community to its senses (one hopes).  
And what of Dauphine?  He is certainly far less sympathetic now he has made 
fools of everyone.  But hasn’t he also revealed his own misanthropic greed in doing so?  
He tricks his uncle out of Morose’s own money, and though he may have a customary 
claim to it, it is certainly not Dauphine’s by obligation.  He intends to use this money to 
purchase a knighthood—claiming thereby an identity that is not intrinsically his own.  
Furthermore, he flagrantly deceives those who helped him to achieve his personal ends.  
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Too, we remember now his reputation as a card shark, swindling funds from his fellow 
gamers.  The deceitful plotter his silence concealed is now made manifest, and it is not 
appealing.  Dauphine now looks like a more ruthless, even sinister, version of the self-
important Morose.  His hoax does not succeed in granting him superior moral qualities.  
On the contrary, they reveal his absolute belonging to his uncentered community, even 
exceeding them in his efforts to purchase an identity.  His identity is as Rebhorn 
describes the trickster’s, a “project,” something to be acquired extrinsically.  But he so 
inexpertly understands the importance of the veneer of sociability, the dependence upon 
one’s representation to secure social acceptance that motivates all the characters’ anxious 
performativity, that he undermines his reputation with the depth and unsavoriness of his 
deception.  He becomes, in the eyes of his community, not a knightly man of integrity, 
but a boy, a cheat, a misanthrope, a swindler, a trickster.  The ambiguity he mercenarily 
utilized with Epicene transfers to Dauphine himself as the engineer of the trick.  In fact, 
the diffusion and variability of his identity, combined with his lack of self-awareness, 
succeed in absenting himself from membership in the event he has initiated. 
Though Dauphine tricks everyone, he clearly wants to be accepted and respected 
among them as a man of wit and knowledge, certainly, but also as a man of wealth and 
nobility possessing distinguished acquaintance.  His aspirations coincide suspiciously 
with those of his sociality, inscribing him as a member of his set.  His traffic in 
ambiguity, however, renders him a suspicious and unknowable entity.  His identity is 
fragmented, unnameable, unrepresentable.  “How now…do you look at me?”  Identity is 
conceived by Dauphine only as a representation, conferred by others, exterior, lacking 
interiority.  Thus it seems he is no longer a member of the set, present without 
representation, he is an excrescence.  Ironically, though, Dauphine’s speaking obscures 
his presentation as well.  As soon as he speaks, his interior absence is revealed.  Since his 
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speech strives only to obtain a constructivist presentation, what it actually presents is 
non-being.  In Badiou’s schema, it is the foreclosure of presentation that presents being, 
“the presentation of presentation” (27) that Iago achieved in self-silencing.  Dauphine 
does not present himself in silence any longer, nor does his speech present.  In his utter 
lacks of self-awareness, Dauphine presents no ontological being and he carries no 
representation.  Dauphine’s speech, then, succeeds in vanishing his presence.  Without a 
center, without authorization, without the failed representation that reveals being, he is 
subsumed by the ontological void.  Although Dauphine is often silent and secretive, he 
has neither a silent, nor a secret self; he has no self.  The notoriously conservative Jonson 
thus demonstrates the risks of being uncentered, of acquiring identity extrinsically, and of 
living without the silent containment of one’s thoughts (fidelity to the truth, or he might 
say, personal integrity) that instantiates presence.  Dauphine has vanished, as his 
community was in danger of until his trick exposed their risk.  In their newly silent state, 
the rest of the multiplicity are present, ontologically exposed and ethically chastised, but 
present with an opportunity to learn from their errors.  They may, by acknowledging their 
secret selves, construct an authentic silent self who substantiates and centers the 
circulating self. 
And what of Epicene?  Epicene remains before the witnesses, a multi-gendered 
emblem of a silent being who points to the gap of existence.  Epicene is present.  
Furthermore, Epicene represents to the community their belongingness via shared folly 
and shared culpability.  He reveals to them their being as a multiplicity.  Epicene is a 
“normal” member of the multiplicity, perhaps the only normal member, with an 
authorizing center of ontological real-ness manifested in his self-silencing.27  And it is 
with the figure of Epicene that Jonson extends his play beyond the footlights.  Unlike 
Shakespeare, Jonson has not invited the audience to ponder with him the void and the gap 
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by closing the performance’s curtain.  With an audacity of purpose, Jonson points into the 
audience singling out each member as his dupe.  We were all, presumably, fooled by 
Dauphine’s Epicene. The play’s trick is to unite the spectator with the members of the 
event in such a way that all are equally implicated as fops, wits, collegiate, and tricksters.  
And like the play’s characters, we must reflect upon our own pretensions to being 
informed.  Jonson’s accusation is voiced by Badiou,  
Nominalism reigns, I stated, in our world: it is its spontaneous philosophy.  The 
universal valorization of ‘competence’, even inside the political sphere, is its 
basest product: all it comes down to is guaranteeing the competence of he who is 
capable of naming realities such as they are.  But what is at stake here is a lazy 
nominalism, for our times do not even have the time for authentic knowledge.  
The exaltation of competence is rather the desire—in order to do without truth—
to glorify knowledge without knowing” (310).   
 
The audience, like the characters, are humbled for their eagerness to speak, to name, to 
use language to confer the appearance of knowledge without actually possessing 
knowledge, to appropriate—beauty, learning, social priority—what they cannot own.  
Jonson’s silence about Dauphine’s trick, then, provides the parallax view and the impetus 
to review our own artificial constructions of identity and subjectivity.  Jonson’s self-
awareness in his use of both speech and silence posits him within the excepted state of 
sovereignty.  His secret self is presented.  In Badiou’s schema, Jonson himself becomes 
the evental meta-site, the element whose membership is indeterminate from within the 
situation.28   
The architecture of Badiou’s mathematical ontology withstands the application of 
these plays to its schematic.  A testament, I think, to the complexity of the plays’ 
engagement with primary and enduring philosophical speculations.  Indeed the plays 
strain Badiou’s ontological edifice by summoning the ethicality latent (though certainly 
not absent) in his relational map.  This suggests to me a greater sense of social obligation 
in effect during the Renaissance, a substantive link between being and ethicality that 
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precedes epistemology.  The emphasis in Othello on proof, and the concern to be 
informed and knowledgeable in Epicene reveal epistemological anxiety.  It is a 
commonplace, really, for the early modern to be concerned to know, how to know, and 
what to know.29  Less frequently noted, however, is the disorienting surprise of the 
unethical friend.  The struggle to categorize the villain-trickster reflects a cultural 
assumption about belonging and morality.  Those who belong to shared situations ought, 
it seems, to be alike.  Iago wants to be like others, so he turns them into what he is; 
Dauphine counts no deception too great if it secures him the finances to acquire social 
likeness.  Even where there is deviation from normative behaviors, observers continue to 
see likeness.  Ethical ontology is deeply embedded within the biology of these plays, 
although the course of time has, apparently, obscured its function.  The matheme mode of 
analysis enables us to access the plays from outside their own discursivity, such that we 
can recognize strains of thought that may propel the play without being overtly 
referenced within it.  The subset of the void, for example, undergirds the reading of 
Iago’s “I am not what I am,” and Dauphine’s inauthentic subjectivity.  Notions of 
representations without presence are common in deconstructive work, but Badiou’s 
theory allows for us to analyze the representation as well as the absent presence, and to 
do so without the fatalism of meaninglessness.  Instead of marginal meanings or the 
meanings of margins, we are able to discuss integral meanings that arise at the margins of 
articulation, as Judith Butler has suggested.30  Since my focus here is self-silencing, it is 
helpful to look at the plays utilizing a structure that moves both inside and outside 
language, much as self-silencing itself weaves in and around rhetoric.  So what can we 
say, now, about self-silencing and the villain-trickster? 
Iago certainly exemplifies Rebhorn’s rhetorizing trickster who seizes sovereign 
power in his use of language to create a credible ethos and command his community.  
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Unlike revengers who find sovereign power in circulation, the villain-trickster creates his 
own authority.  Like most self-creation, however, it is ultimately bankrupt, lacking an 
ontological center.  Rebhorn acknowledges this weakness, but it is up to the playwrights 
to demonstrate what happens to the uncentered rhetor and the power he has 
manufactured.  Iago easily relinquishes his authority when he is caught out, substituting 
for it the intrinsic authority of silence.  In the state of exception, where silence signifies, 
Iago is able to affirm his being and unify with his community as the exemplar of their 
ethical failures.  His personal goals of advancement are forfeit, but they were always 
suspect anyway.  It seems that what Iago most wanted is for everyone to recognize their 
likeness to him, that they too have a void within.  He wants them to empathize with his 
lack of center, lack of meaning.  Iago’s nihilism is transferred to his sociality and beyond 
to the theatrical audience who also seek for an explanation of his motive within 
themselves.  To consider why Iago did what he did is to consider social inequities and the 
secret sins they engender within each of us; it is to recognize that there is a void, an 
ethical and ontological absence in everyone.  However Iago may have intended this 
information to affect his sociality, Lodovico receives it as instructive.  Until, that is, he 
has to apply it to himself, at which point he tries to silence it by shutting out its vision.  
His use of silence, however, is oppressive, and has the oppositional effect of drawing 
attention to the ultimate meaning of Iago’s event. 
Dauphine is a trickster who works in silence.  He is not the animated rhetorician 
of Rebhorn’s analysis, but a secretive emissary from the void.  Like Rebhorn’s trickster, 
however, he is ontologically starved, a condition only fully revealed at the conclusion of 
the play.  In fact all the qualities of the trickster apply to Dauphine, except for his lack of 
rhetorizing.  But Dauphine is silent in a community of urgent self-creators.  All the 
characters are tricksters in this play, they all seek to construct an extrinsic social identity, 
  95 
but few have any self-awareness.  At the end of the play when Dauphine’s reticence is 
exposed as strategic self-silencing, everyone except Dauphine re-evaluates their social 
maneuvering.  Dauphine’s trick affords each an opportunity to reconceive of themselves 
in a more intrinsic, subjectifying way.  This imperative is extended even to the audience 
in Jonson’s audacious self-silencing, which keeps Epicene’s secret even from 
spectators/readers. Only Dauphine himself fails to receive subjective benefit from his 
self-silence.  Though he receives the pecuniary goals he sought, it is at the expense of his 
social standing and personal subjectivity.  He recedes from the play, an image of false 
constructivity, pointing again to the gap of being, the void, which lurks in all beings.   
In both plays it is amply evident that self-silencing is an important mode of 
influence within a sociality.  Whether rhetoric or silence is used to obscure the secret self, 
the presentation of self-silencing always elicits a personal, ethical evaluation on the part 
of witnesses.  Because villains and tricksters use of self-silence is nihilistic, it evokes a 
pharmaceutical response from their social group and the play’s audiences as well.  
Although the communities within the plays, and the plays’ auditors are like the villain-
trickster insofar as they too possess an ethical absence, no one wants to be either the 
villain or the dupe.  So witnesses must in some way transform their secret selves into 
authentic silent selves.  They must conscientiously reform their way of being in the 
world.  Paradoxically, the failure-to-present that self-silencing signifies is a compelling 
presentation of the multiple, social ontology and subsequent ethicality of humanity.  
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England,” Shakespeare Quarterly, 39:4 (Winter 1988): 418-440, who writes  
“…the man playing Epicoene usurps woman’s person and place to act out 
degrading masculine construction of her” (430). Johnston does not read the 
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CHAPTER 4 
"THE THING INVIOLATE": SENSING SELVES 
Why does Hieronimo bite out his own tongue at the climax of Thomas Kyd’s 
revenge play, The Spanish Tragedy?  His claim to be concealing a “thing inviolate” with 
his autoglossotomy has confounded critics for generations, most of whom do not even 
attempt to understand its meaning.1  Yet the scene stands as the defining moment of this 
seminal revenge tragedy, and thus warrants intelligibility.  This essay seeks to extract 
meaning from the self-silencing through an analysis of social relations in the play and 
their legal and linguistic composition.  In analyzing the play’s engagement with 
community, speech, and agency, I am utilizing the social analytics of Emmanuel Levinas, 
as well as engaging the play in a “contest for meaning” with a sermon of Henry Smith’s 
that is contemporaneous with the play.2  As these sites for discourse converge, we see 
that the apparent quiescence of self-silencing belies an urgent desire for ethical activism.  
Furthermore, effectuating this call to ethical reform requires personal proximity and is 
accomplished via the performance of non-performance.  These elements align this essay 
with Early Modern scholarship on justice, authority, representation, sociality and 
subjectivity.  I hope to slice through this rather vast landscape, with specificity and depth 
sufficient to make a compelling case for the autoglossotomy to serve as a call to empathy.  
While I will not presume to have definitively resolved Hieronimo’s self-silencing 
enigma, this analysis will offer a perspective that makes sense both within the context of 
the play and in subsequent instances of staged self-silencings.  I expect as well to deepen 
our understanding of the importance of silence as a subjective and ethical power strategy. 
 Although a few critics have considered the varieties of Early Modern silence and 
its philosophic significance, self-silencing has primarily been considered in connection 
with Stoic self-governance which is not particularly applicable to Hieronimo, or other 
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avengers for that matter (most of whom are as loquacious about the injustices they 
attempt to rectify as they are unrestrained in exacting vengeance).3  If self-silencing is to 
be conceived in a Stoic fashion, it must be in the sense of constancy that Geoffrey Miles 
emphasizes in his book, Shakespeare and the Constant Romans.4  But in what way is 
Hieronimo “constant” in biting out his tongue?  The revenger typically has good reasons 
for carrying out vigilante justice, and is forthright in explaining how his actions are 
“justifiable.”  So why the habitual move to silence?  Hieronimo says, “Urge no more 
words, I have no more to say” (4.4.152), and Hamlet says, “The rest is silence” 
(5.2.299).5  But these silences are peculiar because they come after a great deal of 
explicating and philosophical speechifying, and so beg the question of what and why are 
these revengers silencing?  The silence may foreshadow the avengers impending demise 
or social ostracism but this is more than the silence of death else Hieronimo would not 
claim to be preserving in his silence an “inviolable thing.”  But what is that “inviolable 
thing?”  To begin answering this question, a closer look at the dynamics of revenge and 
revenger in The Spanish Tragedy is in order.  
Hieronimo’s role as the “Knight Marshal” of Spain is pivotal to understanding 
his character’s conflicts and choices.  Scholars have typically understood Hieronimo as 
an advocate, representing petitioners to the King’s justice.6  While this is not inaccurate, 
it fails to recognize either the broad scope of the Marshal’s work, nor the representative 
direction of his advocacy work.  According to John Cowell (1554-1611), who in 1607 
published “The interpreter: or Booke containing the signification of words wherein is set 
foorth the true meaning of all, or the most part of such words and termes, as are 
mentioned in the lawe writers, or statutes of this victorious and renowned kingdome, 
requiring any exposition or interpretation,” the responsibilities of the Marshalsea were 
several-fold.7  The English Knight Marshal (under Elizabeth, Sir George Carey and Sir 
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Thomas Gerrard) is charged with governing and maintaining the civil order on behalf of 
the crown in the jurisdiction of the monarch’s residence and court.  To fulfill this capacity 
the marshal serves as policer, justicer and jailor, especially responsible for securing the 
monarch’s bodily protection.  These efforts are readily attested in Sir Francis Bacon’s 
documentation of Gerrard’s aid in subduing the Essex rebellion, as well as Elizabeth’s 
own proclamation instructing Carey to restrict access to either her or the verge by plague-
carrying sailors of Sir Francis Drake’s navy.8  Though it is true that the marshal brings 
petitions to the sovereign, and administers justice on the sovereign’s behalf, these actions 
are not completed as an advocate for the people, but in representation of the monarchy.  
The distinction I am delineating here between representing the sovereign rather than the 
subject is further emphasized in the knight marshal’s expanded duties.  He is to serve as 
harbinger for the monarch, preceding her so as to organize rank, coordinate ceremonies, 
and provision bed, board and entertainment for guests of the monarchy, as well as for the 
monarch herself during royal appearances, progresses or visits.9  These more hospitable 
and relational aspects of the Marshalsea have been, to my knowledge, universally 
neglected in scholarship on The Spanish Tragedy, to the detriment of our understanding 
of the play’s interest in community.  We see, herein, that the Knight Marshal’s is not 
simply concerned with justice for commoners, but is more specifically interested in 
navigating the complex social relations of persons in regard to the monarchy, especially 
as they regard access and proximity to the sovereign. 
At the start of the play, in fact, it is within these social aspects of the Marshalsea 
that we see Hieronimo working.  Hieronimo, it seems, has been offering valued and 
trustworthy service to his King.  The silent masque he presents before the King of Spain 
and the Ambassador of Portugal is a diplomatic triumph, subduing the enmity of the 
victor and saving face for the disgraced, paving the way for reconciliation and unity 
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between the countries.10  “Spain is Portugal/And Portugal is Spain,” (1.4.132-33) delights 
the King of Spain luxuriating in the union of the recently warring countries.  The 
particulars of the masque are worth attending, however.  The conceit with which 
Hieronimo achieves reconciliation is the performance of the subjection of both countries.  
In the masque, both countries are conquered by England; they are made alike, so one 
cannot sulk nor the other exult in their newly accorded peace.  Hieronimo, following the 
King’s lead, makes each country akin to the other, mirrors, so that ethical and 
compassionate relations may be sustained through the leveling of hierarchy.  Hieronimo’s 
masque promotes civility by evoking empathetic emulation.  While this masque is 
certainly a precursor to the murderous masque of the play’s conclusion, it may also be 
seen—in its lack of dialogue or narration and consequent need for explication—to 
foreshadow the performance of silencing that Hieronimo stages on his own person, a 
performance that also seeks to unify the community after civil unrest.  Furthermore, his 
diplomacy confirms Hieronimo’s character as a savvy, wise, and good-intentioned 
diplomat of the household.  It is, then, particularly conflicting for him when his son is 
brutally murdered by the King’s nephew, Lorenzo.  As a father, he wants revenge.  As the 
admirable Knight Marshal, he is responsible for securing justice, but he recognizes the 
conflict of interest.  His effort to engage the King’s support is blocked by Lorenzo, 
although Hieronimo’s official post as Knight Marshal is retained.  The quandary, 
paradigmatic for revengers, is acute: Hieronimo needs access to the King to secure 
justice; but his authority does not supercede that of the murderer and thus access to the 
king, and therefore justice, is repulsed.  The father cannot be satisfied in the loss of his 
son; the Knight Marshal can neither represent nor serve his king.  The question is not 
only one of justice, then, but one of social rank and relation, of authority and agency.   
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Hieronimo claims that he is denied access to divine justice as well, and yet it is 
not at all clear that the heavens of The Spanish Tragedy are as silent before his pleas as 
he claims.  There are a few circumstances to note here.  First is the imperative for 
revenge and justice.  In this revenge play, as in many, revenge and justice are 
synonymous, or nearly so, for those who have been wronged.  Hieronimo’s wife, Isabella, 
says, “The heavens are just; murder cannot be hid; / Time is the author both of truth and 
right, / and time will bring this treachery to light” (2.5.57-59).  I think this might be 
characterized as a commonplace generalization that nonetheless needs to be emphasized: 
murder is ethically wrong in this play and murderers need to be held accountable.  This 
ethical worldview is confirmed when Hieronimo, crying to the heavens for justice in the 
specific form of a clue to the identity of Horatio’s murderer immediately receives a deus 
ex machina letter (falling, seemingly, from the heavens) composed by Bel-Imperia 
correctly naming Lorenzo and Balthazar as the murderers (3.2.24).  When he seeks 
confirmation, again from the “countermured walls” of heaven, he receives Pedringano’s 
letter of confession. It is impossible for this misdeed to go unchecked; the very universe 
of The Spanish Tragedy will not permit it.  If Hieronimo does not know whom to blame, 
he will be informed.  So that we are not confused by obfuscated ethics, I feel it is worth 
emphasizing the way in which Horatio’s murder is presented as a legitimate social 
violation in both a legal and a moral sense. 
Another point to highlight here is the conflation of revelation and revenge in 
which both Hieronimo and his wife, Isabella, engage.  In the lines quoted above, Isabella 
is comforted that the crime will come to “light.”  Hieronimo asks the “sacred heavens,” 
“If this incomparable murder thus/Of mine—but now no more—my son/Shall unrevealed 
and unrevenged pass,/How should we term your dealings to be just/If you unjustly deal 
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with those that in your justice trust?” (3.2.7-11).  “Unrevealed” and “unrevenged” are 
linked such as to be nearly synonymous here and again with Hieronimo’s later prayer: 
O sacred heavens, may it come to pass 
That such a monstrous and detested deed, 
So closely smothered and so long concealed,  
Shall thus by this be venged or revealed? (3.7.45-48). 
 
The joining of the ideas of revelation and revenge suggest a further moral imperative to 
honesty, an assumption that the dishonesty and dissembling of the murderers is an 
additional and complicating ethical failing.  Much as Deborah Shuger argued that 
governmental censorship revealed a social expectation of truth, rather than a desire to 
conceal dissent, so The Spanish Tragedy, or at least Hieronimo and his wife, likewise 
seems to expect civil (and civilized) transparency.11  This conflation of truth and justice, 
may motivate the theatrically-minded Hieronimo to take his revenge on the stage, where, 
presumably, all is revealed, even accomplished anew, in the light of public performance.  
Certainly, it establishes that for Hieronimo, truth is social; it needs to be revealed and 
shared.   
Perhaps these points about homicide and honesty are self-evident, but I linger on 
them in order to remember that revenge tragedies are not simply concerned with personal 
satisfaction or legal/political failures, but also with restoring social morality.  Social 
morality may be sought for personal satisfaction but is also foundational to legal or 
political issues, and thus it is engendered in the web of sociality where subjects interact.  
The scrupulous and diplomatic Hieronimo is in a quandary: he needs the truth to be 
revealed, he needs retribution, but he cannot get these things in the ordinary legal way 
because the criminals have greater authority than he.  To the perception of the ingenuous 
Hieronimo, the very fact of Lorenzo’s criminality naturally undermines and voids his 
authority, and an ethical lapse within the royal family threatens the well-being of the 
entire state.  Yet the intricacies of the social and legal system to which Hieronimo is so 
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attuned, do not accommodate this circumstance.  Thus, personally and professionally, 
Hieronimo is obliged to seek out provisional authority with which to restore the Spanish 
sociality to its ethical norm.  
In the same year that Kyd’s play was published, a sermon of Henry Smith’s 
(1560-1592?) was also printed entitled “Satan’s Compassing the Earth.”12  Smith’s 
epigraph is Job 1:7-8, a surprisingly mundane scene of heavenly governance, that is 
nonetheless disconcerting in its implications.  The Lord has summoned his children to 
appear before him and Satan arrives among them.  God inquires from where he comes, 
and Satan answers, “From copassing (sic) the earth to and fro, and from walking in it.”13  
Smith’s exegesis is entirely concerned with Satan’s occupation of the earth.  He advises 
readers that just as “It is some vantage unto us to heare that the Spaniards are comming 
before they come,” so should we be warned that Satan is lurking so “that wee may bee in 
a readines against him.” (Smith 482).  Smith elaborates upon the ways in which Satan 
may be said to “compasse the earth,” but does not delve into the more peculiar aspects of 
his epigraph, nor its enigmatic aftermath.  After Satan delivers his nonchalant alibi of a 
walkabout, God directs his attention to the “blameless” Job.  Satan accuses Job of being 
good only because God has made life easy for him with health, wealth, family and 
reputation.  So God permits Satan to take everything away from Job, except his life, as a 
test of Job’s faith, which Satan proceeds to do.  The remainder of the book depicts Job’s 
struggle to understand God’s purpose in his suffering (since he was not privy to the 
heavenly conference) and to maintain belief in God’s justice and benevolence despite the 
terrible degradation he experiences.  Smith tangles with the knotty theological 
ramifications of this divine council only with the surprising (and entirely undeveloped, 
though iterated) suggestion that it is as if Satan approaches God “…to get a commission 
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that God would make him knight Marshal over the world, to slay and kill as many as he 
hated…” (486).    
There is no reason to believe Smith had seen Kyd’s play with its murderous 
Knight Marshal, Hieronimo.  On the contrary, Smith, a moderate Puritan, cautions his 
readers against theatrical performance, so presumably he did not attend them himself.  
But the construction of the Knight Marshal’s office as that of a murderer, rather than a 
peacekeeper and protector, is provocative enough to suspect that perhaps Smith was 
familiar with the outlines of Kyd’s tale, which was an exceptionally popular and 
frequently staged play.  The ubiquitous Thomas Nashe does stand as one tenuous link 
between the popular lecturer of St. Clement Danes and the literary/theatrical world.  
Coining Smith’s oft-repeated sobriquet, Nashe writes upon Smith’s death, “…Silver-
tongue’d Smith, whose well tun’d stile hath made thy death the general teares of the 
Muses….”14  Other than Nashe’s admiration for Smith’s style, however, the precise 
nature of their acquaintance is unknown.  It is possible, though, to grant Smith a 
theoretical familiarity with Kyd via Nashe, who taunted Kyd for his Senecan translations.  
Nashe’s personal intimacy with the household of Knight Marshal Sir George Carey is 
also suggestive.15  Smith, however, does not need Nashe to be connected with the 
Queen’s household.  His stepmother was Margaret Cecil, sister to Lord Burghley, and the 
powerful Lord Treasurer may be styled a patron of Smith’s, having intervened on his 
behalf during anti-Puritan contentions (Jenkins 10-21).  Smith’s popularity and general 
esteem is uncontested.  “By 1610 Smith’s printed sermons had gone through eighty-five 
or more editions and his fame as a powerful preacher survived him for several decades” 
(Jenkins 59).  In any case, Smith’s sermon invites a propitiously homologous reading of 
the play because of a coincidence of thematic parallels not limited to, but certainly 
beginning with, the startling presence of a homicidal court official.  
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Why should Smith’s configure Satan as a Knight Marshal whose authority to kill 
derives from his “king.”  There are, to my knowledge, no pertinent topical circumstances 
of marshals murdering rampantly and serially at Elizabeth’s behest.  Throughout the 
sermon, however, Satan is compared to Spain – both are threats to the English, 
deceptively seeking to subdue or destroy.  “…if God make you see your countrie naked, 
your temples desolate, your cities ruined, your houses spoiled, you will say the Spaniards 
have been here: so when you see your minds corrupted, your hearts hardened, your willes 
perverted…you may say the devil hath beene here” (Smith 488).  Of course, The Spanish 
Tragedy is set in Spain, making Hieronimo the Spanish Knight Marshal: he is doubly 
indicted.16  Interestingly, both the Spaniards (as Smith conceives them) and Satan are 
identified in the sermon, not in themselves, but by reading evidence of their presence; for 
Smith, they signify silently.  Kevin Dunn has argued that Hieronimo as a representative is 
also a sign only, that his primary problem is the lack of an authentic subjectivity available 
for those who legally represent.17  In another parallel, Satan is described like a Judas, 
“because he kisseth when he betrayeth, as though he would not betray” (Smith 490).  
Both Lorenzo, the villain of Kyd’s play, and Hieronimo are guilty of similarly 
demonstrating affection to those whom they plot to ruin.  Hieronimo’s performance of 
affection toward Lorenzo is so convincing it precipitates his wife’s suicide.  Satan’s 
“compassing” especially resonates in the play as Hieronimo locks (encompasses) the 
King and his retinue in the theatre for his vengeance-taking.  Prior to committing his 
murders, he says, “The ugly fiends do sally forth of hell,/And frame my steps to 
unfrequented paths/And fear my hearts with fierce inflamed thoughts” (3.2.16-18).  Here, 
Hieronimo claims explicitly that he is directed to roam and plot murder by devils.  As he 
“compasses” the earth, even his cries for justice encircle heaven, 
The blustering winds, conspiring with my words, 
At my lament have moved the leafless trees, 
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Disrobed the meadows of their flowered green, 
Made mountains marsh with spring tides of my tears, 
And broken through the brazen gates of hell. 
Yet still tormented is my tortured soul 
With broken sighs and restless passions, 
That winged, mount and hovering in the air, 
Beat at the windows of the brightest heavens, 
Soliciting for justice and revenge. 
But they are placed in those empyreal heights 
Where, countermured with walls of diamond, 
I find the place impregnable, and they 
Resist my woes, and give my words no way. (3.7.5-18) 
 
Hieronimo’s “ceaseless plaints” (3.7.4) are likened to traveling winds that have altered 
the earth (disrobed the meadows) and assaulted heaven. Although Hieronimo echoes 
Job’s anxious solicitation of God for justice, he compares to Smith’s Satan – Spanish, 
murderous, deceptive, and “compassing” the earth.  In fact, this dual personification 
proves useful for many revengers.  Though they suffer wrong at the hands of authority, 
they also, like Satan, exercise an assumed authority in “kil[ling] as many as he hate[s].”   
A curious figuring, Satan “commissioned” by God.  Satan, who slays whomever 
he hates, as the enforcer for and harbinger of God; it reinforces the notion of sovereign 
omnipotence even as it undermines the notion of sovereign benevolence.  It reveals a 
power that cascades from God and is exercised on his behalf by Satan: the sorrows that 
beset Job are “authorized” by God.  Smith fails to articulate a response to this theological 
quandary, but surely recognizes the subversive potential of his configuration.  By 
implication, or even imputation, the King authorizes the crimes of his people.  Authority 
is not bivouacked in the King’s body, it is not held in stasis until the sovereign requires 
its use, but is in perpetual circulation amongst the King and those in whom he vests 
power.  Responsibility for the actions of his agents, ultimately belong to the King.  
Though there is little to suggest, in the Knight Marshal’s responsibilities, that injudicious 
killing and slaying is customary, Smith assigns Satan the role of Knight Marshal, a role 
supposedly representative of the King’s justice.  Satan, in other words, exercises his 
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sovereign’s authority.  The Spanish Tragedy’s Knight Marshal Hieronimo is also granted 
the authority of his King to administer justice in the court’s dominions.  Where Satan is 
an “accuser” in the divine court, the Knight Marshal’s duties as both police and 
magistrate register him as both accuser and advocate.  The natural conflict in these roles 
is underscored with Hieronimo’s personal conflict of interest.  Could Hieronimo, like 
Satan, extend his own, sovereignly-appointed authority to slaying and killing?   
 I introduce Smith’s sermon in order to illustrate the ways in which Hieronimo’s 
dilemma is complicated by competing ideologies of obligation.  Hieronimo himself is one 
minute praying for (and receiving) information about the murderer’s identity, the next he 
claims, as quoted above, that his steps are guided by hell’s fiends.  The religious 
command of Romans 12:19 to forego vengeance collides with the Senecan hero who 
redresses crime at any personal cost.  Hieronimo wavers from one to the other within a 
handful of lines (3.13.2-20).  But for this Knight Marshal, these ordinary constructions of 
justice-seeking are entangled with those of his profession.  We might, following Bradin 
Cormack’s lead, conceive of Hieronimo’s dilemma in terms of jurisdiction.  Cormack 
writes,  
…jurisdiction identifies authority as power produced under the administrative 
recognition of the geographical or conceptual limits that exactly order it as 
authority.  Jurisdiction amounts to the delimitation of a sphere—spatial (state, 
city, or manor; domestic, maritime, or foreign), temporal (proximate or 
immemorial past; regular or market days), or generic (matters spiritual or 
temporal; promise or debt)—that is the precondition for the judicial as such, for 
the very capacity of the law to come into effect.18 
 
The Knight Marshal’s generic sphere of authority confusingly includes minor legal 
petitions such as debts and leases (3.13.59-65), capital offenses such as murder (3.6), as 
well as matters of civility such as the entertainment of ambassadors (1.4).  The 
Elizabethan legal system itself is hereby problematized for assigning this absurdly broad 
jurisdiction, as well as for necessitating the discordant roles it required the Knight 
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Marshal to play in adjudicating it.  Jailor and magistrate?  Guardian of the monarch’s 
person and director of entertainment?19  As Cormack’s book reveals, England’s legal 
system had plenty of opportunity for revision in its development.  Hieronimo is nearly 
paralyzed with inaction while he considers how to proceed from within this muddle of 
familial, social, religious, cultural and legal obligations. 
The Spanish Tragedy almost obsessively places characters and actions in 
ambiguous positions between warring claims of identity, loyalty, and obligation.  Don 
Andrea of the Induction is neither a lover nor a warrior, and so cannot find peace in the 
afterlife until his tale is resolved.20  The credit for Prince Balthazar’s capture belongs 
fully to neither Horatio nor Lorenzo.  The pursuant peace is only conditional.  Balthazar 
remains in the Spanish court as neither free man nor prisoner, “Meanwhile live thou, 
though not in liberty, yet free from bearing any servile yoke” (1.2.147-8).  The viceroy of 
Portugal, Alexandro, Pedringano, Bel-Imperia and of course Hieronimo are all denied 
access to the persons who can effect their physical or emotional liberation.  The play 
positions characters in impossibly difficult moral situations all but abandoned by 
behavioral precedents.  The characters must proceed with neither law nor custom to guide 
them.  The Spanish Tragedy demonstrates the way in which civil nomos is created by 
individual subjects’ reactions to these competing ethical claims.  Whether they rest their 
confidence in civil servants, family, the monarchy, or divine justice every character 
grapples with social morality, enacting behaviors that either defy or reify paradigms of 
communal relations.  The play is keen to investigate the subjective and social experience 
of those negotiating with forms of authority.  Not surprisingly, these issues manifest in 
the play via the problematization of speech, hearing and personal access. 
Language in this play is often figured as deceptive and ineffective, and at least 
twice is portrayed as a cause of death.21  Balthazar laments the ineffectual love letters he 
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sends to Bel-Imperia, “My words are rude and work her no delight.  The lines I send her 
are but harsh and ill, Such as do drop from Pan and Marsyas’ quill” (2.1.14-16).  Marsyas 
lost a verse contest with Apollo and was subsequently flayed alive (note, p. 22).  When 
Bel-Imperia attempts to paint a sylvan picture of an assignation with Horatio, she 
curiously, forebodingly, refers to Philomela, the Ovidean link between speech and 
violence.  Furthermore, Bel-Imperia figures the nightingale singing only with a thorn to 
her breast.  Love relationships in the play are not secured with speech.  On the contrary, 
speech belies its purported goal bringing division and death to the would-be lovers.  
Somehow, speaking of love destroys the very subject of which it speaks, as well as the 
subject who speaks.   
 The subplot also demonstrates problems with speech, but this time with an 
emphasis on hearing.  The Viceroy of Portugal is deceived by the false words of Villupo 
eager to get rid of a rival.  The Viceroy refuses to listen to Alexandro’s protestations of 
innocence, and then, when Alexandro is vindicated, the Viceroy refuses to hear 
Alexandro’s plea for leniency toward Villupo.  Likewise, Hieronimo pleads for justice to 
the King of Spain, “Justice, oh Justice!  Oh my son, my son,/My son whom naught can 
ransom or redeem”  (3.12.65-6).  But the King’s response is to urge others to “restrain 
[Hieronimo’s] fury” (3.12.80) and to defer hearing the matter.  This anticipates the 
King’s later failure to hear Hieronimo when he explains what prompted his vengeance.  
Hieronimo himself neglects his advocate work and chews up the petitions of those in his 
charge.  In The Spanish Tragedy, speech is divisive; hearing is compromised.  Unable or 
unwilling to listen, the civil community in this play is non-functional.   
Henry Smith’s sermon on Satan’s Compassing the Earth both begins and ends 
with an admonition to listen: 
Take heed how you heare, for that which I am to speake unto you of the devil, the 
devil would not have you heare: and therefore as hee is here called a Compasser, 
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so hee will compass your eyes with shewes, and your eares with soundes, and 
your sences with sleepe, and your thoughtes with fansies, and all to hinder you 
from hearing while the articles are against him, and after I have spoken, hee will 
compasse you againe with business, and cares, and pleasures, and quarrels, to 
make you forget that which you have heard, as hee hath made you forgetter that 
which he have heard before, or else to contemne it, as though you might doe well 
without it: as hee hath compassed the which doe walke in the streetes while the 
voice of god soundeth in the Churches as they passes by: therefore before everie 
Sermon yee had need to remember Christes lesson, Take heed how you heare. (1) 
 
Smith argues that persons are vulnerable to Satan when allowing life to “compass” them 
with “showes,” “soundes,” “sleepe,” and “fancies” such that they are not attentive to life.  
The King of Spain’s failure to listen manifests Smith’s “compassed” with “business, and 
cares,” and links him with the divinity who resists Hieronimo’s “ceaseless ‘plaints.”  If 
false and deceptive speech undermines subjective authority in the play, the unique and 
apposite trait of sovereignty is the deferral of listening or failure to hear.   
The sovereign’s silence is not, however, always a form of negligence or absence.  
Revenge figures sovereign silence as powerful.  The gate of horn (as opposed to that of 
ivory) is said to offer dreams of truth in the silence of the night.22  In a related scene, Don 
Andrea complains (for the third time) about witnessing his antagonist’s seemingly 
successful machinations, until Revenge assures him, “…although he (Revenge) sleep 
awhile; For in unquiet, quietness is feigned, And slumb’ring is a common worldly wile” 
(3.15.23-5).  Twice, then, in connection with Revenge, silence is imagined to be rife with 
the action of thinking: first dreaming, then scheming.  C.L. Barber, too, has noticed the 
surprising sense of effectuality that Revenge depicts in stillness and sleep.  He describes 
Revenge as a type of chorus, who in turn describes the “dramatic movement” of the play, 
“The accomplishment of the plot is a reversal…which comes about by the growth…of a 
motive…even though it may go underground” (145).  Sovereign silence, even the 
“sleepe” that Smith cautions against, is not, then, necessarily impotence; it may be a type 
of subjective or ethical acting.  When Lorenzo urges the King to dismiss Hieronimo from 
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his position.  The King refuses out of compassion, “We shall increase his melancholy so.  
‘Tis best we see further in it first…” (3.12.99-100).  Although he postpones attending to 
Hieronimo’s cry for justice, his silence arises out of ethical concern for Hieronimo’s 
distracted state.  There are two senses of authority’s silence then: the failure/deferral of 
hearing and the active silence of ethical consideration.  It is not clear that these are 
actuated in mutual exclusion.  The silences of The Spanish Tragedy have a mixture of 
motivations, but it is an enjoyment of sovereign power to resist articulation.  Just as Job 
discovers in the indexed text of Smith’s sermon, the subjective mode of the sovereign is 
silence that signifies.  To “take heed of how we hear,” however, we find that this silent 
signification reflects inter-relationally: revealing the monarch’s ethical sensitivity and 
prompting an ethical reaction (good or ill) from the listener as they grapple with the non-
performance of the monarch.  
Catherine Belsey in her study on The Subject of Tragedy argues that the 
diachronic man of 15th century morality plays has no agency; the subjects of history are 
God and the Devil.  Moving into later plays, Belsey notes the unclear authority with 
which Hieronimo exacts his revenge.   “…uncertain whether he speaks in the name – the 
discourse – of heaven or hell, or neither, Hieronimo finally bites out his own tongue, 
repudiating the right which defines the subject, the right of speech itself.”23  As we have 
seen, though, Hieronimo has discovered that speech is an ineffectual emissary of his 
agency.  He needs another authorizing agent or means.  Hieronimo’s situation evokes the 
theological suggestion of Henry Smith’s sermon: that the devil is empowered by God, 
that his power is actually God’s power.  That God would “commission” Satan to 
wantonly destroy God’s own handiwork is hardly thinkable, commissioning is far 
different from simply “permitting” Satan to harm as traditional readings of the book of 
Job suggest.  And yet Smith’s choice of the word “commission” points to the crucible of 
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Christian claims about God’s goodness and power.  The “problem of evil,” as it is 
termed, is simply the question that if God is all-good and all-powerful, then why is there 
evil and suffering.  The orthodox response is that suffering was not part of God’s original 
creation (“…it was very good” [Genesis 1:31]), but death (spiritual and physical) was 
introduced with the fall of man.  When humankind chose to enjoy fruit from the tree of 
good and evil, it chose to learn about God’s benevolence (the good) through suffering 
(the evil).  As persons endure various hardships, they seek meaning, encounter God, and 
through recognition of his Being come to understand through ethical relation, their own 
being and social obligation.  Suffering calls humans back to a right relation with God.  
The horrors that undo Job, to use Smith’s exemplar, are not consequences of his own 
personal sin; there is not a one-to-one correlation of sin and suffering.  God’s purposes in 
Job’s suffering are to prove Satan a false accuser and a liar, but Job does not know this.  
Although he does not deny his belief in God, he does say inappropriate things about God 
as he wrestles with his seemingly unjust treatment.  At the conclusion of the book, God 
finally speaks to Job, face to face.  Job has required, “Shewe me, wherefore thou 
contendest with me” (Job 10:2); God does not offer a direct articulate response.  Instead, 
God directs him to look upon the “shewe” of creation.  With the performance of the 
created world, God illuminates to Job that he perceives their relationship wrongly.  In the 
face of Job’s relative ignorance and impotence compared to God’s own omniscience and 
omnipotence, Job is humbled.  “Behold, I am vile: what shall I answer thee? I will lay 
mine hand upon my mouth.  Once I have spoken, but I will not answer; Yes, twice but I 
will proceed no further” (Job 39:37).  Job cried for justice (twice), then self-silences.  For 
Job, this silence is born out of a recognition of their right relation: God’s power exceeds 
his own, and yet, Job’s own power is also an extension of God’s power.  His agency 
originates with his creator.  His fate and his response to it, therefore reflect his creator 
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who designates Job’s role and significance in life.  So that he is not one “who darkeneth 
the counsel by wordes without knowledge,” Job is silent (Job 38:2).  His silence solicits 
his community to make meaning out of his situation as they recognize the nature of being 
as socially contingent; recognize that we are always in relation to others and thus there is 
always ethical obligation at the core of agency, sovereign or subject.  God is responsible 
for Job, Job is responsible to God; their agency is shared. 
Henry Smith’s depiction of Satan as a commissioned Knight Marshal positions 
him as an extension, a representative, of the sovereign will.  As Smith concludes his 
sermon, he iterates this idea: the devil comes to God, “not to bee reformed of his evill, 
but to have a pasport to doe more evill” (Smith 6).  A passport—precisely what the 
underworld cannot find for Don Andrea—a license or authorization to move, exercise 
agency.  A passport is the “safe conduct” guarantee for the enacting of one’s role in the 
world.24  Hieronimo keenly desires revenge but feels his “ceaseless plaints” have availed 
him nothing.  Nor has he found one to hear his lament, “Where shall I run to breathe 
abroad my woes…” (3.7.1).  There is no Knight Marshal to whom Hieronimo may 
present his action.  The social breakdown of the community is complete.  Hieronimo is 
isolated: Isabella is suicidal; Pedringano is dead; Bel-Imperia is confined; and Lorenzo 
prevents his access to the King.  Everyone seems senseless to Hieronimo’s suffering, 
though, indeed, “everyone” is intimately concerned with Horatio’s murder in their own 
self-involved way.  Hieronimo tries, when denied access to the King, to relinquish his 
position so that he may freely assume the anti-civil role of revenger,  
I’ll make a pickax of my poniard, 
And here surrender up my marshalship; 
For I’ll go marshal up the fiends in hell 
To be avenged on you all for this. (3.12.75-9) 
 
The King, however, chooses to retain Hieronimo as his Knight Marshal, despite his 
curious outburst.  Hieronimo decides to become the Senecan avenger anyway.  His 
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passport to “slay and kil as many as he hate[s],” lies in his sovereignly-assigned role of 
Knight Marshal.  Hieronimo’s execution of vengeance then, may be seen by him as an 
extension of his civil responsibility.  The inordinately broad and confused jurisdictional 
obligations offer a type of warrant for this very personal execution of his duties.  
Hieronimo’s authority derives from the King, and it is in service to the King that he 
relieves the court of the criminal element.  Belsey’s diachronic man of the 15th century 
gives way not necessarily to the humanist man rebounding from the angel on one 
shoulder to the devil on the other, but to the subject that encompasses both.  The subject 
of history is not God and Satan, but God manifested through a variety of commissioned 
agents including Satan, Job, the King, of course, and Hieronimo, agent for the King.  
Though the King calls him a traitor after he murders the conspirators, Knight Marshal 
Hieronimo, like Smith’s slaying Satan, may be perceived as fulfilling his sovereignly-
assigned duties with a Stoic-like constancy.  
Actually conducting his legal duties, however, proves challenging for Hieronimo, 
who in a fit, shreds the petitioners actions at no small cost to their cause.  The equity of 
his previous efforts is undermined by his new “secret” identity as a revenger.  Although 
the written petitions of Hieronimo’s subjects fail to move him, Old Bazulto’s silent 
performance of sorrow does move Hieronimo to empathy, engaging his response, if only 
to commiserate.  Hieronimo now recalls his earlier success in using the power of 
performance to secure empathy.  As Katharine Eisaman Maus notes,  
The force of empathy seems to propel the confrontation into the register of the 
aesthetic: the Old Man is Hieronimo’s ‘portrait.’  …mimetic representation 
hightens rather than diminishes real-life pertinence….  In the last act, in a fable 
that turns out to be true, Hieronimo attempts to enforce upon the rulers of Spain 
and Portugal the acknowledgment of likeness that had overcome him….25   
 
Hieronimo can use his role of Knight Marshal to stage his vengeance in such a way that it 
too will elicit the empathy he desires, and restore the monarchy to the ethical norm it 
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enjoyed at the start of the play.  The way to accomplish his vengeance and reconcile the 
fractured Spanish community is to reenact the earlier diplomatic success of the silent 
masque.  Hieronimo hopes to make others feel as he does, to effect a performance that 
elicits empathy, fellow-feeling.26  He finds power and agency in silent (or 
incomprehensible) shows that obtain relational understanding in witnesses.  But of 
course, to enact vengeance theatrically is also to employ another of Smith’s tricks of 
Satan: “shewes” that create “fancies.”  Though his actions are homicidal, his use of 
theatre to accomplish them suggests that he has not relinquished hope of effecting ethical 
reform.  The civil anomie of this sociality is symptomatized not only in the unjust murder 
of Horatio, but also in the divisions speech cause, complicated by an inability to listen or 
empathize.  Hieronimo’s effort to achieve justice, then, incorporates not only the legal 
concern to see murderers penalized, but also the social concern to enable right social 
relations.  The use of silent performance to accomplish these aims is apt.  The masque 
demonstrates Ciceronian constancy of public performance; it affirms the sovereign 
mandate for social justice; and it enacts a restorative empathy amongst observers.  Or at 
least it is supposed to. 
In the climactic scene Hieronimo stages a masque of murders for the King of 
Spain and the Viceroy of Portugal that imprecisely mirrors the events that led to his son, 
Horatio’s, murder, ostensibly selected for performance because of its similar 
circumstances.  Hieronimo directs the actors to speak the play each in a different 
language, embodying the divisive nature of speech in the Spanish community.  As the 
executor of discordant language, Hieronimo plays a divine role, sundering the linguistic 
community, remanding the villains to a confusion of speech that mirrors their actual 
linguistic relations.  As he remarks in anticipation of the masque, “Now shall I see the fall 
of Babylon,/Wrought by the heavens in this confusion” (4.1.195-6).  The Babelian 
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implication that these villains usurped divine prerogative in inflicting Horatio’s untimely 
demise is compounded in Hieronimo’s assumption of divine privilege in orchestrating 
their destruction.  As explicator of the play, as well, Hieronimo seemingly assumes 
authorial privilege that links him to a godly author of all things.  Upon the vengeful 
completion, however, and the deaths of the conspirators, Hieronimo says “…I at last 
revenged thoroughly,/Upon whose souls may heavens be yet avenged/With greater far 
than these afflictions” (4.4.173-5).  Hieronimo identifies his vengeance with an earthly 
justice, leaving the villains’ souls to a divine justice.  Thus he here rejects the notion that 
his role is that of a divine instrument and punctuates his exemplification of Henry 
Smith’s Satan, his Knight Marshal who with “shewes” can “slay and kill as many as he 
hated.”  But there is reason to believe in the actions that follow that, just as Smith’s 
sermon suggests, Hieronimo, satanic Knight Marshal, does indeed complete a divine 
commission.   
As Hieronimo wreaks his vengeance in accord with information that is seemingly 
heaven-sent, he explains his “justice” with reference to his murdered son whose dead 
body he hangs on the scaffold as demonstrable stage property.  He urges the Viceroy to 
sympathize with his loss, as Maus explains, 
Ranging the corpse of his socially inferior son alongside the bodies of the heirs 
apparent, Hieronimo stages and voices a radically leveling sentiment: that one 
dead child is very like another, that paternal love feels essentially the same for 
noble and commoner, that his suffering is worth as much as the suffering of 
princes. (68) 
 
Leveling certainly is part of Hieronimo’s ethical pedagogy, it may be even more 
subversive than Maus suggests.  In the masque that mirrors the real situation of Horatio’s 
demise, Hieronimo plays “Lorenzo’s part” and assigns Lorenzo his son’s part so that he 
might more easily murder Lorenzo on stage.  In the representation, then, Hieronimo 
murders his own son.  This is a leveling of a more divine sort—connecting Hieronimo 
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with Abraham who representatively sacrificed his son as a type of God who in turn 
sacrifices Jesus, the demonstrable representation of divine justice.  There is here a 
circularity of sacrifice and representation that allows each father to assume a sovereign 
role in a cycle of ethical procurement.  I do not propose that this Christian parallel is 
either intentional or even overt.  I find rather, like Barber says of another scene, that 
“…the mode of expression or embodiment seems likely to have been shaped by religious 
prototypes…” (Barber 152).  The significant point is Hieronimo’s extension of sovereign, 
even divine, authority. As Satan works from God’s commission in Smith’s configuration, 
Hieronimo may also.  And this, of course, is the compelling question of revenge tragedies 
– are revengers instruments of divine justice?   
The murderous re-enactment of his son’s brutal murder secures secures 
Hieronimo something that has been denied him since the death of his son: access to the 
King.  More specifically, access to the King’s ear, an audience with the King.  As he 
discovered in the encounter with Bazulto, words are not as effective in securing attention 
as the empathy produced in an experience of “likeness.”  The “likeness” that Hieronimo 
solicits from Castile or the Viceroy of Portugal by murdering their sons cannot be 
duplicated with the King of Spain—he is childless.  And Maus has pointed out that 
Hieronimo’s message about social leveling is not received by the King who accuses 
Hieronimo of treason.27  Hieronimo’s justice fails to achieve his empathy goal.  In what 
way can Hieronimo initiate a sense of “likeness” in the King, the preeminent arbiter of 
justice in the community?  I propose it is in mirroring to the King, precisely what the 
King presents to him: silence.  A review of the critical scene is helpful.  After the 
masque, Hieronimo provides a lengthy explanation of his vengeful motivation, claims to 
have no more to say, and rushes to hang himself.  He is prevented as his audience only 
just begins to understand that the onstage violence was real.  The King demands 
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Hieronimo speak, and Hieronimo again, this time more concisely, explains of Lorenzo 
and Balthazar’s murder of Horatio.  In response, the King asks, mysteriously, “Why 
speakest thou not?” (4.4.179).  Now the King might be asking why Hieronimo is not 
speaking at that very instant in time or the King might be wondering with this query why 
Hieronimo didn’t tell him this tale earlier.  Obviously, Hieronimo has spoken, has been 
speaking, has hardly stopped speaking, so it seems the question must be the latter 
allowing Hieronimo the opportunity to explain how access to the King was rebuffed.  But 
Hieronimo answers as if the question is the former – a query about a hardly-lapsed pause 
in speech.  “What lesser liberty can kings afford/than harmless silence?  Then afford it 
me./Sufficeth I may not, nor I will not, tell thee” (4.4.180-3).  Curious. What will he not 
tell?  Hasn’t he explained everything already? The King vows to torture Hieronimo, and 
Hieronimo says, “Thou mayest torment me…But never shalt thou force me to reveal/the 
thing which I have vowed inviolate….” (4.4.186-9).  What vow?  When did he vow 
something to be inviolate?  This scene, so perplexing to critics, affords now several 
possible interpretations. 
Why do you not speak?  Because it would reveal something I have vowed not to 
violate.  To understand what Hieronimo might consider “inviolate,” it helps to think of 
what his vengeance has revealed to be righteous: his constancy in performing the role of 
arbiter of civility, the authority he has encompassed, or the procuring of empathy.  Which 
of these things could be violated in speech?  Only empathy, which throughout the play 
arises only in silent proximal performance as exemplified in the earlier masque and the 
encounter with Bazulto.  That which Hieronimo cannot speak is the ethical imperative.  
As a sense or feeling it can only be conveyed, person-to-person, through an empathetic 
connection, a recognition of the fellow human.  As the King persists in questioning 
Hieronimo, his demands for a just explanation echo Job’s similar demands of God.  The 
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King becomes the petitioner in this reversal.  Like Job he wants to know why he and his 
kingdom suffers, but this demand for information is likewise granted only proximal 
performance in response.  Hieronimo’s assumption of divine prerogative, exercised like 
Satan’s God-given commission, depicts a subjective exchange in the social edifice: the 
King petitions; Hieronimo silences.   
Then Hieronimo bites out his tongue.  There are no stage directions indicating the 
spectacular disposition of the “bitten forth” tongue.  Evidently, Hieronimo is not 
swallowing, gagging or choking on it.  Does he hold it in his hand?  Does he wave it aloft 
in a taunt?  Is it lying impotent and vulnerable upon the floor?  Whatever the staging, the 
dismembered tongue emblematizes the play’s cogitations on ineffective speech.  There is 
no substantive agency in speech.  Speech may reveal a potential subjectivity or articulate 
ideals of sociality, but it does not secure liberty, or ethicality, or even fully reveal 
subjectivity.  Speech cannot accomplish Hieronimo’s, and by extension neither the 
community’s nor (obversely) the sovereign’s revision of social morality.  But the 
spectacle of sovereign silence in the face of manifest suffering initiates an experience of 
relational ethics that although it cannot be articulated, can be felt.  As Carla Mazzio says 
of Hamlet, Hieronimo tries to “express the horrors of inexpressibility” (213).  Mazzio too 
is concerned to demonstrate,  
how theatrical incarnations of the inarticulate—while indexing rifts in the 
production of shared meanings in the various spheres of religion, humanism, law, 
vernacularism, historiography, and print culture—worked to expose and evoke 
forms of thought and feeling otherwise obscured by the relegation of the 
inarticulate to the domain of the senseless.”28   
 
For the King, enduring Hieronimo’s silence should feel like a reversal, a parallax view of 
what it must be like to be a petitioner to a silent sovereign.  This mirroring effect is 
emphasized when Hieronimo, in a speech-act attempts to exchange his pain with the 
King’s sovereignty. 
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Hieronimio’s determination to secure vengeance through theater reveals his 
concern to engage his audience in feeling likeness.  Performance and proximity (face-to-
face) are critical for ending apathy and exciting empathy.  At the height of his grief for 
Horatio, Hieronimo seeks access to Bel-Imperia, hoping to confirm the contents of her 
accusatory letter.  Lorenzo impedes this counsel, and Hieronimo comments in an aside, 
“My grief no heart, my thoughts no tongue can tell” (3.2.67).  In context, it reads as 
another “ceaseless ‘plaint.”  Either Hieronimo’s heart is not sufficient to contain his grief, 
his tongue unable to speak his grieving thoughts, or as a comment on his barred access to 
Bel-Imperia, there is no other heart or tongue in which to confide his thoughts and 
grievances.  These figures for the impotence of speech and the loneliness of grief are 
resurrected however, immediately preceding Hieronimo’s autoglossotomy.  He says to 
the King, “Pleased with their deaths and eased with their revenge,/First take my tongue 
and afterwards my heart” (4.4.191-2).  Hieronimo is not so much relinquishing 
subjectivity here, as trying to pass his subjectivity to another.  By giving the King his 
tongue and heart, he metonymically gives the King his thoughts and feelings of grief.  As 
Hieronimo assumes the King’s role, he transfers his part to the King, reinforcing the 
suggestion that Hieronimo and the King are alike.  The gesture seems designed to elicit 
empathy, to create the subjective “likeness” upon which ethical concern depends.  His 
autoglossotomy is not so much a revocation of communicative endeavors as a rhetorical 
flourish highlighting the mutual “experience of embodiment, a ‘common human lot’” 
(Maus 69).  Hieronimo, in his face-to-face silence, represents sovereign authority to the 
King.  Like the active silence of sovereignty, Hieronimo’s mimicry of sovereign silence 
is “quiet in unquietness” as it works to restore ethicality.29 
A 1602 addition to these lines inserts ahead of “take my tongue,” the phrase, 
“Now to express the rupture of my part.”  Mazzio reads this as the “rupture of my 
  126 
part[s],” (sic) (110) expressing Hieronimo’s “surrender to (and complicity with) a world 
of fragments and self-alienation” (111).  She contrasts this “surrender” with Stoic 
philosopher Zeno’s autoglossotomy which she writes, “was universally interpreted as 
heroic” (111).  Although I certainly agree that Hieronimo’s autoglossotomy indicts 
“discursive systems” that are “impotent” and “fractured,” (110) I do not find it necessary 
to change “part” to a plural form.  It reads, in its singular form, as a relinquishing of his 
role, his part, his performance first in the sociality and then in the theatre of vengeance.  
He gives the King first his tongue so that the King may cry for justice (which he does).  
Then he gives the King his heart so that the King may feel the pain Hieronimo feels at 
Horatio’s murder.  In this reading, Hieronimo’s autoglossotomy is aligned with Zeno’s 
which, in Mazzio’s own conception, “functions to dramatize a solidarity of spirit that 
contrasts with the fragmenting and fragmentable material world” (111).  In other words, 
what does Hieronimo surrender here?  Is he giving up his resistance and reform, or is he 
giving away the pain of violent loss in an effort to secure ethical reform.  Echoing, as it 
does, the scene of barred access to Bel-Imperia, it seems plain that Hieronimo is at last 
sharing his grieving self with the king.  The manner in which he does so is designed to 
bypass the divisiveness of language, and enact a fellow feeling through mimesis.  This 
empathetic exchange can only be accomplished because Hieronimo has taken on, 
“compassed,” the King’s silence, rendering them alike.  And when the exchange is 
complete, Hieronimo commits suicide.  
Reckoning with the silent presence of being elicits a definitive reaction.  Giorgio 
Agamben articulates how Heidigger perceives of that moment of sociality, 
…in the disclosure of Dasein [being], the call (Anruf) of a Voice of conscience 
appears, and imposes a more originary comprehension (ursprunglicher Fassen) 
of this very disclosure…presented as an “existential foundation” that constitutes 
the Being as disclosure.  The voice that calls is not, however, a vocal 
offering…but is a pure “giving-to-be-understood” (zu-verstehen-geben): 
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But how are we to determine what is said (das Geredete) in this kind of 
discourse?  What does the conscious call to him to whom it appeals?  
Taken strictly, nothing….  The call dispenses with any kind of utterance.  
It does not put itself into words at all; yet it does not remain obscure and 
indefinite.  Conscious discourses solely and constantly in the mode of 
keeping silent.  In this way it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but 
forces the Dasein which has been appealed to and summoned, into its 
own silence.”30 
 
The interaction Heidigger describes here is akin to what is accomplished in theatrical 
self-silencings.  The unexpected silence of an individual issues a call to the conscious.  
Witnesses must examine their own conscious, must realize again the socially bound 
nature of their existence and its attendant imperative to right relation.  The Voice “attunes 
us (stimmt) to the terror of the abyss” (LD 60) writes Heidigger.  Listeners of the Voice, 
witnesses to self-silencing, encounter a realized subject in a singular moment, a subject 
who calls to them with Voice, but not language. This encounter creates a sort of mirror 
that elicits recognition of the social embeddedness of being.  Lacanian theory would have 
this mirrored moment function to subjectify via difference and opposition: the Other is 
not me.  But Heidigger, Agamben and especially Levinas suggest that the mirror effect, 
especially in silence, reveals an essential sameness among humanity: the Other is like 
me.31  And although that sameness functions only at a pre-lingual level, it nonetheless 
instigates ethical anxiety.  The performance of being thus takes on an experiential quality.  
The silence is an enigmatic aporia to be endured.  Without language its content is 
unspecific, mysterious.  And yet it is a moment redolent with meaning insofar as meaning 
is affirmed, as is Being and ethical obligation.   
The crucible for ethical effectiveness in self-silencing lies in performance.  To 
marshal and convey the varied meanings of silence, to elicit recognition of likeness, to 
provoke listeners of the silence to empathy and ethical contemplation, silence must be 
demonstrated.  There must in fact be an audience, or at least a witness/listener to whom 
the silence is addressed.  Judith Butler’s relevant essay on mourning and violence, 
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“Precarious Life” offers a helpful analysis of Levinasian philosophy that highlights the 
experience of the ethical in “face-to-face” encounters.32 Please permit an extended 
quotation: 
The Levinasian notion of the “face” has caused critical consternation for a long 
time.  It seems to be that the “face” of what he calls the “Other” makes an ethical 
demand upon me, and yet we do not know which demand it makes.  The “face” 
of the other cannot be read for a secret meaning, and the imperative it delivers is 
not immediately translatable into a prescription that might be linguistically 
formulated and followed.  
Levinas writes: 
The approach to the face is the most basic mode of 
responsibility…. The face is not in front of me (en face de moi), 
but above me; it is the other before death, looking through and 
exposing death.  Secondly, the face is the other who asks me not 
to let him die alone, as if to do so were to become an accomplice 
in his death.  Thus the face says to me: you shall not kill.  In the 
relation to the face I am exposed as a usurper of the place of the 
other.… 
The face is what one cannot kill, or at least it is that 
whose meaning consists in saying, ‘thou shalt not kill.’  Murder, 
it is true, is a banal fact: one can kill the Other: the ethical 
exigency is not an ontological necessity…. 
So the face, strictly speaking, does not speak, but what the face means is 
nevertheless conveyed by the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill.’  It conveys 
this commandment without precisely speaking it.  It would seem that we can use 
this biblical command to understand something of the face’s meaning, but 
something is missing here, since the “face” does not speak in the sense that the 
mouth does; the face is neither reducible to the mouth nor, indeed, to anything 
the mouth has to utter.  Someone or something else speaks when the face is 
likened to a certain kind of speech; it is a speech that does not come from a 
mouth or, if it does, has no ultimate origin or meaning there. (131-133). 
 
The “face” reveals the humanity of the Other.  The presentation of the “face,” a “figure 
for what cannot be named, an utterance that is not, strictly speaking, linguistic” (131) 
provokes in witnesses, according to Levinas, the precise ethical recognition found in self-
silencing.  In fact, we might see that self-silencing and “face-to-face” are two ways of 
discussing the same effect since Levinas goes on to link the “face-to-face” encounter with 
“the situation of discourse” (138). 
 First, the “face” conveys its meaning apart from words.  Butler writes, “The face, 
if we are to put words to its meaning, will be that for which no words really work; the 
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face seems to be a kind of sound, the sound of language evacuating its sense, the 
sonorous substratum of vocalization that precedes and limits the delivery of any semantic 
sense” (134).  Like Heidigger’s “Voice,” Levinas’s “face” is a language-less call.  
Communication is dependent not on articulation, but on a spectacle of silence.  Secondly, 
as Butler carefully demonstrates, the “face” functions only insofar as it reveals a failure 
of representation.   
 The cry that is represented through the figure of the face is one that 
confounds the senses and produces a clearly improper comparison: that cannot be 
right, for the face is not a sound.  And yet, the face can stand for the sound 
precisely because it is not the sound.  In this sense, the figure underscores the 
incommensurability of the face with whatever it represents.  Strictly speaking, 
then, the face does not represent anything, in the sense that it fails to capture and 
deliver that to which it refers. 
 For Levinas, then, the human is not represented by the face. Rather, the 
human is indirectly affirmed in that very disjunction that makes representation 
impossible, and this disjunction is conveyed in the impossible representation.  
For representation to convey the human, then, representation must not only fail, 
but it must show its failure. (PL 144) 
 
And isn’t this exactly what Hieronimo’s autoglossotomy accomplishes?  Doesn’t 
Hieronimo’s tongue show the failure of language to affirm likeness or evince ethical 
empathy or behavior?  Hieronimo explains his violence, but this does not move the King 
or the Viceroy to ethical contemplation. His performance of failed representation, his 
self-silencing, however, succeeds in humanizing, making more than an image, what is 
presented.  Butler explains the paradox:  
When we consider the ordinary ways that we think about humanization and 
dehumanization, we find the assumption that those who gain representation, 
especially self-representation, have a better chance of being humanized…Levinas 
has made clear that the face is not exclusively a human face, and yet it is a 
condition for humanization.  On the other hand, there is the use of the face, 
within the media, in order to effect a dehumanization.  It would seem that 
personification does not always humanize.” (141) 
 
Performing failed representation, as in self-silencing, succeeds in touching man’s ethical 
impulse in a way that ordinary representation does not.33  Presenting the “face,” then, or 
performing self-silencing is an effectual method of asserting one’s human-ness in a 
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manner that circumnavigates, even flouts dominating modes of representation.  It is 
eminently suited then for use as a tactic of resistance and reform against dominant power 
paradigms.  It exercises the power both to undermine reigning hegemonies, and to inspire 
the creation of alternate systems that more broadly accommodate the unrepresented.  
So does Hieronimo’s self-silencing in fact have the proposed effect on witnesses?  
After the bodies are removed, the King’s curious, concluding, remark is, “I am the next, 
the nearest, last of all.”  To what does he refer?  Death?  Certainly there is no reason he is 
the nearest person to death, and certainly he will not be the last.  Does he mean in relation 
to his bloodline or the throne?  He is apparently the last of his bloodline, but how could 
he be the “next” or “nearest”?  And he cannot be the next, nearest, or last to rise to the 
throne, because he already possesses it and it will surely pass to another eventually.  The 
line reads contemplatively, like a personal reflection about the events.  These terms of 
proximity and temporality—next, nearest, last—suggest that perhaps he has been affected 
by the circumstances and recognizes their immediacy to his own being.  Perhaps his 
conscious has been summoned.  He is the next, the nearest, and the last to receive 
Hieronimo’s lesson of empathy.  It touches him more closely than any other, because it is 
his own power reverberating in Hieronimo’s actions.  But the vagueness of the King’s 
words, their aimless signification, attenuates any meaningful ethical application.  All the 
king can express is that he feels polysemously that the events touch him.  There is no 
indication that he sees himself in Hieronimo nor any sign that he sees anything other than 
an ethical failure here.  There is no systemic resolution forthcoming.  It is as if the King 
experience Levinas’ unending constraint of responsibility for the other; he is subjectified, 
but without understanding or commitment.  For all Hieronimo’s desire to enjoy the 
sympathy of his sociality, he cannot do so if he commits the very crime of which he 
complains.  One cannot simultaneously be the murderer and the victim.  Certainly the 
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King is moved by events, and perhaps he feels some empathy or responsibility, but it is 
generalized and unspecific.  What reforms are warranted?  Hieronimo’s self-silencing 
initiated the proximal ethical anxiety in the King that it ought, but his own compromised 
authorial role deprived the feeling of a meaningful referent. 
The play further dispels any notions of social compassion that may arise from the 
pathos of Hieronimo’s circumstance with the Revenge frame.  The last lines of the play 
are given to Revenge and Don Andrea, who spend them plotting horrific eternal 
punishments for several of the characters.  In other words, Hieronimo’s performance of 
vengeance witnessed fails to induce in Andrea any fellow-feeling or sympathetic 
leanings.  On the contrary, he is as vengeful as ever.  The play’s audience, however, 
likely experiences a different reaction.  The casual cruelty of Andrea’s everlasting 
dispensations, combined with the too-tidy resolution of the subplot, cause us throughout 
the play to engage most closely with the abused Hieronimo.  Andrea’s delight in doling 
out further punishments does not erase for us the genuine pathos Hieronimo’s tale elicits; 
conversely Andrea puts us off hearing more of the already extensive bloodshed.  And 
unlike the King, we have had privileged access to, and emotionally participated in, once-
noble Hieronimo’s pitiable suffering.  Hieronimo’s self-silencing could not elicit ethical 
reform within his play, but it does reach beyond the stage and into the audience to affect 
us with an empathetic fellow-feeling, propelled by the failure of the play to demonstrate 
compassion.35   
Henry Smith wraps up his sermon expressing a concern that auditors will, upon 
their departure, resume the “bad exercises” from which they came, “…some unto the 
Tavernes, and some unto the Alehouses, and some unto Stages, and some unto 
Brothels….” (493).  He fears lest some “hath learned nothing, but goeth empty away” 
(493).  While this may be a legitimately concern preachers, Smith might have learned 
  132 
from his Bible that those who depart the much-maligned theatre are unlikely to go away 
empty.  During Job’s encounter with God, Job is directed to look upon God’s creation.  
He does so, and repents saying, “I have heard of thee by the hearing of the eare, but now 
mine eye seeth thee.  Therefore I abhorre myself, and repent in dust and ashes” (Job 42:5-
6).  Hearing words has not provided a genuine experience of God to Job.  It is in 
proximity, in the theatrical encounter, that Job is moved to experience the other in an 
ethical relation.  And yet, in a way, this experience too is a failed representation.  Job by 
no means apprehends all there is to apprehend of God.  He is not granted a beatific 
vision, but is directed only to look upon creation.  Job, like Kyd’s audience, experiences 
empathy when he fails to truly perceive the Other.  Job recognizes that his likeness to 
God is limited.  Except insofar as he is embodied (dust) and mortal (ashes), Job re-aligns 
his agency with that of God.  For Hieronimo, for Thomas Kyd, for playgoers, the issue of 
authority is not so simply resolved.  Stephen Greenblatt has suggested that Machiavelli’s 
“Discourses” “treats religion as if its primary function were not salvation but the 
achievement of civic discipline, as if its primary justification were not truth but 
expediency.”36  Likewise, for Kyd, who purportedly was tortured until he informed on 
Marlowe’s unorthodox theology, religious and civil life are inextricably bound.  As the 
imperatives of one overlap the other a tangle of authorization and obligation of a legal, 
cultural, social, familial, sovereign and personal nature indenture man to choose an action 
from within a cumbrous disarray of responsibilities and precedents.37  Faced with 
overwhelmingly complex social imperatives, one can only hope to receive compassion 
from our sociality when we inevitably fail to perform adequately. 
Although revengers notoriously outdo the crime they are avenging, our 
compassion for them centers upon their driving need to reveal injustice.  Their eagerness 
to redress crime attests to their sensitivity to the delicate balance of social relations.  
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Their desire to redeem their sociality from villainy is legible as personal heroism, 
confronting as they do malevolent powers within the community.  The Spanish Tragedy 
is a play about personal and legal justice, about jurisdictional authority and obligation, 
and about ethics and the nomos of civil life.  Is it a play about silence?  Inasmuch as the 
presiding moment of the play is Hieronimo’s lingual sparagmos—then yes, this is a play 
about the power of silence.  I hope to have offered here a reading that, if nothing else, 
takes seriously the meaning of Hieronimo’s theatrical dismemberment and its claim to 
inviolability.  This self-silencing and its empathetic aim reverberates, not only throughout 
the play, but in much of Early Modern literature.  It is not only revengers who use silence 
to engage their community in moral deliberations.  Nor is it necessary that this be a 
conscious effort on the part of the revengers for it to be effective.  Villains and tricksters 
also resort to silence, and though the purpose of their silence is self-serving, it too proves 
socially revelatory.  Women’s silence is eager not to signify, except in revealing the 
oppression at work in their silencing.  And theatrical silences that fail to resolve the tale, 
or shock or horrify the audience, elicit an empathetic feeling that is the first step toward 
ethical action.  At the threshold of language, silence which signifies holds court.  It is not 
difference which creates subjectivity in these Renaissance plays, but similarity: a likeness 
that is found in kinetic non-performance. 
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Notes to Ch. 4 “The Thing Inviolate”: Sensing Selves 
 
1 Nearly all writers address Hieronimo’s autoglossotomy, but few deal with his claim to 
preserving a “thing inviolate.”  Prominent scholars of The Spanish Tragedy who 
do not consider what is “inviolate” include Katharine Eisaman Maus, Inwardness 
and Theatre in the English Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995); and C.L. Barber, Creating Elizabethan Tragedy: The Theater of Marlowe 
and Kyd, Ed. Richard P. Wheeler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).  
Catherine Belsey, The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in 
Renaissance Drama (London: Methuen, 1985) evades the issue with “…what is 
impenetrable, unknown, unknowable is the explanation which lies beyond the 
narrative” (77).  Carla Mazzio, The Inarticulate Renaissance: Language Trouble 
in an Age of Eloquence (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 
says only that “Hieronimo believes that he bites off his tongue to protect a secret, 
but the secret is that there is no secret” (110).  This type of deflation is 
characteristic of most scholarship on the play.  All further references to these 
authors will be to these texts by page numbers. 
 
2 The felicitous phrase “contests for meaning” may be found in Belsey, p. 6. 
 
3 There are, of course, a number of ways in which scholars might explore silence.  For 
those considering Early Modern silences in a usefully general sense, see Mazzio, 
Christina Luckyj, “A moving Rhetoricke”: Gender and Silence in Early Modern 
England (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002); Mary E. Hazard, 
Elizabethan Silent Language (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000); 
Philip C. McGuire’s Speechless Dialect: Shakespeare’s Open Silences, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).  For self-silencing as Stoicism 
see Luckyj, Mazzio, “Staging the Vernacular: Language and Nation in Thomas 
Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy,” Studies in English Literature 38:2 (1998); and 
Eugene D. Hill, “Senecan and Virgilian Perspectives in The Spanish Tragedy,” 
Renaissance Historicism: Selections from English Literary Renaissance, Eds. 
Arthur F. Kinney and Dan S. Collins (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1987 ) 108-130. On the Renaissance and Stoicism, see also, Geoffrey 
Miles, Shakespeare and the Constant Romans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 
and Margaret Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009).  Also of interest is Margaret De Grazia, “Shakespeare’s View of 
Language: An Historical Perspective,” Shakespeare Quarterly, 29:3 (Summer 
1978): 374-388. 
 
4
 Miles.  For more on Renaissance self-regulation and its originating theories see Graver, 
Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame 
in Early Modern England (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993) and 
Francis Barker, The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection (London: 
Methuen, 1984).  All further references to these authors will be to these texts by 
page numbers. 
 
5Thomas Kyd, The Spanish Tragedy, English Renaissance Drama, Ed. David Bevington 
(New York: Norton, 2002) 3-73.  All further citations are to this edition of the 
text.  And, William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, 
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Ed. Sylvan Barnett (New York: Signet Classic, 1998).  All further citations are to 
this edition of the text. 
 
6
 Textual note 5 on p. 9 of the Norton edition of Kyd’s play describes the Knight 
Marshal’s position as “…a military officer and magistrate belonging to the royal 
household and acting for the Crown.”  For scholars emphasizing only 
Hieronimo’s advocate duties as Knight Marshal see Mazzio, Barber, Kevin 
Dunn, “’Action, Passion, Motion’”: The Gestural Politics of Counsel in The 
Spanish Tragedy, Renaissance Drama 31 (2002), 27-60.  Frank Ardolino, “The 
Hangman’s Noose and the Empty Box: Kyd’s use of Dramatic and Mythological 
Sources in The Spanish Tragedy (3.4-7).” Renaissance Quarterly 30 (1977) 339.  
See also Molly Smith, The Theater and the Scaffold: Death as Spectacle in The 
Spanish Tragedy, SEL 32 (1992) 217-232.  Again, I am unaware of any who 
consider the expanded duties of the Knight Marshal as described by Cowell in 
the following note. 
 
7 John Cowell, The interpreter: or Booke containing the signification of vvords wherein is 
set foorth the true meaning of all, or the most part of such words and termes, as 
are mentioned in the lawe vvriters, or statutes of this victorious and renowned 
kingdome, requiring any exposition or interpretation…(Cambridge, 1607)  Text 
Creation Partnership digital edition.  Early English Books Online.  Web.  16 June 
2011 
http://eebo.chadwyck.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/search/full_rec?SOURCE=var_s
pell.cfg&ACTION=SINGLE&ID=99844611&ECCO=N&FILE=../session/13219
97442_27627&SEARCHSCREEN=CITATIONS&DISPLAY=AUTHOR&SUB
SET=1&ENTRIES=1&HIGHLIGHT_KEYWORD=default>.  On approximately 
pg. 173 is the entry “mareshall (mariscallus)” which lists the variety of duties 
I’ve discussed here as well as in Note 9 below.   
 
8 Francis Bacon (1561-1626), A declaration of the practises & treasons attempted and 
committed by Robert late Earle of Essex and his complices, against her Maiestie 
and her kingdoms and of the proceedings as well at the arraignments & 
conuictions of the said late Earle, and his adherents, as after: together with the 
very confessions and other parts of the euidences themselues, word for word 
taken out of the originals. (London, 1601)  Text Creation Partnership digital 
edition.  Early English Books Online.  Web.  16 June 2011  < 
http://gateway.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99836190>.   
AND 
England and Wales. Sovereign (1558-1603: Elizabeth I), By the Queenes 
commaundement forasmuch as it is found by good proofe, that many persons 
which haue serued of late on the seas, in the iourney towardes Spayne and 
Portingall, in comming from Plimmouth, and other portes ... haue fallen sicke by 
the way, and diuers died as infected with the plague ... (London, 1589)  Text 
Creation Partnership digital edition.  Early English Books Online.  Web.  16 June 
2011  
<http://gateway.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:33150888> 
 
9 Cowell, and see also “marshal of the king’s house” Def. 1 and 2, Webster’s Revised 
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Unabridged Dictionary (1913) 14 June 2011 <www.dictionary.die.net> which 
also lists the more complete duties I’ve described.  For convenience, here is an 
excerpt of that entry:   
1. Originally, an officer who had the care of horses; a groom. [Obs.] 
2. An officer of high rank, charged with the arrangement of ceremonies, the 
conduct of operations, or the like; as, specifically: 
(a) One who goes before a prince to declare his coming and provide 
entertainment; a harbinger; a pursuivant. 
(b) One who regulates rank and order at a feast or any other assembly, directs the 
order of procession, and the like. 
(c) The chief officer of arms, whose duty it was, in ancient times, to regulate 
combats in the lists. 
The office of Knight Marshal was dissolved in 1840. 
 
10 Dunn sees the dumb show reflecting Hieronimo’s desire for personal sovereignty.  For 
another class reading of the dumb show, see James R. Siemon, “Sporting Kyd,” 
English Literary Renaissance 24 (1994): 553-82.  In this article Siemon also 
argues that Hieronimo’s dismemberment turns silence against class dominance, a 
reading sympathetically related to my own. 
 
11 Deborah Shuger “Civility and Censorship in Early Modern England,” Censorship and 
Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation, Ed. Robert C. Post (Los Angeles: 
Getty Research Institute Publications and Exhibitions Program, 1995), 89-110.  
Shuger’s analysis demonstrates that rather than suppressing political polemics or 
monarchical disparagement, Early Modern censorship was far more concerned 
with inhibiting and correcting the slander and libel of its citizenry.  See also 
Dunn, “’Action, Passion, Motion,’” addresses expectations of honesty in his 
discussion of the councilor and the “counselor’s ethic of bodily transparency” 
(36). 
 
12 Henry Smith (1550-1592?), “Satan’s Compassing the Earth,” The Sermons of Master 
Henry Smith Gathered Into One Volume.  Printed According to his Corrected 
Copies in His Lifetime.  Whereunto is Added, God’s Arrow Against Atheists. 
(1607) (Early English Books Online Editions: ProQuest) Facscimile 
Reproduction.  All further references are to this edition.  This sermon was 
published individually in (London, [Imprint - Thomas Scarlet] 1592).  I am using 
modern orthography, but have preserved original spelling. 
 
13 The Geneva Bible: A Facsimile of the 1560 Edition, Intro. By Lloyd E. Berry 
(Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc, 1969).  2nd Printing, 2007.  All further 
references are to this edition.  I am using modern orthography but have preserved 
original spelling here too. 
 
14
 R. B. Jenkins, Henry Smith: England’s Silver-Tongued Preacher (Macon: Mercer 
University Press, 1983): 14.  See also John L. Lievsay, “Silver-Tongued Smith, 
Paragon of Elizabethan Preachers,” Huntington Library Quarterly 11:1 
(November 1947): 13-36. 
 
15 Arthur Freeman, Thomas Kyd: Facts and Problems (London: Clarendon Press Oxford, 
1967): 65-69.  For more on Nashe and his social sphere including the Knight 
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Marshal (and Governor of the Isle of Wight) George Carey, see C. G. Harlow, 
“Nashe’s Visit to the Isle of Wight and His Publications of 1592-4,” Review of 
English Studies: A Quarterly Journal of English Literature and the English 
Language 14:55 (August 1963): 225-242; and E.D. Mackerness, “Thomas Nashe 
and William Cotton,” Review of English Studies: A Quarterly Journal of English 
Literature and the English Language 25:100 (October 1949): 342-346. 
 
16Both Eugene D. Hill, “Senecan and Virgilian Perspectives in The Spanish Tragedy” and 
Frank Ardolino, Thomas Kyd’s Mystery Play: Myth and Ritual in the Spanish 
Tragedy (New York: Peter Lang, 1985) read the play as containing a pro-English, 
anti-continental sentiment.  
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